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Pharmaceutical Arbitrage: Balancing Access and
Innovation in International Prescription Drug Markets
Kevin Outterson, J.D., LL.M.*

INTRODUCTION
The price of prescription drugs lies at the heart of two major public
health issues: distributing antiretroviral medicines for use against the
global AIDS epidemic and purchasing medications from Canada by U.S.
consumers using the Internet. Both situations highlight the need to reduce
financial barriers to access to medications, while maintaining incentives to
promote pharmaceutical innovation.
For better or worse, the World Trade Organization’s (WTO)
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
1
2
(TRIPS) is a global nexus for drug access issues. In TRIPS-related
* Associate Professor of Law, West Virginia University College of Law. Special thanks
to the American Society of Law, Medicine & Ethics September 2003 Health Law Young
Scholars Workshop and the West Virginia University College of Law Faculty Workshop for
helpful comments and suggestions. This research was supported by a Hodges Research
Grant from the West Virginia College of Law. An early draft of this Article was prepared
during my tenure as a Visiting Fellow at the Lauterpacht Research Centre for International
Law at the University of Cambridge. Helpful comments were received from many people,
including Frances Miller, Ben Moulton, Charity Scott, Ana Iltis, Timothy D. McBride,
Thomas Greaney, Jesse Goldner, Sidney Watson, Sandra Johnson, Nicolas Terry, Aidan
Hollis, and Andrew Farlow, as well as from participants at the New Economic Windows 2004
conference in Salerno, the symposium at the University of Connecticut School of Law
(October 2004), The Canadian Conference on International Health (October 2004), and
the Global Forum for Health Research Forum 8 Conference in Mexico City (November
2004).
1. See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, art.
27.1, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS–RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994)
[hereinafter TRIPS or TRIPS Agreement]. The United States implemented the WTO
agreements in the Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809
(1994).
2. The story of how the WTO TRIPS Agreement became the de facto forum for these
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discussions, two sets of arguments are usually forwarded. Some argue that
pharmaceutical prices are necessarily high because innovation is
3
expensive. They posit that the research and development (R&D)
enterprise must be nurtured by high prices to yield the next generation of
4
breakthrough therapies. Others counter that much of the profits going to
5
pharmaceutical companies are used for marketing and other expenses

issues has been told by many authors. Among the best accounts are books by Peter Drahos
and John Braithwaite, Susan Sell, and an article by Laurence Helfer. PETER DRAHOS WITH
JOHN BRAITHWAITE, INFORMATION FEUDALISM: WHO OWNS THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY? (2002);
SUSAN K. SELL, POWER AND IDEAS: NORTH-SOUTH POLITICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND
ANTITRUST (1998); SUSAN K. SELL, PRIVATE POWER, PUBLIC LAW: THE GLOBALIZATION OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS (2003); Laurence R. Helfer, Regime Shifting: The TRIPS
Agreement and New Dynamics of International Intellectual Property Lawmaking, 29 YALE J. INT’L L.
1 (2004).
3. See, e.g., Harvey E. Bale Jr., Patents, Patients and Developing Countries: Access, Innovation
and the Political Dimensions of Trade Policy, in THE ECONOMICS OF ESSENTIAL MEDICINES 100,
102-04 (Brigitte Granville ed., 2002) [hereinafter ECONOMICS OF ESSENTIAL MEDICINES]. Dr.
Bale is the Director-General of the International Federation of Pharmaceutical
Manufacturers Association.
4. ANDY SCHNEIDER, TAXPAYERS AGAINST FRAUD EDUCATION FUND, REDUCING MEDICARE
AND MEDICAID FRAUD BY DRUG MANUFACTURERS: THE ROLE OF THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT 47
(2003) (“Pharmaceutical manufacturers have long maintained that government price
controls will thwart the development of vital new drugs with the potential to cure diseases
and relieve human suffering. The desired alternative, they argue, is a vigorous free market,
with prices set through negotiations between buyers and sellers. For this market to work
effectively, manufacturers contend, they must retain the right to keep their prices
confidential from competitors.”).
5. In this Article, the terms “pharmaceutical companies” and “PhRMA companies”
refer to the research-based pharmaceutical companies that are members of the PhRMA
trade association. Pharmaceutical companies have traditionally been categorized as either
research companies (e.g., Pfizer, Merck) or generic companies without significant research
programs (e.g., Mylan Labs, Cipla Ltd.). The United States trade association of research
pharmaceutical companies is the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America
(PhRMA). See Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America, at http://www.
phrma.org (last visited Oct. 20, 2004). The international trade association of PhRMA
company groups is the International Federation of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers
Associations (IFPMA). See International Federation of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers, at
http://www.ifpma.org (last visited Oct. 20, 2004). Generic drug companies have their own
trade associations, such as GPhA, at http://www.gphaonline.com (last visited Oct. 20,
2004). In recent years, these distinctions have blurred as research companies have invested
in generic subsidiaries and as generic companies have begun substantial research programs.
It may sometimes be more accurate to describe research or generic lines of business, rather
than companies per se.
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6

rather than for R&D and that without affordable access, innovation is a
7
cruel taunt. New wonder drugs will not improve health unless patients are
actually able to receive them. A pill you cannot afford is neither safe nor
effective. Medicines, according to this argument, are not normal market
8
goods to be distributed primarily to the wealthy.
Nowhere are the arguments for the equitable distribution of
medicines made with more force than in the AIDS treatment crisis.
Differential pricing is one response to the tension between innovation and
access with regard to AIDS medications: It permits antiretroviral drugs to
be sold cheaply or donated in low income countries, while maintaining
9
high prices in markets like the United States. In theory, high prices in
high income countries can support innovation, while lower prices in low
income countries improve access. However, differences in pricing—and
thus opportunities for arbitrage—do not always reflect direct or voluntary
10
efforts to facilitate access in developing countries; they may also result
from diverse systems of government regulation and intervention and
corporate efforts to maximize profit. The price of drugs is affected by
domestic intellectual property (IP) laws, pharmaceutical reimbursement
systems, and other legal systems specific to each country. As a result, for
example, patented pills in Australia are often cheaper than their
equivalents in Canada, which are in turn often cheaper than those in the
United States. These pricing gaps create the demand for cross-border
pharmaceutical parallel trade, or pharmaceutical arbitrage. It is alleged
that if such trade is left unchecked, it will significantly reduce the financial
gains reaped in certain countries, most prominently the United States,

6. See, e.g., Marcia Angell, The Truth About Drug Companies, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, July 15,
2004, at 51.
7. See, e.g., Ellen ‘t Hoen, TRIPS, Pharmaceutical Patents, and Access to Essential Medicines:
A Long Way from Seattle to Doha, 3 CHI. J. INT’L L. 27, 29-30 (2002).
8. MÉDECINS SANS FRONTIÈRES, MSF CAMPAIGN BROCHURE 5 (2004), http://www.access
med-msf.org/documents/campaignbrochure2004.pdf (“Medicines aren’t just any
consumer goods.”).
9. A joint workshop was conducted in 2001 on differential pricing for essential drugs
by the World Health Organization and the World Trade Organization, with substantial
participation from global drug companies. The final report is published as WORLD HEALTH
ORG., REPORT OF THE WORKSHOP ON DIFFERENTIAL PRICING AND FINANCING OF ESSENTIAL
DRUGS: A WHO/WTO SECRETARIAT WORKSHOP (2001), http://whqlibdoc.who.int/hq/
2001/a73725.pdf. A more concise summary of the final report was published in 2002.
WHO-WTO, Differential Pricing and the Financing of Essential Drugs, in ECONOMICS OF
ESSENTIAL MEDICINES, supra note 3, at 209-31.
10. This is sometimes referred to in this Article as voluntary differential pricing.
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which provide financial support for global R&D innovation and, thus,
may undermine voluntary differential pricing schemes (e.g., AIDS
12
initiatives) that benefit low income countries. So long as R&D costs
13
continue to be partially funded by sales revenues, the conventional
wisdom holds that pharmaceutical arbitrage is a major threat to both
differential pricing and innovation. Preventing pharmaceutical arbitrage
from low income markets into high income markets is generally viewed as
the linchpin of this analysis.
Thus, in the context of differential pricing, pharmaceutical arbitrage is
becoming an increasingly prominent subject of debate; in particular, fear
of arbitrage is being used to justify expanding pharmaceutical IP rights and
14
related powers of appropriation. This Article explores key functions of
pharmaceutical arbitrage, including its impact on access and innovation
and its implications for the implementation of the TRIPS Agreement and
other government interventions affecting pharmaceutical prices and
distribution.
Part I of the Article establishes a theoretical framework for
understanding pharmaceutical markets and innovation, using the heuristic
15
device of optimal pharmaceutical rents to explore pharmaceutical arbitrage.
11. Tom Blackwell, Canada’s Drug Pricing Unfair, U.S. Alleges: Pharma Companies Back Plan
To Restrict Cross-Border Sales, NAT’L POST (TORONTO), May 3, 2004, at A6; Gardiner Harris,
Cheap Drugs from Canada: Another Political Hot Potato, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2003, at C1. But see
ALAN SAGER & DEBORAH SOCOLAR, DO DRUG MAKERS LOSE MONEY ON CANADIAN IMPORTS?
(Boston Univ. Sch. of Pub. Health, Data Brief No. 6, 2004), http://www.healthreform
program.org.
12. PATRICIA M. DANZON & ADRIAN TOWSE, DIFFERENTIAL PRICING FOR PHARMACEUTICALS:
RECONCILING ACCESS, R&D AND PATENTS 28-29 (AEI-Brookings Joint Ctr. for Regulatory
Studies, Working Paper No. 03-7, 2003).
13. A prominent alternative formulation would be the Hubbard-Love R&D Treaty,
which does not rely on retail sales to recover R&D costs. Tim Hubbard, Alternatives to the
Price System, Presentation at Columbia University (Dec. 4, 2003), at http://www.
earthinstitute.columbia.edu/cgsd/accesstomedicines_papers.html; James Love, A New
Trade Framework for Global Healthcare R&D, Presentation at Columbia University (Dec. 4,
2003), at http://www.earthinstitute.columbia.edu/cgsd/accesstomedicines_papers.html.
14. Powers of appropriation are those mechanisms, including legal rights and
entitlements, that allow individuals or entities to control the distribution of (and thus to
capture) the value created. See, e.g., David Ellerman, Introduction to Property Theory (Apr.
2004) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Yale Journal of Health Policy, Law, and
Ethics), http://www.economics.ucr.edu/seminars/spring04/Intro-to-Prop-Theory.pdf .
15. In this Article, the term rents is generally used in lieu of patent rents because in
pharmaceutical markets, many legal tools are utilized to make returns on investment
appropriable to the innovator in addition to patent law. See infra Section I.C. The phrase
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In the absence of definitive data on pharmaceutical R&D, the heuristic can
offer a guide to policymakers attempting to balance access and innovation.
Part II of the Article applies this framework to two situations: the global
pricing of antiretroviral drugs and the issue of Canadian-U.S. cross-border
arbitrage.
The primary conclusions of this Article fall into two clusters. First, the
heuristic indicates that several forms of pharmaceutical arbitrage are
beneficial, delivering lower prices to consumers without harming
innovation. Arbitrage within and between high income markets, such as
the Canadian Internet sales to the United States, will not harm innovation
if pharmaceutical rents remain supra-optimal. Pharmaceutical industry
claims of sub-optimality must be backed with full transparency to allow for
public evaluation of pricing, production cost, and profitability data
throughout the world.
More broadly, the heuristic indicates that optimal economic incentives
for innovation can be maintained while providing low income populations
with greatly expanded access to patented medicines. Unlike physical
16
property, pharmaceutical innovation is generally nonrival. Therefore, in
markets which are unlikely to contribute importantly to global
pharmaceutical rents, the shackles of intellectual property law and other
forms of appropriation are both unnecessary and dangerous; such laws
should be set aside in these circumstances, permitting the broadest
possible dissemination of pharmaceutical innovation. Practical experience
suggests that voluntary differential pricing is unlikely to deliver needed
17
medications at the lowest possible marginal cost. Low transaction cost
compulsory licenses are preferable and are consistent with the needs for
18
innovation.
Furthermore, while much of the current debate is focused on AIDS
(and to a lesser extent on tuberculosis and malaria), the analysis in this
Article is not limited to these conditions. Consistent with global optimal
pharmaceutical rents, access can be expanded to all categories of global
diseases, including cancer and heart disease, without damaging innovation.

pharmaceutical rents is thus meant to capture all of the various ways, including regulationbased market exclusivity, in which pharmaceutical innovators appropriate rents. When the
term patent rents is used herein, the narrower meaning is intended.
16. Nonrival goods can be utilized simultaneously by multiple users without risk of
exhaustion. See JOHN B. TAYLOR & IMAD MOOSA, MACROECONOMICS (2d ed. 2002). For further
discussion of this term, see infra text accompanying note 24.
17. See infra note 151 and accompanying text.
18. The need to improve compulsory licensing procedures is discussed in Part II.
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In the second cluster of conclusions, I determine that the threat of
pharmaceutical arbitrage is overstated and rarely observed empirically.
This Article describes the legal and commercial frameworks which
generally obstruct arbitrage, and argues that the most dangerous threat to
innovation and public health comes from counterfeit medications, not
from arbitrage. Resources now being expended to limit diversion in donor
programs and differential pricing schemes could be more profitably
reallocated to anti-counterfeiting initiatives within high income markets. A
prime example of a misdirected anti-arbitrage effort is the initiative within
the President’s Emergency Plan for HIV/AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) to
establish its own supply chain and procurement policies.
I. THE THEORY OF PHARMACEUTICAL ARBITRAGE
A. The Innovation Theory of IP Law
From ancient times, law and social conventions have supported the
right to exclude—a fundamental component of the concept of personal
19
and real property. Persons investing in the production of goods are able
to reap a reward for their efforts because, in part, the law creates a
property right in the goods produced. This property right is somewhat
exclusive, meaning that other persons cannot take the property without
20
consent, due process, or some important public policy. In the language of
21
economics, goods and services are “appropriable.” At common law,
22
knowledge was not considered personal property, perhaps because the

19. See, e.g., Exodus 20:15 (NRSV) (“You shall not steal.”). The right to exclude others
from an individual’s or group’s real property developed much later and is not yet fully
ascendant in some communities.
20. In physical property, the right to exclude is subject to many exceptions and
conditions; critiques of analogies to intellectual property are yielding some interesting
research. See, e.g., MARK A. LEMLEY, PROPERTY, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, AND FREE RIDING 3-17
(John M. Olin Program in Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 291, 2004); STEWART E. STERK,
WHAT’S IN A NAME? THE TROUBLESOME ANALOGIES BETWEEN REAL AND INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY 1-3 (Jacob Burns Inst. for Advanced Legal Studies, Benjamin N. Cardozo Sch. of
Law, Working Paper No. 88, 2004).
21. Use of the term “appropriable” can be found in an array of works. See, e.g., James J.
Anton & Dennis A. Yao, Expropriation and Inventions: Appropriable Rents in the Absence of
Property Rights, 84 AM. ECON. REV. 190 (1994).
22. See, e.g., Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 657 (1834). The first English
copyright statute was the Statute of Anne, 8 Ann., c. 19 (1710), and the first English
“patent” statute was the Statute of Monopolies, 21 Jac. 1, c. 3 (1624). See also Carle Hesse,

198

193 ART_OUTTERSONV5

12/25/2004 4:45 PM

PHARMACEUTICAL ARBITRAGE

use of information is subject to at least two peculiar characteristics. First,
knowledge is generally inappropriable or nonexcludible: It is typically
more difficult to exclude other persons from using knowledge than
23
physical property. Second, knowledge is nonrival: While physical goods
like corn or wheat are exhausted when used, knowledge may be used
24
without exhaustion.
The nonrival nature of knowledge permits its widest possible
25
dissemination without creating shortages, a potential boon for humanity.
But, the fly in the ointment is appropriation. If homo econimus understands
that the fruits of research will not be appropriable, then the market offers
no financial incentive to innovate. Others will gladly use the innovation
without compensating the innovator. The economic model predicts that
when the innovator cannot capture the positive externality (or consumer
surplus), the incentive to innovate is undermined.
However, this model is overly pessimistic. Inventive knowledge grew in
the centuries prior to the adoption of patent law; important books were

The Rise of Intellectual Property, 700 B.C. – A.D. 2000: An Idea in the Balance, DAEDALUS, Spring
2002, at 26-45 (tracing the epistemological foundations of intellectual property). The
innovation theory is not the sole justification for patent law, but it is the dominant one in
Anglo-American jurisprudence. Another possible ground for patent law is the contract or
disclosure theory, which posits that patents are socially preferable over trade secrets due to
the socially useful disclosure function. See Vincenzo Denicolo & Luigi Alberto Franzoni, The
Contract Theory of Patents, 23 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 365, 366-68 (2004). In pharmaceuticals,
the marketing approval process requires disclosure in any event, making the contract
theory less applicable.
23. This Article uses the terms inappropriable and nonexcludible interchangeably.
24. While knowledge is not destroyed through use, it may lose value because it is
inappropriable. For example, market-moving financial information loses its value quickly,
particularly as market participants act on the information. This is a function of
inappropriability, rather than exhaustion or rivalry. From a societal perspective, knowledge
does not lose value through use, but adds to the public domain.
25. The point is occasionally overlooked. In his critique of the consequences of the
TRIPS Agreement, for example, Alan Sykes underemphasizes the nonrival nature of
pharmaceutical patents by analogizing compulsory licensure to physical expropriation. Alan
O. Sykes, TRIPS, Pharmaceuticals, Developing Countries, and the Doha “Solution,” 3 CHI. J. INT’L
L. 47, 56 (2002); see also William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Indefinitely Renewable
Copyright, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 471, 484-86 (2003) (arguing that some forms of IP are rival,
particularly trademarks and personal likenesses). Trademarks and personal likenesses
indicate origin rather than being knowledge per se. Pharmaceutical knowledge is nonrival
in the classic sense, although nonrival use will certainly undercut monopoly pricing and
affect ex ante innovation incentives.
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26

written before the Statute of Anne. This can at least be partially explained
by non-economic motives for research, such as curiosity or personal
27
achievement. In most industries, patents play a relatively minor role in
28
promoting innovation.
Nevertheless, pharmaceutical research companies strongly embrace
29
this neo-classical innovation model. They argue that without IP laws first
26. The British Statute of Anne is considered the first copyright law. Statute of Anne,
1710, 8 Ann., c. 19 (Eng.). Today’s industrialized countries are relatively recent converts to
the cause of strong IP laws. DRAHOS WITH BRAITHWAITE, supra note 2, at 29-38.
27. The open source movement in science is built upon such factors, as articulated by
several leading scientists. Tim Hubbard & James Love, Medicines Without Barriers: From the
Human Genome Project to Open Development Models for Medical R&D, NEW SCIENTIST, June 14,
2003, at 29; Stephen M. Maurer et al., Finding Cures for Tropical Diseases: Is Open Source an
Answer?, in BIOTECHNOLOGY: ESSAYS FROM ITS HEARTLAND 33-37 (Lynn Yarris ed., 2004),
http://www.salilab.org/publications; Sir John Sulston, Open and Collaborative Movements
in Science, Presentation at the Trans-Atlantic Consumer Dialogue Future of WIPO
Workshop, Geneva (Sept. 13, 2004).
28. For most industries, it appears that patents play a relatively modest role in making
invention non-appropriable by free riders. See, e.g., ASHISH ARORA ET AL., R&D AND THE
PATENT PREMIUM 4, 34-35 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 9431, 2003)
(“Empirical work also suggests that the inducement provided by patents for innovation is
small.”); WESLEY M. COHEN ET AL., PROTECTING THEIR INTELLECTUAL ASSETS: APPROPRIABILITY
CONDITIONS AND WHY U.S. MANUFACTURING FIRMS PATENT (OR NOT) 2, 24-25 (Nat’l Bureau of
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. W7552, 2000) (finding that forty years of empirical
data demonstrates that patents do not improve innovation, with exceptions in
pharmaceuticals, and concluding that patents are not the most significant mechanisms for
appropriating returns to innovation in most industries, with secrecy, lead time, and
complimentary capabilities leading); Richard C. Levin et al., Appropriating the Returns from
Industrial Research and Development, in 3 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 783
(Martin Neil Baily & Clifford Winston eds., 1987); Richard C. Levin, A New Look at the Patent
System, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 199, 200-01 (1986); Edwin J. Mansfield, Patents and Innovation: An
Empirical Study, 32 MGMT. SCI. 173 (1986). In pharmaceuticals, secrecy is not an option with
the public drug application process, and the evidence strongly suggests a link between
patents and innovation. ARORA ET AL., supra, at 4-5, 35. Arora’s study found a significant
patent premium (i.e., a positive return on investment), particularly in biotechnology,
medical instruments, and drugs. Id. at 30, 34-35.
29. One prominent source on R&D expenditures by PhRMA companies is Joseph A.
DiMasi et al., The Price of Innovation: New Estimates of Drug Development Costs, 22 J. HEALTH
ECON. 151 (2003). These claims are defended vigorously by PhRMA and its members. See,
e.g., ERNST & YOUNG LLP, PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY R&D COSTS: KEY FINDINGS ABOUT THE
PUBLIC CITIZEN REPORT (2001), http://www.phrma.org/mediaroom/press/release//200108-11.277.pdf; Sidney Taurel, Hands Off My Industry, WALL. ST. J., Nov. 3, 2003, at A14.
Sidney Taurel is the president, chairman, and chief executive officer of Eli Lilly.
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movers would incur all research costs (including failed programs), while
free riders (subsequent movers such as generic drug companies) would
benefit from significantly lower cost structures.
30
IP law offers an allegedly second-best solution to this impasse—the
Constitution’s favorite monopolies “promote the progress of science and
useful arts, by securing for limited times, to authors and inventors the
31
exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries.” Currently,
under U.S. federal law and the TRIPS Agreement, the patent period is not
32
less than twenty years after filing.
The social costs of making pharmaceutical knowledge appropriable
are generally three-fold. First, the cumulative effect of these laws allows the

30. See, e.g., TOMAS J. PHILIPSON & STÉPHANE MECHOULAN, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY &
EXTERNAL CONSUMPTION EFFECTS: GENERALIZATIONS FROM PHARMACEUTICAL MARKETS 3 (Nat’l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 9598, 2003) (“In the private case, it is wellunderstood that efficient competition ex-post leads to insufficient R&D incentives ex-ante,
which is of course the common second-best rationale for patents.”); id. at 8, 14-15. For a
timely recognition that a bare patent does not equal the clear right to exclude, see Mark A.
Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Probabilistic Patents, J. ECON. PERSP. (forthcoming 2004) (manuscript
at 19, on file with author). Lemley and Shapiro’s analysis is not specific to pharmaceuticals,
where multiple patents and other appropriation strategies heighten the degree of
exclusion. See infra Part I.
31. U.S. CONST. art. I., § 8, cl. 8. Of course, a bare patent does not grant market power if
the invention is unimportant or easily substitutable. Kenneth W. Dam, The Economic
Underpinnings of Patent Law, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 247-51 (1994). Pharmaceutical patents of
blockbuster drugs are a strong case of patents creating market power and may be more
appropriately denominated as a monopoly. The pharmaceutical industry eschews the
monopoly label, but nevertheless defends the patent system as essential to encourage R&D.
One cannot have it both ways.
32. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2000); TRIPS, supra note 1, art. 33. TRIPS permitted many
developing countries to implement on a delayed basis. TRIPS, supra note 1, arts. 65-66.
After extensions, most developing countries must implement the TRIPS Agreement by
January 1, 2005, but the thirty “least developed countries” may defer full implementation
for pharmaceutical products until 2016. Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health,
Doha WTO Ministerial 2001, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2, ¶ 7 (Nov. 20, 2001) [hereinafter Doha
Declaration on TRIPS]. Despite these concessions, all but three of Africa’s Least Developed
Countries (LDCs) have already adopted patent laws for pharmaceuticals. PHIL THORPE,
STUDY ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE TRIPS AGREEMENT BY DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 1
(Comm. on Intellectual Prop. Rights, Study Paper 7 (circa 2004). TRIPS merely sets
minimum periods of IP protection; the United States can still unilaterally extend patent
protection, and has done so with copyright. WTO Members are also free to negotiate socalled “TRIPS-plus” agreements with additional provisions requiring protections in excess
of the TRIPS Agreement’s minimum standards.
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innovator to charge a higher price under monopolistic conditions. James
Love, Director of the Center for Consumer Project on Technology,
33
estimates the deadweight cost at $400 billion per year. Second, these
higher prices hinder medical access, directly impacting the health of many
34
low income people globally. Finally and most generally, appropriation, by
necessity, delays the entry of knowledge into the public domain and thus
35
may hinder cumulative innovation.
The perceived tension between the development and dissemination of
knowledge permeates the most compelling issues in pharmaceutical IP
36
37
38
policy. Patent doctrines such as scope, experimental use, and fair use
are also battlegrounds in the struggle between innovation and the public
39
domain. This Article locates additional laws in the policy battleground as
well. If too many laws support appropriation (i.e., excessive IP rights and
other excessive restrictions on nonrival use), the system needlessly raises
40
costs and restricts access to important pharmaceuticals. Too few might
throttle the R&D enterprise, and society might forgo valuable qualitative
improvements. It is far from clear that current policy strikes an appropriate
balance. At the celebration of the tenth anniversary of the TRIPS
33. James Love, Statement of Essential Inventions, Inc. to the Commission on
Intellectual Property Rights, Innovation and Public Health (Apr. 5, 2004).
34. See infra Subsection II.A.1.
35. See infra notes 130-131 and accompanying text.
36. Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90
COLUM. L. REV. 839 (1990) (examining the potential role of patent breadth in fine tuning
the efficiency of the patent system). Many economic studies examine elements of this
question. See, e.g., WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, INVENTION, GROWTH, AND WELFARE: A THEORETICAL
TREATMENT OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 70-90 (1969) [hereinafter NORDHAUS, INVENTION,
GROWTH & WELFARE]; William D. Nordhaus, The Optimum Life of a Patent: Reply, 62 AM.
ECON. REV. 428 (1972) [hereinafter Nordhaus, The Optimum Life of a Patent]; F.M. Scherer,
Nordhaus’ Theory of Optimal Patent Life: A Geometric Reinterpretation, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 422-27
(1972) [hereinafter Scherer, Optimal Patent Life]. For a recent example, see PHILIPSON &
MECHOULAN, supra note 30, at 8-13.
37. Rebecca Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and Experimental
Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017 (1989); Rebecca Eisenberg, Proprietary Rights and the Norms of
Science in Biotechnology Research, 97 YALE L.J. 177 (1987).
38. Maureen A. O’Rourke, Toward a Doctrine of Fair Use in Patent Law, 100 COLUM. L.
REV. 1177 (2000).
39. Dam, supra note 31, at 261-68.
40. This point assumes that increased consumption of patented pharmaceuticals creates
net positive externalities, i.e. that society benefits from increased access and consumption
of the drug. PHILIPSON & MECHOULAN, supra note 30, at 9.
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Agreement, Pascal Lamy, Director of DG-Trade, noted:
IPRs are justified by their societal purpose: they constitute a public policy
tool to encourage innovation and creativity. These are the ends, and the
patents and copyrights granted to innovators and creators are the means
to achieve it. But the hierarchy of ends and means does not end here.
Indeed, the encouragement of innovation and creativity is itself serving
higher purposes: economic, social and cultural development that should
benefit all.
So, international intellectual property policy is a question of striking the
right balance between private interests, their public policy objective
(access to knowledge) and other public goods. Should this
public/private bargain be struck in the same way in all WTO Members?
Not necessarily. Here the level of development and the national public
41
policy objectives come into play.

B. Differential Pricing and Pharmaceutical Arbitrage
1. Differential Pricing
In simple economic models, goods are sold at a single market-clearing
price. In reality, clever selling firms realize that some customers will pay
more than the market-clearing price. The selling firm increases its profit by
selling each item at the highest price each particular buyer will pay. The
economic literature identifies this process as price discrimination, which is
42
synonymous with differential pricing for our purposes.
Indeed, differential pricing is common: The same product is
43
frequently sold at different net prices to various buyers. The seller charges

41. Pascal Lamy, The TRIPs Agreement 10 Years On, Speech to the International
Conference on the 10th Anniversary of the WTO TRIPs Agreement (June 23, 2004),
http://europa.eu.int/comm/commissioners/lamy/speeches_articles/spla233_en.htm.
42. Price discrimination is the term generally utilized in the economic literature but
should not be confused with price discrimination under the Robinson-Patman Act, 15
U.S.C. §§ 13-13b, 21a (2000). This Article follows the usage most common in the essential
medicines literature: differential pricing. Tiered pricing, equity pricing, and price
segmentation are other terms occasionally used for pharmaceutical differential pricing. See,
e.g., DG TRADE, EUROPEAN UNION, TIERED PRICING FOR MEDICINES EXPORTED TO DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES, MEASURES TO PREVENT THEIR RE-IMPORTATION INTO THE EC MARKET AND TARIFFS
IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (EU Working Document, 2002).
43. This particular definition is found in LOUIS PHILIPS, THE ECONOMICS OF PRICE
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44

what each market segment will bear. A selling firm might attempt to
differentiate its prices on an individual sale basis, a pure form of
45
differential pricing which Pigou labeled first-degree price discrimination.
First-degree price discrimination is also known as perfect price
discrimination, since it fully extracts all consumer surplus for the benefit of
46
the producer. In the case of pharmaceuticals, this would provide cash
flow for innovation but would impair access through higher consumer
cost. In reality, transaction costs almost always make first-degree
differential pricing untenable: The seller’s marginal costs of collecting and
understanding all of the relevant factors for each buyer usually outweigh
47
the gains in marginal revenue. If the number of market segments is kept
relatively small, however, the marginal revenue may exceed the marginal
48
cost, resulting in second- or third-degree price discrimination. In seconddegree price discrimination, purchasers segment themselves into price
levels. For example, railroad passengers choose either first, second, or
third class seats and coupon clippers segment themselves into distinct
markets. In third-degree price discrimination, the producer segments the
market, generally using monopolistic power to distinguish the different
prices customers are willing to pay. Global sales of patented
pharmaceuticals offer examples of both second- and third-degree price
49
discrimination.
DISCRIMINATION 6, 17 (1983).
44. The airline industry provides an oft-cited example. On almost every flight,
passengers will have paid many different prices for the same service. The market has been
segmented into multiple buyer groups, including business travelers, vacation travelers,
frequent flyers, and last minute purchasers. See, e.g., ERNST R. BERNDT, AM. ENTERPRISE INST.
FOR PUB. POLICY RESEARCH, UNIFORM PHARMACEUTICAL PRICING: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 5-6,
9-10 (1994). However, it is worth noting that some, like Louis Philips, argue that the airline
example is not technically an example of price discrimination, concluding that reserving a
seat weeks in advance and buying a last minute ticket are different services. PHILIPS, supra
note 43, at 9.
45. The classic description of first-, second-, and third-degree price discrimination is
found in ARTHUR CECIL PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 321-47 (4th ed. 1920). A helpful
summary of Pigouvian price discrimination may be found in PHILIPS, supra note 43, at 11-14.
46. It is perfect from the perspective of the selling firm, rather than the consumer.
PHILIPS, supra note 43, at 158.
47. PIGOU, supra note 45, at 280.
48. See PIGOU, supra note 45; PHILIPS, supra note 43, at 12-13.
49. Examples of second-degree price discrimination include consumer selection of
branded or unbranded drugs, the opportunity to apply for patient assistance programs, and
monopsonistic price controls. Examples of third-degree price discrimination include
voluntary differential pricing programs by manufacturers.
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The primary focus of this Article is third-degree price discrimination,
although I typically employ the more general term, differential pricing.
The term “voluntary differential pricing” in this Article refers specifically to
third-degree price discrimination, as distinguished from second-degree
price discrimination such as price controls imposed by monopsonistic
payor governments.
50
Differential pricing is endemic to pharmaceutical markets.
Pharmaceutical companies segment markets for differential pricing
purposes, generally along efficient boundaries such as political borders or
payor classes, with the support of legal institutions. Voluntary differential
51
pricing exists among different countries and among different buyers or
52
payor classes within countries. Second-degree differential pricing occurs
53
when price controls are imposed.
2. Pharmaceutical Arbitrage
Pharmaceutical arbitrage is the theoretical nemesis of differential
54
pricing. While differential pricing assumes that the first purchaser is the

50. This is true, at least, in recent years. See infra Part II. But at least one Wall Street
Journal editor is calling on PhRMA companies to abandon voluntary price discrimination
for a single price in all developed countries. See Holman W. Jenkins Jr., Two CEOs, Two
Trials, WALL ST. J., July 14, 2004, at A15 (“A better idea would be for Pfizer and fellow drug
makers to publish and stick to a single price at which each drug will be sold to customers in
the developed countries. Price discrimination may be socially beneficial; [i]t may allow
more people to benefit from a new drug than would be possible if each had to pay an equal
share of research costs. Politically, however, price discrimination has become an albatross
around the industry’s neck, because other developed nations use price controls to force
R&D costs back onto American consumers.”).
51. For example, in many African countries pharmaceutical companies charge less for
certain drugs in than they do in the United States. See, e.g., John S. James, Merck, BristolMyers Squibb Announce Major Price Reductions in Poorest Countries, AIDS TREATMENT NEWS, Feb.
26, 2001, http://www.aids.org/atn/a-361-03.html.
52. Examples in the United States include Medicare, Medicaid, Veterans Affairs, federal
employees, private health plans, and individuals.
53. See, e.g., infra note 199 and accompanying text (discussing Australia’s scheme).
54. For a classic account of the interplay between arbitrage and differential pricing, see
PHILIPS, supra note 43, at 14-16. A recent study from the London School of Economics does
not find any evidence of the predicted price convergence in pharmaceutical parallel
trading markets in Europe. PANOS KANAVOS ET AL., THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF
PHARMACEUTICAL PARALLEL TRADE IN EUROPEAN UNION MEMBER STATES: A STAKEHOLDER
ANALYSIS 15-16 (London Sch. of Econ. & Political Sci., Special Research Paper, 2004),
http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/LSEHealthAndSocialCare/documents/otherpaperseries.
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ultimate user, arbitrage occurs when buyers in a lower-priced market re-sell
the product to consumers in a higher-priced market. Pharmaceuticals sold
for five dollars in India may be identical to products sold for one hundred
dollars in the United States, creating the opportunity for arbitrage. When
arbitrage involves IP and crosses an international border, it is called
55
parallel trade. Absent other constraints, neo-classical economic theory
predicts that arbitrage will erode price-differentiated markets, moving all
sales towards an equilibrium price. As a result, arbitrage redirects
consumer surplus away from the producer and into the hands of the
56
consumer, improving access through lower cost. Arbitrage is in fact a
normal function of a competitive capitalistic economy, a key component of
the invisible hand. Arbitrage loses favor when it threatens innovation by
hindering appropriation by pharmaceutical companies. As will be seen
later, the empirical reality of pharmaceutical arbitrage departs from the
57
neo-classical model in significant ways. This Article recognizes that
pharmaceutical arbitrage may be either helpful or dysfunctional to
consumer welfare.
C. Laws Affecting Pharmaceutical Arbitrage
Successful pharmaceutical price discrimination requires market
segmentation and must minimize arbitrage by customers and
intermediaries. Several tools may be employed, including contract,
product differentiation supported by trademarks, and regulatory
58
structures. Each affects the degree of appropriation in pharmaceutical
markets, and thus, the balance between access and innovation.

htm.
55. Parallel trade, “also called grey-market trade, is the act of taking goods placed into
circulation in one market, where they are protected by a trademark, patent or copyright,
and shipping them to a second market without the authorization of the local owner of the
intellectual property right.” Keith E. Maskus & Mattias Ganslandt, Parallel Trade in
Pharmaceutical Products: Implications for Procuring Medicines for Poor Countries, in ECONOMICS OF
ESSENTIAL MEDICINES, supra note 3, at 57. The practice is not necessarily illegal, depending
upon the country’s laws concerning exhaustion of IP rights. See supra Subsection I.A.1.
56. PHILIPS, supra note 43, at 18.
57. See infra Subsection II.A.1; see also supra note 54 (citing study finding no empirical
evidence of price convergence in EU pharmaceutical arbitrage).
58. See Jonathan M. Barnett, Private Protection of Patentable Goods, 25 CARDOZO L. REV.
1251 (2004).

206

193 ART_OUTTERSONV5

12/25/2004 4:45 PM

PHARMACEUTICAL ARBITRAGE

1. Contract
Private ordering may support differential pricing: The contract
59
between a buyer and seller may expressly or implicitly forbid arbitrage. If
the customer breaches the agreement, the seller can pursue contractual
remedies. The effectiveness of contractual remedies will in many cases
depend upon whether the seller has privity with every arbitrageur and on
the monitoring costs required to ensure compliance. In pharmaceutical
markets, manufacturers are likely to lack privity with the multiple layers of
pharmaceutical distributors and retailers, and contracts of adhesion in the
style of shrink-wrap licensing are impractical since pharmaceutical goods
are sold rather than licensed. Contractual restrictions on subsequent trade
may run afoul of competition law. The European Court of Justice, for
example, is generally skeptical of contractual provisions preventing intra60
European arbitrage. Any relaxation of these competition law principles,
or a novel expansion of licensing-style restrictions on subsequent transfer,
would decrease the potential for arbitrage and expand the appropriation
powers of pharmaceutical innovators.
2. Product Differentiation
Successful arbitrage requires that the lower priced product be the
same as, or easily substituted for, the more expensive product. When the
product is fungible and easily transferable, consumers can cross the price
61
discriminating market segments by choosing the lowest price. However,
producers rarely concede strict fungibility; marketing efforts are deployed
to influence consumers and reduce their willingness to make substitutions,
62
thus supporting differential pricing. This process generally occurs

59. Airlines, for example, forbid the transfer of tickets. Some firms refuse to sell
equipment, but only lease it with sub-leasing forbidden. The famous example of leased
Xerox equipment is described in PHILIPS, supra note 43, at 151-53. A more recent example
is the software industry’s widespread use of non-transferable licenses. These are most often
clickwrap or shrink-wrap licenses—contracts of adhesion. See J.H. Reichman & Jonathan A.
Franklin, Privately Legislated Intellectual Property Rights: Reconciling Freedom of Contract with
Public Good Uses of Information, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 875 (1999). Firms may also contractually
prohibit parallel trade of their products.
60. Case C-306/96, Javico Int’l v. Yves Saint Laurent Parfums SA, 1998 E.C.R. I-1983,
[1998] 5 C.M.L.R. 172 (1998).
61. BERNDT, supra note 44, at 8-10; PHILIPS, supra note 43, at 27.
62. Aspirin might be considered a fungible commodity. The active ingredient is well
known and unprotected by patents. Yet, the aspirin market is filled with differentiated
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between similar products from competing companies, but parallel traders
force companies to confront movements of differentially priced products
between geographic markets. Trademarks and laws constraining parallel
trade support product differentiation. Granting patents for modest
variations in dosage and formulations also supports product
differentiation.
Laws regulating pharmaceutical marketing also affect the potential for
63
arbitrage. Drug companies target both consumers and physicians with
their marketing efforts: Overall, U.S. promotional spending on
64
prescription drugs in 2000 totaled $15.7 billion. Even after generic entry,
these marketing efforts are remarkably effective in retaining market
65
share. Finally, transaction costs also influence the ease of substitution. If
laws raise arbitrage transaction costs, product differentiation is supported,
and arbitrage is hindered.

products. Some aspirins are marketed with brand names as proxies for safety and reliability.
Others are compounded with other ingredients such as caffeine or buffering agents.
Aspirin may be purchased in particular sizes, shapes, and delivery methods, such as pills,
capsules, or gel caps. Despite this product differentiation, at some level all aspirins are
subject to substitution. If the preferred brand or form of aspirin is unavailable, or priced
too high, some consumers will substitute another form of aspirin, or may even substitute
with another class of analgesic, such as ibuprofen or acetaminophen.
63. Companies spend billions of dollars to employ product representatives, who meet
with doctors in various venues. In 2000, the industry employed 83,000 drug representatives
at a cost of $4 billion. NAT’L INST. FOR HEALTH CARE MGMT. RESEARCH & EDUC. FOUND.,
PRESCRIPTION DRUGS AND MASS MEDIA ADVERTISING 5 (2001) [hereinafter NIHCM]. Free
samples valued at $7.9 billion were given to doctors in 2000, and $1.9 billion was spent on
educational conferences for doctors. Id. These efforts encourage particular prescribing
habits and shift demand between drugs through substitution. Id. at 7; see also SCHNEIDER,
supra note 4, at 26-36 (fraud cases); Compliance Program Guidance for Pharmaceutical
Manufacturers, 68 Fed. Reg. 3,731, 23,735-38 (May 5, 2003). The industry has also taken
steps to suppress negative research. See Angell, supra note 6, at 62; NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH,
REPORT OF THE NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH BLUE RIBBON PANEL ON CONFLICT OF
INTEREST POLICIES 1-5 (2004), http://www.nih.gov/about/ethics_COI_panelreport.pdf
[hereinafter NIH, CONFLICT OF INTEREST].
64. NIHCM, supra note 63, at 4. Approximately one-third related to one-on-one
meetings with doctors, visits to hospitals, or conferences, and only a portion of that could
be considered educational. The largest marketing expense is for free drug samples ($7.9
billion in 2000). Id. at 4. In 2000, U.S. unit sales of the fifty most heavily advertised drugs
rose at six times the rate of other drugs. Id. at 7.
65. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, HOW INCREASED COMPETITION FROM GENERIC DRUGS HAS
AFFECTED PRICES AND RETURNS IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY, at xii-xiii (1998)
[hereinafter CBO, INCREASED COMPETITION].
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3. Government Regulation of Pharmaceuticals
Pharmaceutical regulation influences substitution, transaction costs,
and arbitrage. Two major legal categories are particularly relevant to
pharmaceutical arbitrage: IP laws and national drug regulatory agencies
(NDRAs).
i. Intellectual Property (IP) Laws
IP laws facilitate pharmaceutical differential pricing by creating legally
enforceable rights, which in turn support the appropriation of rents.
Pharmaceutical patents prevent substitution by identical compounds
during the patent period. Trademarks support brand identification and
differentiation of products to consumers, hindering consumer confusion
66
or unintended substitution.
In many countries, the first sale of a patented product exhausts the
67
public law rights of the patent holder for that item. This exhaustion rule
68
is a necessary condition to legal domestic arbitrage, as it permits domestic
69
resale by the purchaser without the permission of the patent holder.
Exhaustion may be applied on a domestic or an international basis. The
domestic exhaustion rule renders parallel imports illegal while the
international exhaustion rule removes patent law barriers to international
66. TIMOTHY H. HIEBERT, PARALLEL IMPORTATION IN U.S. TRADEMARK LAW 151-57 (1994)
(discussing the consumer confusion theory underlying the exclusion of parallel imports
under trademark law); WARWICK A. ROTHNIE, PARALLEL IMPORTS 101-05 (1993) (discussing
the role of distinct domestic goodwill to successfully exclude parallel goods under
trademark law).
67. ROTHNIE, supra note 66, at 125-42 (Anglo-Commonwealth patent law); id. at 143-50
(U.S. patent law).
68. It is necessary, but not sufficient: Significant price differentials and relatively low
transaction costs are also required. The power of other factors is demonstrated by the
persistence of pharmaceutical pricing differentials within the EU, despite a strong internal
exhaustion rule and EU firms specializing in pharmaceutical arbitrage. ROTHNIE, supra note
66, at 477, 494-97. See generally DG TRADE, supra note 42, § 3.
69. Domestic parallel trade in pharmaceuticals is legal within the EU and the United
States. See, e.g., Case 187/80, Merck v. Stephar, 1981 E.C.R. 2063, [1981] 3 C.M.L.R. 463
(holding that parallel drug trade is legal in the EU); DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS
§ 16.03[2] (2003) (explaining the U.S. domestic exhaustion rule). But see Case T-41/96,
Bayer A.G. v. E.C. Commission, [2001] 4 C.M.L.R. 4 (holding that unilateral acts by
pharmaceutical company to choke off supply of drugs to parallel exporters is not actionable
under EU law); Glaxo Group Ltd. v. Dowelhurst Ltd. [2004] EWCA Civ. 129 (requiring
repackaging in some cases to protect the trademark).
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70

parallel trade. United States law only recently rejected the international
71
patent exhaustion rule, and the extent of the rejection may not yet be
72
clear, although the recent Free Trade Agreement with Australia commits

70. DG TRADE, supra note 42, § 3.1 (“A country providing for international exhaustion
effectively makes parallel imports legal, while a country (or regional group) that provides
for national (or regional) exhaustion enables rightholders to act against such imports.”).
TRIPS does not commit to a position on exhaustion, specifically reserving the issue to
domestic law. TRIPS, supra note 1, art. 6. Some commentators writing on the economics of
essential medicines mention in passing that U.S. patent law rejects the international
exhaustion rule. See, e.g., JOHN H. BARTON, DIFFERENTIATED PRICING OF PATENTED PRODUCTS
(WHO, Comm’n on Macroeconomics & Health, Working Paper No. 2, 2001); JEAN O.
LANJOUW, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE AVAILABILITY OF PHARMACEUTICALS IN POOR
COUNTRIES 19 n.29 (Ctr. for Global Dev., Working Paper No. 5, 2002), reprinted in 3
INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY (2002) [hereinafter LANJOUW, INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY].
71. One distinguished commentator states, without discussion, that the 1994
amendments reject international exhaustion for U.S. patents, which might imply that the
Uruguay Round required this result. CHISUM, supra note 69, § 16.05[3]. The amendment
was included as part of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act by which the United States
joined the WTO. Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809
(1994). Section 533 of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act amended 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) to
expand the definition of infringement to include importation into the United States of a
patented product. The legislative history of this provision is obscure. The House Reports on
the Uruguay Round Agreements Act do not include an analysis of Section 533, and the only
mention in the summary description is: “amends the definition of infringing activity to
include offers for sale and importation of a patented good.” H.R. REP. NO. 103-826(I), at 8
(1994). The unofficial summary by the Congressional Research Service merely states: “(Sec.
533) Deems offering to sell or import a patented invention into the United States to be
patent infringement.” Cong. Research Serv., Bill Summary & Status, H.R. 5110 (Pub. L. No.
103-465), 103d Cong. (Sept. 27, 1994).
72. Four points are important. First, prior to the 1994 amendments, U.S. patent law was
leaning in favor of the international exhaustion rule, a trend which resulted in the 1995
U.S. Supreme Court case, K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281 (1988). See also CHISUM,
supra note 69, § 1605[3]; ROTHNIE, supra note 66, at 183. Second, it is not clear at all that
Congress intended to overturn the international exhaustion exception by the enactment of
§ 533. One may declare importation an act of infringement and yet retain the narrower
exception for authorized sales abroad being imported legally under international
exhaustion. But see CHISUM, supra note 69, § 16.05[3]. Third, the provision, enacted as part
of the Uruguay Round Agreements, was not required, as WTO Members retain domestic
flexibility to choose any exhaustion rule. Finally, the heuristic of optimality, see infra Section
I.D, suggests that any provision which strengthens drug patent rights will enhance
beneficial innovation only if rents are sub-optimal. This issue was not demonstrated to
Congress in the legislative history to the 1994 amendment.
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both parties to the domestic exhaustion rule.
If the United States does follow the domestic exhaustion rule for
pharmaceutical patents, drugs sold in the United States, exported to
Canada, and then re-imported back into the United States arguably qualify
74
for domestic exhaustion. However, the Prescription Drug Marketing Act
of 1987 blocks reimportation by anyone other than the manufacturer,
75
forbidding this form of arbitrage.
ii. National Drug Regulatory Agencies
The TRIPS Agreement generally leaves the drug approval process to
76
individual countries. The global diversity of regulatory actors creates the
possibility that each country will have a unique drug regulatory
environment, with different approaches to issues such as generic
substitution, drug approval, reimbursement, parallel trade, advertising,
and pharmaceutical arbitrage. In addition, each country’s market may
differ due to other significant factors such as economic development and
demand elasticity. The net result is that law assists in the creation of unique
market characteristics in each country, which may result in differentiated
prices either by facilitating voluntary differentiation and impeding
conditions necessary for arbitrage, or by taking actions, such as price
controls, that essentially demand a differentiated scheme.
To begin, a country’s regulatory conditions may uniquely affect the
potential for product differentiation—an impediment to arbitrage—by
allowing or disallowing certain marketing efforts or dictating transactions
costs. For example, in 1997, the United States’s national drug regulatory

73. In 2004, the U.S.-Australia Free Trade Agreement committed both parties to the
domestic exhaustion rule for patents. Free Trade Agreement, May 18, 2004, U.S.-Austl. §
17.9.4, http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Australia_FTA/Final_Text/
Section_Index.html.
74. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Shifting Functional Balance of Patents and Drug
Regulation, 19 HEALTH AFF. 119, 129-32 (2001). Re-imported patented drugs are produced
in the United States under proper authority, legally exported to a second country (such as
Canada) and then re-imported by a third party, arguably exhausting U.S. patent rights over
the pills themselves. There is no evidence that the 1994 modifications to 35 U.S.C. § 271(a)
were intended to waive the domestic exhaustion rule on re-imported goods. See supra notes
71-72. As discussed infra Section II.B, Canadian pharmaceutical arbitrage has recently
exploded despite this restriction.
75. Prescription Drug Marketing Act of 1987, 21 U.S.C. §§ 331(t), 381(d) (2000).
76. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, art. 1, § 1.
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agency, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), modified its
regulations to permit direct to consumer (DTC) advertising for
78
79
pharmaceutical drugs. Virtually no other countries permit the practice.
The creation of the DTC rule by the FDA modifies information costs
80
related to substitution.
Other government regulations also influence pharmaceutical
81
marketing. For example, federal law prohibits the sale of a drug sample
or the domestic resale of deeply-discounted drugs sold to certain
82
hospitals, hindering arbitrage of these products and thus supporting their
provision at differential prices. The U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services applies Medicare fraud and abuse laws to the practices of
drug representatives, forbidding remuneration to encourage particular
83
prescribing practices within federal programs.
Regulatory postures can alter manufacturing costs of potential
competitors. The current de facto global standard for quality
pharmaceutical manufacturing is the Standard of Good Manufacturing

77. 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2000).
78. The regulations are now found at 21 C.F.R. § 202.1 (2004).
79. In recent years, only the United States and New Zealand permit DTC broadcast ads.
NIHCM, supra note 63, at 16. In 2002, Canada permitted restricted DTC advertising and is
affected by spillover from American media. CAN. INST. FOR HEALTH INFO., DRUG
EXPENDITURE IN CANADA: 1985-2002, at 41 (2003). In the 2004 U.S.-Australia Free Trade
Agreement, web-based DTC advertising is permitted. Free Trade Agreement, supra note 73,
Annex 2-C, ¶ 5.
80. PHILIPS, supra note 43, ch. 12. DTC campaigns build consumer demand,
encouraging the patient to ask for a prescription by name. Advertising shifts the demand
curve for prescription drugs to the right. NIHCM, supra note 63, at 2 (noting that DTC
advertising increases consumer sales of patented pharmaceuticals); CBO, INCREASED
COMPETITION, supra note 65, at 20. Spending for DTC advertising grew at an annual rate of
44.9% from 1995 to 2000 and is now growing at an annual rate of 9.4%. Stephen Heffler et
al., Health Spending Projections for 2002-2012, HEALTH AFF., Feb. 7, 2003 (Web Exclusive), at
http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/content/full/hlthaff.w3.54v1/DC1. Product shift,
increased unit prices, and increased volumes each account for about a third of the growth
in prescription drug spending. C. Daniel Mullins et al., The Impact of Pipeline Drugs on Drug
Spending Growth, 20 HEALTH AFF. 210, 213 (2001). In 2000, the most heavily advertised drugs
accounted for 47.8% of the $20.8 billion increase in U.S. retail spending on prescription
drugs. NIHCM, supra note 63, at 2.
81. 21 U.S.C. §§ 331(t), 353(d) (2000).
82. Id. § 353(c)(3).
83. SCHNEIDER, supra note 4, at 26-36 (reviewing False Claim Act litigation against drug
companies, particularly involving marketing related fraud); Compliance Program Guidance
for Pharmaceutical Manufacturers, 68 Fed. Reg. 23,731, 23,733-39 (May 5, 2003).
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Practice (GMP). PhRMA companies are now cooperating with the United
States, the EU, and Japan to develop a higher global standard, known as
84
the International Conference on Harmonization (ICH). Imposition of
ICH would discourage substitution of drugs manufactured by less85
expensive non-OECD pharmaceutical companies. This effort could be
viewed as rent-seeking behavior through technical standards. Likewise,
donor agencies often face substitution choices during the procurement
86
process, which may be subject to regulation or political intervention.
Furthermore, international arbitrage may simply be proscribed by
NDRAs. Under the Food, Drug and Cosmetics Act, drugs cannot be
87
imported unless approved by the FDA, creating a non-tariff barrier to
international trade. Some drugs are produced in the United States and
88
exported to countries with price controls such as Canada. Since the drugs
are produced in the United States, they arguably comply with FDA rules,
and could be re-imported back into the United States by arbitrageurs.
However, the U.S. Prescription Drug Marketing Act of 1987 prohibits the
reimportation of a prescription drug by anyone other than the
89
manufacturer. The law was ostensibly intended to address safety concerns
90
for the U.S. pharmaceutical supply chain, but its effect is to prevent
84. GRAHAM DUKES, UN MILLENNIUM PROJECT, INTERIM REPORT OF TASK FORCE 5
WORKING GROUP ON ACCESS TO ESSENTIAL MEDICINES 32 (2004).
85. The OECD is the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development; its
membership consists almost exclusively of high income countries. See OECD, Information
by Country, at
http://www.oecd.org/infobycountry/0,2646,en_2649_201185_1_1_1_2_
1,00.html; World Bank, Data & Statistics: Country Group, at http://www.worldbank.org/
data/countryclass/classgroups.htm (last visited Nov. 22, 2004). Non-OECD pharmaceutical
companies are essentially those based outside of Japan, North America, and Europe, such as
India’s Cipla and Ranbaxy. These companies are typically best known for their production
of generic products. See, e.g., Donald G. McNeil, Jr., Selling Cheap ‘Generic’ Drugs, India’s
Copycats Irk Industry, N.Y. Times, Dec. 1, 2000, at A1.
86. The United States’s unilateral effort on AIDS (PEPFAR) has chosen to ignore the
WHO prequalification process, as well as all recipient country drug regulatory agencies, and
now imposes a supplementary FDA approval process for AIDS drug procurement. Sarah
Lueck, White House Aims To Answer Critics of Its AIDS Fight, WALL ST. J., Apr. 29, 2004, at A9;
Sarah Lueck, White House Gets Pressure on AIDS Plan, WALL ST. J., Mar. 25, 2004, at A4. This
decision, ostensibly made on quality grounds, also supports the product line of PhRMA
companies by imposing additional regulatory requirements on their generic competitors
located in India, South Africa, Thailand, and Brazil.
87. 21 U.S.C. §§ 360(i), 381(a) (2000).
88. See infra Subsection II.A.2.
89. 21 U.S.C. §§ 331(t), 381(d) (2000).
90. H.R. REP. No. 100-76, at 7 (1987).
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international pharmaceutical arbitrage or parallel trade.
Finally, PhRMA companies generally do not enjoy unconstrained
monopoly power to set prices on patented drugs. In high income
countries, regulatory systems, as well as payor monopsony, will likely yield
countervailing pricing power. In some countries, the government sets
92
pharmaceutical prices by regulatory process, including reference pricing
93
and rate setting. In others, price regulation occurs when the government
94
enters the market as a purchaser and acts with monopsony power. Private
payors (health plans or their agents such as pharmacy benefit managers)
may either mimic the government prices, or utilize their own market
95
power to negotiate prices. Moreover, most third-party payors have
pharmaceutical substitution agendas of their own which are subject to
government regulation. Many health plans now require prescriptions to be
filled with generic equivalents whenever medically appropriate. In the
96
United States, state and federal laws generally support these efforts.

91. The government also has the power to seize counterfeit or improperly diverted
drugs. For an interesting story on the diversion of Serostim within the United States, see
Christopher Windham, Cracking Down on Illicit Use of AIDS Drugs, WALL ST. J., Jan. 19, 2004,
at B1.
92. PATRICIA DANZON & JOHATHAN D. KETCHAM, REFERENCE PRICING OF PHARMACEUTICALS
FOR MEDICARE: EVIDENCE FROM GERMANY, THE NETHERLANDS AND NEW ZEALAND (Nat’l Bureau
of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. W10007, 2003) (discussing reference price systems
in Germany, The Netherlands, and New Zealand).
93. House of Commons Select Comm. on Health, Minutes of Evidence (Jan. 23, 2002),
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200102/cmselect/cmhealth/515/2012321.
htm (examination of Dr. John Patterson, President-elect, Association of the British
Pharmaceutical Industry) (“Prices almost never go up on medicines in this country
[England], as you saw from the report to Parliament in December. In brief, the PPRS is a
scheme which caps profits and profitability in our industry at a level equivalent to the
average return on capital of the FT 100.”). The United States effectively sets rates for
government purchase of services from physicians and hospitals, but generally not for
pharmaceuticals.
94. In the United States, the recently-enacted Medicare Act disabled federal
monopsony power in the purchase of outpatient prescription drugs under Medicare.
Medicare Prescription Drug Improvement and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108173, § 301 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395).
95. CBO, INCREASED COMPETITION, supra note 65, at xi.
96. See, e.g., W. VA. CODE § 30-5-12 (2004) (allowing pharmacists to substitute generic
medicines for brand name medicines without approval from the prescriber); id. § 23-4-3
(requiring generic substitution within the Workers’ Compensation program). But see
DANZON & KETCHAM, supra note 92, at 7 (noting that Germany restricts generic
substitution).
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iii. The Hatch-Waxman Act
Traditionally, IP law regulates the economic incentives of innovation
while NDRA regulations and related laws control drug efficacy and safety.
However, the patent system is not the only source of exclusive, or
97
monopoly, rights. Under the Hatch-Waxman Act and other legislation
98
such as the Orphan Drug Act, the FDA may grant additional exclusive
marketing periods under an array of circumstances—for example,
99
rewarding first-mover generic drugs, certain drugs for uncommon
100
conditions (so-called orphan drugs), or compliance with social goals
101
such as testing drugs for efficacy and safety on children. Indeed, when
examining the incentives for pharmaceutical innovation, it is not the
length of the patent period that matters most but the duration of this
102
exclusive marketing period. PhRMA companies are maximizing their
103
opportunities under these provisions.

97. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15, 21, 28 and 35 U.S.C.)
[hereinafter Hatch-Waxman Act]. Under the Hatch-Waxman Act, the FDA also influences
the patent process, since Hatch-Waxman extends the patent for half of the period that a
drug is undergoing clinical trials, plus the full amount of time spent in the FDA approval
process. 35 U.S.C. §§ 155, 155A, 156 (2000).
98. 21 U.S.C. §§ 360aa-360ee (2000).
99. Id. § 355(j).
100. Id. §§ 360aa-360ee.
101. Id. § 355a.
102. The term “exclusive marketing period” means the actual period during which a
pharmaceutical company sells an FDA-approved drug in the United States without direct
competition. The legal sources of this period include patent law, non-patent “exclusive
marketing” rights granted by the FDA under Hatch-Waxman, the use of litigation and
agreements to forestall competitive entry, and the evergreening of patents through filings
for new uses and formulations.
103. For example, the number of putative orphan drugs qualifying for tax credits and
extended exclusive marketing periods has soared as companies have narrowly defined
markets to remain under the 200,000-person threshold. Steven R. Salbu, AIDS and Drug
Policy: In Search of a Policy, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 691, 692, 704-06 (1993) (noting that the FDA
designated AZT as an orphan drug in 1987 and half of AIDS drugs as of August 1991 were
designated as orphans); John J. Flynn, The Orphan Drug Act: An Unconstitutional Exercise of the
Patent Power, 1992 UTAH L. REV. 389 (noting that the FDA designated early AIDS drugs such
as AZT, and other best-selling drugs such as EPO and Taxol as orphan drugs). The tax
expenditure on the Orphan Drug Act is now $200 million per year, not including the cost
of the grant of market exclusivity. JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX
EXPENDITURES FOR FYS 2004-2008 (Joint Committee Print 2003). Public Citizen notes the
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The 1984 Hatch-Waxman Act was the first major piece of legislation to
link patent law and FDA regulations in this way. The Act regulates patent
expiry and generic entry following patent expiration, directly addressing
104
the balance between innovation and access. The United States is now
exporting portions of the Hatch-Waxman Act to other countries through
105
bilateral free trade agreements.
106
After a patent or exclusive marketing period expires, competition by
generic drugs is not automatic. Generic drugs must receive FDA approval
as well, albeit under an abbreviated process. The generic entry process can
take some time, particularly if existing data on safety and efficacy cannot
be used or if the manufacturing processes are complex. PhRMA companies
have resorted to strategic litigation and collusive agreements to lengthen
107
effective exclusive marketing periods.
These abuses prompted
108
amendments to Hatch-Waxman in 2003. PhRMA companies are already
responding with new tactics to keep generic drugs off the market by
denying the generic companies an adequate financial return for the
109
expensive generic approval process.

inefficiency of the incentive mechanism: Pediatric tests cost only $3.9 million per drug on
average, but the six-month patent extension can result in huge financial rewards exceeding
$1 billion. PUBLIC CITIZEN’S CONG. WATCH, PUBLIC CITIZEN, THE OTHER DRUG WAR II: DRUG
COMPANIES USE AN ARMY OF 623 LOBBYISTS TO KEEP PROFITS UP 4 (2002). The FDA estimates
the total cost of the pediatric testing initiative from 2001 to 2021 to be $14 billion,
approximately equal to the proposed five year AIDS program. FDA, THE PEDIATRIC
EXCLUSIVITY PROVISION: STATUS REPORT TO CONGRESS (2001).
104. See, e.g., Elizabeth Stotland Weiswasser & Scott D. Danzis, The Hatch-Waxman Act:
History, Structure, and Legacy, 71 ANTITRUST 585 (2003). Philipson and Mechoulan describe
this balance in the language of economics: “Appropriate policy must simultaneously solve the
externality problem ex-post and the R&D problem ex-ante.” PHILIPSON & MECHOULAN, supra
note 30, at 12 (emphasis in original).
105. See, e.g., Free Trade Agreement, supra note 73, §17.9.6.
106. By the late 1990s, the U.S. pharmaceutical exclusive marketing period was
approximately fourteen years. CBO, INCREASED COMPETITION, supra note 65, at 45-48. If
someone undertakes to update this figure, care should be taken to account for all of the
factors affecting effective exclusive rights.
107. FTC, GENERIC DRUG ENTRY PRIOR TO PATENT EXPIRATION 13-23 (2002).
108. Pub. L. No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066 (2003), tit. IX (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)
and uncodified). The Congressional Research Service prepared a summary of the Act which
provides some guidance on Congress’s intent in amending Hatch-Waxman. See Cong.
Research Serv., Prescription Drug and Medicare Improvement Act of 2003, Bill Summary
and Status, S.1, 108th Cong. (June 13, 2003).
109. Leila Abboud, Drug Makers Use New Tactic To Ding Generics, WALL ST. J., Jan. 27, 2004,
at B1.
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D. The Heuristic of Globally Optimal Pharmaceutical Rents

110

1. Nonrival Access to Pharmaceutical Knowledge
The goal of IP laws should be to maximize nonrival access to
pharmaceutical knowledge, with just enough legal support for the
appropriation of rents to protect socially optimal R&D. Since
pharmaceutical knowledge is nonrival, it should be disseminated in the
widest possible fashion at the lowest possible cost for the greatest possible
benefit to global public health. This Article describes this condition as
“nonrival access.”
The pharmaceutical industry has borrowed language from the world
of physical property to attack nonrival access. They call nonrival access
“theft” or “piracy.” At best, nonrival users are characterized as “free
111
riders.”
These terms are inappropriate since nonrival use of
112
pharmaceutical knowledge does not cause anything to be lost, so long as
the socially optimal level of appropriation for R&D is still achieved. In a
world of excessive rents, we should call it theft (or, in some cases,
genocide) to deny nonrival access to low income populations.
For the pharmaceutical industry, the globally optimal level of
113
appropriation through rents must be sufficient to fund the socially

110. Once again, the broader term rents is used here in lieu of patent rents in order to
encompass the various mechanisms beyond patent law which facilitate appropriation, as
described supra Section I.C. The use of the term patent rents is meant to signify only the
narrow meaning of patent-based appropriation.
111. DRAHOS WITH BRAITHWAITE, supra note 2, at 19-29 (piracy); LEMLEY, supra note 20, at
3-16 (property and free riding); STERK, supra note 20, at 24-25 (analogies to tangible
property).
112. Cf. Selling Life-Saving Drugs to Poorer Countries: At What Cost?, Research at Penn
(Nov. 6, 2002), at http://www.upenn.edu/researchatpenn/article.php?504&hlt.
113. The economic analysis of socially optimal patents has been undertaken by Nordhaus
and Scherer. NORDHAUS, INVENTION, GROWTH & WELFARE, supra note 36, at 70-92; Nordhaus,
The Optimum Life of a Patent, supra note 36, at 428; Scherer, Optimal Patent Life, supra note 36,
at 422. Scherer argues that shortening patent life will reduce R&D only for the most
marginal inventions, particularly in industries with nonpatent barriers to entry and post
innovation pricing discipline. Scherer, Optimal Patent Life, supra note 36, at 426. The
pharmaceutical research industry contains both conditions. Nordhaus concluded that a
fixed patent life was not optimal, but given that requirement, the length of the life should
err to a longer rather than a shorter period. Nordhaus, The Optimum Life of a Patent, supra
note 36, at 428. Philipson and Mechoulan cover the same territory when they argue that
“[a]ppropriate policy must simultaneously solve the externality problem ex-post and the R&D
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optimal level of R&D. Optimization must balance concerns of cost, quality,
and access, looking for the greatest net gain to global public welfare.
Excessive rents harm human health without advancing socially optimal
R&D. Society must decide when the best level of appropriation has been
114
reached.
Maximizing R&D at all costs should not be our objective. Resources
115
devoted to R&D are not available for other uses. Uwe Reinhardt puts it
this way: “Year after year, the last dollar spent on drug research and
development (R&D) should yield society as much benefit as it would have
116
yielded if it had been spent to produce other goods or services.”
We should also avoid the assumption that all R&D targets are equally
valuable. Some innovations are more valuable than others. Companies
allocate research funds in response to price signals from commercial
pharmaceutical markets. As a result, Americans now have a third drug for
117
erectile dysfunction, and funds for neglected disease innovation are
118
literally going to the dogs, but malaria and AIDS vaccines are not

problem ex-ante.” PHILIPSON & MECHOULAN, supra note 30, at 12, 12-15. Recently,
Christopher Yoo undertook a nuanced review of copyright law which covers some of the
same terrain as my approach, but with assumptions of copyright market entry and
substitutability which do not apply to pharmaceutical patents. See Christopher S. Yoo,
Copyright and Product Differentiation, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 212 (2004).
114. Philipson and Mechoulan make a similar point in the language of economics:
“Under external effects in consumption, rewards to innovation should not be guided by
potential consumer surplus, as under private goods, but the entire social surplus that includes
benefits to non-consumers as well as consumers . . . .” PHILIPSON & MECHOULAN, supra note
30, at 2.
115. Currently the United States spends more than fifteen percent of its GDP on health
care. Robert Pear, Health Spending Rises to Record 15% of Economy, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2004, at
A16. Perhaps we can agree that increasing pharmaceutical R&D to twenty percent or fifty
percent of GDP would be excessive.
116. Uwe E. Reinhardt, An Information Infrastructure for the Pharmaceutical Market, 23
HEALTH AFF. 107 (2004).
117. Viagra (sildenafil) was approved by the FDA in 1998. First Oral Therapy for Erectile
Dysfunction, 28 FDA MEDICAL BULL. 1 (1998), http://www.fda.gov/medbull/summer98/
erectile.html. Levitra (vardenafil) was approved in August 2003. FDA, Talk Paper, FDA
Approves New Drug for Treatment of Erectile Dysfunction in Men (Aug. 19, 2003),
http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/ANSWERS/2003/ANS01249.html. Cialis (tadalafil) was
approved in November 2003. FDA, Talk Paper, FDA Approves Third Drug To Treat Erectile
Dysfunction (Nov. 21, 2003), http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/ANSWERS/2003/ANS
01265.html.
118. In 1999, the FDA approved two drugs to treat canine Cognitive Dysfunction
Syndrome, also known as separation anxiety in dogs. FDA, Talk Paper, FDA Approves First
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available.
You get the sense that ships are passing in the night on this issue.
James Love estimates the static global deadweight loss on pharmaceutical
120
patents at over $400 billion per year, and Larry Lessig implores us not to
allow IP law to be perverted while a holocaust devastates millions in the
121
developing world. Meanwhile Joseph DiMasi and Henry Grabowski
suggest that the “dynamic benefits created by patents on pharmaceuticals
can, and almost surely do, swamp in significance their short-run
122
inefficiencies.” Yet, in a major study, the Congressional Budget Office
conceded that no one knows whether current levels of pharmaceutical
123
R&D are optimal. This is the pressing question.
2. Globally Sub-Optimal Pharmaceutical Rents
Globally sub-optimal pharmaceutical rents would stifle the production
of pharmaceutical knowledge, creating a generational equity issue. The
present group of patients might benefit from sub-optimal pharmaceutical
rents because such rents result in innovative treatments that are cheaper
and thus more accessible, but future quality would be compromised.
Pharmaceutical companies would invest less when creating inappropriable
knowledge. This is the nightmare scenario portrayed by PhRMA
companies when they argue that constraints on their ability to appropriate
rents will squelch innovation.

Behavioral Drugs for Dogs (Jan. 5, 1999), http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/answers/
ans00934.html. Perhaps soon a drug will be developed for erectile dysfunction in dogs.
119. For an introduction to donor efforts led by the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation to
stimulate development of a malaria vaccine, see Malaria Vaccine Initiative, at http://www.
malariavaccine.org.
120. James Love, supra note 33, at 2.
121. Lawrence Lessig, The International Information Society, 24 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 33, 3637 (2004).
122. JOSEPH A. DIMASI & HENRY G. GRABOWSKI, PATENTS AND R&D INCENTIVES: COMMENTS
ON THE HUBBARD AND LOVE TRADE FRAMEWORK FOR FINANCING PHARMACEUTICAL R&D 2
(2004) (citation omitted), http://www.who.int/intellectualproperty/news/en/Submission
3.pdf. DiMasi and Grabowski cite the 2003 study by Philipson and Mechoulan, but that
study assumes sub-optimality rather than proves it. See PHILIPSON & MECHOULAN, supra note
30.
123. The 1998 study by the Congressional Budget Office states: “No one knows whether
that amount of investment in R&D is over or under the optimal level.” CBO, INCREASED
COMPETITION, supra note 65, at 48.
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3. Globally Supra-Optimal Pharmaceutical Rents
Globally supra-optimal pharmaceutical rents are rarely recognized as a
potential problem by PhRMA companies. By definition, supra-optimal
pharmaceutical rents are not necessary to fund R&D; they simply harm
consumers by raising prices and restricting access without providing the
counterbalancing benefits of future innovation.
i. Are Supra-Optimal Pharmaceutical Rents Possible?
One economist reviewer of an earlier draft of this Article suggested
that pharmaceutical rents cannot be supra-optimal because PhRMA
companies have not fully appropriated all consumer surplus associated
124
with their products. This is another way of saying that PhRMA companies
have not yet achieved first-degree differential pricing (or Ramsey Optimal
Pricing). While Ramsey Optimal Pricing would maximize the sales and
profits of PhRMA companies, it does not respond to the distributional
balance between innovation and access. Nor does it address the quality of
research undertaken with the surplus so completely extracted from
consumers. In a market beset with profound agency problems and
information disparities, it is absurd to assume that consumers will purchase
pharmaceuticals at the cost-effective price. Given what we know about
pharmaceutical markets, it is at least equally likely that PhRMA companies
will stimulate demand which varies from optimal therapeutic need, while
neglecting less lucrative markets.
This critique also fails to account for important negative externalities.
PhRMA companies have failed to get the right pills to the right people at
the right price. If another regime would result in greater global welfare
(improved therapeutic outcomes) without damage to dynamic innovation
incentives, then it should be preferred even if it reduces pharmaceutical
rents slightly.
Consider the vast global gains in welfare which would result if nonrival
access could be accomplished without diminishing the incentive to
innovate. The opportunity cost of failing to do so is staggering. The net
gains to global social welfare would be very significant, even if nonrival
access came at the cost of a modest slice of innovation. It is in this sense
that pharmaceutical rents may be supra-optimal.

124. I thank Aidan Hollis for this comment. My criticisms are not directed at him.
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ii. Are Pharmaceutical Rents Supra-Optimal?
Some empirical evidence suggests that PhRMA companies earn well
above market rates of return, one possible indicator of supra-optimal
125
pharmaceutical rents. The industry’s long-term profits are four times the
126
rate of the Fortune 500. Analysis of IRS data from 1990 to 1996
demonstrates that the drug industry’s after-tax profits are more than triple
127
the rate for all industries.
Calculating optimal pharmaceutical rents must account for other
sources of public funding for R&D, such as government grants, direct
government expenditures, foundation donors, and tax incentives. The
industry receives substantial tax incentives, resulting in an effective U.S.
128
federal income tax rate of 16.2%, compared with 27.3% generally.
The ways in which PhRMA companies currently opt to expend their
cash flows may also indicate supra-optimality. The pharmaceutical industry
129
currently spends more on sales and marketing than on R&D. Large
marketing expenses are not proof that pharmaceutical rents are supraoptimal, but merely indicate that the industry believes the return on
investment in marketing is greater than alternative investments such as
R&D. If the industry holds a relatively low view of the value of an additional
125. The barriers to this calculation are both empirical and theoretical. On the empirical
front, internal company data are not generally available to researchers. Studies by DiMasi,
Hansen, and Grabowski rely on self-reported PhRMA company data rather than a truly
objective data set. DiMasi et al., supra note 29. IRS data shows extraordinary profits and low
taxation but is protected against public disclosure by the Internal Revenue Code. See GARY
GUENTHER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., FEDERAL TAXATION OF THE DRUG INDUSTRY FROM 1990 TO
1996 (1999). Accurate pricing data is unavailable outside of the companies. CBO,
INCREASED COMPETITION, supra note 65, at 20. On the theoretical front, useful questions are
posed by Reinhardt, supra note 116; and William S. Comanor, Political Economy of the
Pharmaceutical Industry, 24 J. ECON. LIT. 1178, 1182-86 (1986).
126. DAVID H. KRELING ET AL., THE KAISER FAMILY FOUND., PRESCRIPTION DRUG TRENDS: A
CHARTBOOK UPDATE exhibit 32 (2001). The judgment of the equity markets is significant,
even under a weak form of the efficient capital markets hypothesis.
127. GUENTHER, supra note 125.
128. Id.
129. KRELING ET AL., supra note 126, exhibit 30 (noting that the top ten major
pharmaceutical manufactures in 2000 spent 34.4% of their revenues on “marketing,
general and administrative” expenses and 13.7% on “research and development.”). But see
Uwe E. Reinhardt, Perspectives on the Pharmaceutical Industry, 20 HEALTH AFF. 136 (2001)
(suggesting that not all SG&A expenses are truly marketing). With deference to Reinhardt,
the differential is large enough to suggest that R&D receives less than marketing, absent
more specific and verifiable data.
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dollar of R&D investment, then perhaps society would be better served
with that additional dollar being used to provide life-saving access to
medicines.
Some scholars, including proponents of the anti-commons
130
movement, suggest that the neo-classical link between patents and
innovation is overstated, particularly for industries marked by cumulative
131
132
innovation such as genetics. If so, optimal rents may be lower than
previously expected.
The most important data required to resolve this question are in the
hands of the pharmaceutical industry and are not available in a reliable
133
form to independent researchers. This fact alone is a compelling reason
to demand transparency. It certainly seems plausible to presume that
supra-optimal rents are currently being collected. The burden of coming
forward with contrary evidence should be placed on the parties controlling
the relevant information: the PhRMA companies.
4. Implications of Global Optimality
Pending the resolution of the empirical issue, the concept of globally
optimal pharmaceutical rents is useful as a heuristic tool. The following
Subsections outline several implications which follow from applying this
tool to pharmaceutical markets.

130. The leading article is Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter
Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698 (1998). For a recent
study on the importance of maintaining a scientific commons, see J.H. Reichman & Paul F.
Uhlir, A Contractually Reconstructed Research Commons for Scientific Data in a Highly Protectionist
Intellectual Property Environment, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 315 (2003).
131. Oren Bar-Gill & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Value of Giving Away Secrets, 89 VA. L.
REV. 1857 (2003). While Bar-Gill and Parchomovsky list “pharmacology” as one such
industry, they do not make that case convincingly in the article. If PhRMA companies are
eager to publish and forego patents, it is a nascent trend.
132. The work of Tim Hubbard and James Love is particularly interesting in this regard.
Hubbard & Love, supra note 27.
133. See supra note 125. Pharmaceutical pricing and profitability data are notoriously
opaque and misleading. SCHNEIDER, supra note 4; Gardiner Harris, Drug Companies Settle 7
Suits for $1.6 Billion, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 2003, at 8 (“Drug companies have paid a total of
$1.6 billion since 2001 to settle seven suits brought by whistle-blowers that accused them of
marketing fraud and overbilling Medicare and Medicaid . . . .”). Some researchers suggest
that increased pricing opacity is necessary to sustain differential pricing for low income
countries. DANZON & TOWSE, supra note 12, at 16-20. I suggest that transparency will better
serve global public health.
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i. Nonrival Access to Pharmaceutical Innovation
Patented pharmaceuticals can be delivered at marginal cost of
production to low income populations without harming innovation. The
majority of AIDS patients in low income countries are quite poor and are
not part of the global market for patented drugs. Supplying their needs is a
humanitarian response, and pharmaceutical companies do not actually
134
lose viable commercial markets as a result. These non-market patients
could receive unlicensed or royalty-free drugs without impacting the cash
135
flow of PhRMA companies.
Even if global pharmaceutical rents are currently sub-optimal,
unlicensed or royalty-free production should still be allowed so long as it
does not replace any commercial market, and thus does no financial harm
136
to the patent owner. Certainly if global pharmaceutical rents are now
supra-optimal, PhRMA companies could bear the expenses of monitoring
and enforcing differential pricing without harming innovation. Supraoptimality also permits expansion of differential pricing programs to
middle income markets, even with some displacement of commercial
markets. The magnitude of expense and market loss that could be
tolerated would depend on the amount by which pharmaceutical rents are
supra-optimal.
a. The Need for a Credible Threat of Compulsory Licensing
OECD members with monopsonistic public sector purchasing of
pharmaceuticals can negotiate or impose domestic second-degree
differential pricing to meet local needs. For developing countries, which
often lack a significant publicly financed pharmaceutical sector,

134. See John H. Barton, TRIPS and the Global Pharmaceutical Market, 23 HEALTH AFF. 146,
148 (2004).
135. Frederic M. Scherer recently made a similar point when he argued for allowing free
riding by developing countries on pharmaceutical patents. F.M. Scherer, A Note on Global
Welfare in Pharmaceutical Patenting, 27 WORLD ECON. 1127, 1141 (2004) [hereinafter Scherer,
Global Welfare].
136. Philipson and Mechoulan criticize this position, but their stance is undermined if
global pharmaceutical rents are supra-optimal. PHILIPSON & MECHOULAN, supra note 30, at
19-20. Even if one assumes sub-optimality, differential pricing for ARVs does not reduce
R&D incentives if cash flows to the innovators are untouched. Philipson and Mechoulan’s
argument thus collapses to a complaint that differential pricing does not improve upon
status quo R&D incentives. If the effect in innovation is positive or neutral, the health gains
(positive externalities) from increased access should drive policy.
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compulsory licensing, or at least the credible threat thereof, may be
required.
At the Fourth WTO Ministerial Conference in Doha, WTO members
137
agreed to the Doha Declaration as an interpretation of TRIPS. The Doha
Declaration allows WTO Members to take measures to “protect public
138
health and, in particular, to promote access to medicines for all.”
Specifically, WTO Members may compel licensure to protect public health,
139
without limitation to AIDS or any particular disease.
Sovereign threats of such compulsory licenses, public pressure from
140
NGOs, and actual competition from generic companies persuaded
PhRMA companies and the United States to embrace differential pricing
of antiretroviral (ARV) medications for a number of poor countries
combating HIV/AIDS. Médecins sans Frontières (MSF) and others
consider the threat and use of compulsory licenses to have been essential
in convincing companies to establish meaningful differential pricing

137. Doha Declaration on TRIPS, supra note 32. The legal status of the Doha Declaration is
discussed in James Thuo Gathii, The Legal Status of the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public
Health Under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 291 (2002);
and in CARLOS M. CORREA, IMPLICATIONS OF THE DOHA DECLARATION ON THE TRIPS
AGREEMENT AND PUBLIC HEALTH 5 (WHO, Health Econ. and Drugs, EDM Series No. 12,
2002), http://www.iprsonline.org/resources/health.htm [hereinafter CORREA, IMPLICATIONS OF DOHA]. The legal status of the Cancun General Council Decision is a joint
commitment by WTO Members to abide by its terms in good faith. Press Release, European
Comm’n, EU Strongly Welcomes WTO Deal on Generic Medicines, IP/03/1189 (Sept. 1,
2003) [hereinafter EU, Cancun]. (The EU uses the phrase “Perez Motta text” to describe
the Cancun General Council Decision.) Practically speaking, it would be virtually
impossible to prevail at DSB on a provision contrary to the Cancun General Council
Decision. The legal status of both Doha and Cancun are expected to be clarified in a
planned 2004 amendment to TRIPS. General Council, World Trade Org., Implementation of
Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health: Decision of the
General Council, WT/L/540, ¶ 11 (Aug. 30, 2003) [hereinafter Cancun General Council
Decision]; see also Doha Declaration on TRIPS, supra note 32, ¶ 7.
138. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, art. 31(f); Doha Declaration on TRIPS, supra note 32,
¶ 4.
139. Doha Declaration on TRIPS, supra note 32, ¶ 5; ‘t Hoen, supra note 7, at 40-41.
140. This Article is generally focused on generics of controversial legal status, sometimes
referred to as “unlicensed” generics (i.e., a copy of a patented pill made by a manufacturer
that has not been authorized by the originator company). This terminology can be
confusing in light of the role of compulsory licenses and the questionable need for
licensing in some situations. It is simply important to keep in mind that we are not speaking
simply of generics for off-patent products, but the more complex market for generics of
drugs that may be subject to patents in the United States or elsewhere.
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programs. PhRMA companies strongly resisted both significant price
reductions as well as generic ARV drugs, citing both TRIPS and domestic
142
IP legislation.
Several examples illustrate the effectiveness of the credible threat of
generic production. Brazil’s threat to issue a compulsory license, coupled
with its non-recognition of pharmaceutical patents prior to the adoption of
143
TRIPS, permitted the distribution of free ARVs within Brazil. In January
2001, the United States requested a WTO panel against Brazil to prevent
144
Brazilian “local manufacture” of ARVs. Under international pressure, the
United States withdrew the panel request on June 25, 2001, in the months
145
leading up to the Fourth WTO Ministerial Conference in Doha.

141. MÉDECINS SANS FRONTIÈRES, SURMOUNTING CHALLENGES: PROCUREMENT OF
ANTIRETROVIRAL MEDICINES IN LOW- AND MIDDLE-INCOME COUNTRIES 7, 9, 42 (2003),
http://www.accessmed-msf.org/documents/procurementreport.pdf [hereinafter MSF,
SURMOUNTING CHALLENGES] (report prepared by MSF at the request of the WHO); Marleen
Boelaert et al., Letter to the Editor, 287 JAMA 840, 840 (2002) (“This impressive discount
offered by the companies to developing countries was not merely due to public outcry, but
mostly as a response to competition by generic drugs.”).
142. MSF, SURMOUNTING CHALLENGES, supra note 141; Judy Rein, International Governance
Through Trade Agreements: Patent Protection for Essential Medicines, 21 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 379,
394-404 (2001); Susan K. Sell, TRIPS and the Access to Medicines Campaign, 20 WIS. INT’L L.J.
481, 491-96 (2002) [hereinafter Sell, TRIPS]; ‘t Hoen, supra note 7, at 30-33.
143. U.K. COMM’N ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, INTEGRATING INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT POLICY 43 (2002); JEROME H. REICHMAN WITH CATHERINE
HASENZAHL, UNCTAD, NON-VOLUNTARY LICENSING OF PATENTED INVENTIONS: HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVE, LEGAL FRAMEWORK UNDER TRIPS, AND AN OVERVIEW OF THE PRACTICE IN CANADA
AND THE USA 2 (Project on IPRs and Sustainable Development, Issue Paper No. 5, 2003);
Jorge Bermudez, Expanding Access to Essential Medicines in Brazil: Recent Economic Regulation,
Policy-Making and Lessons Learnt, in ECONOMICS OF ESSENTIAL MEDICINES, 178, 193 (2002).
144. Permanent Mission of the United States, Brazil Measures Affecting Patent Protection,
Request for the Establishment of a Panel by the United States, WT/DS199/3 (Jan. 9, 2001),
http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/c/brazil/Req4EstabPanel.html. Executive Order 13155
had specifically reserved to the United States the right to seek such a panel. Exec. Order
No. 13155, 65 Fed. Reg. 30521, 30522 (May 10, 2000) (“This order does not prohibit the
United States Government from invoking the dispute settlement procedures of the World
Trade Organization to examine whether any such law or policy is consistent with
[TRIPS].”). For an overview of the Brazilian and South African situations by the
Congressional Research Service, see JOHN R. THOMAS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., HIV/AIDS
DRUGS, PATENTS AND THE TRIPS AGREEMENT: ISSUES AND OPTIONS 13-17 (2001) [hereinafter
THOMAS, CRS REPORT].
145. CORREA, IMPLICATIONS OF DOHA, supra note 137, at 2 & n.6; THOMAS, CRS REPORT,
supra note 144, at 15; ‘t Hoen, supra note 7, at 38-47.
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Indeed, even the United States has resorted to this tactic in recent
years: During the anthrax scare, threats of compulsory licensing of
146
ciprofloxacin were instrumental in securing a lower price from Bayer,
147
and compulsory licensing remains an important remedy in litigation.
Finally, voluntary no-royalty licenses, such as Merck’s recent grant to
148
South African-Indian company Thembalami Pharmaceuticals, must be
viewed in the context of South Africa’s compulsory licensing law. That is,
such licenses can be seen as responses to the looming threat of compulsory
149
licensing.
146. Jill Carroll & Ron Winslow, Bayer Agrees To Slash Prices for Cipro Drug, WALL ST. J., Oct.
25, 2001, at A3 (“The agreement comes after a high-stakes threat by Tommy Thompson,
HHS secretary, to break Bayer’s patent for Cipro if he didn’t get the price he wanted.”).
The U.S. compulsory license statutes are 7 U.S.C. § 2404 (2000) (patents necessary for the
nation’s food supply); 17 U.S.C. § 115 (2000) (copyrights to certain musical works); 28
U.S.C. § 1498 (2000) (patents); 35 U.S.C. § 203 (2000) (patents developed through the use
of government research funding under the Bayh-Dole Act); and 42 U.S.C. § 2183 (2000)
(atomic energy). The U.S. compulsory license statutes do not contain the restrictions
required by Article 31 of TRIPS. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, art. 31. For an
authoritative review of United States and Canadian experience with compulsory licensure,
see REICHMAN WITH HASENZAHL, supra note 143, at 19-22.
147. Makan Delrahim, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, U.S.
Department of Justice, Forcing Firms To Share the Sandbox: Compulsory Licensing of
Intellectual Property Rights and Antitrust, Presentation at the British Institute of
International and Comparative Law (May 10, 2004).
148. Press Release, Merck & Co., Inc., Merck & Co., Inc. Grants License for HIV/AIDS
Drug Efavirenz to South African Company, Thembalami Pharmaceuticals in Effort To
Accelerate Access to Life-Saving Treatment (July 14, 2004), http://www.pressmethod.com/
releasestorage/5003645.htm.
149. South Africa passed a compulsory licensing law in 1997, Medicines and Related
Substances Control Amendment Act No. 90 of 1997 (Republic of South Africa). The
government was promptly sued by PhRMA companies. The U.S. government suspended
bilateral economic assistance to South Africa as punishment for defending the suit.
Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, 1999, Pub. L.
No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681-153 (1999) (suspending appropriation of all bilateral economic
assistance to South Africa, including AIDS/HIV programs, until steps are taken to repeal
section 15(c) of South Africa’s Medicines and Related Substances Control Amendment Act
No. 90 of 1997). Many commentators have written about the case and the U.S. trade
pressure exerted upon South Africa. See, e.g., Lissett Ferreira, Access to Affordable HIV/AIDS
Drugs: The Human Rights Obligations of Multinational Pharmaceutical Corporations, 71 FORDHAM
L. REV. 1133, 1155 (2002); Rein, supra note 142, at 400-02; ‘t Hoen, supra note 7, at 30-31.
Doha paragraph 4 discourages Members from exerting bilateral pressure which hinders the
exercise of TRIPS and Doha rights. CORREA, IMPLICATIONS OF DOHA, supra note 137, at 12.
The U.S. government and PhRMA companies relented under great pressure in April 2001,
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Although threats of compulsory licensing may lead to differential
pricing, it is worth noting that reliance on voluntary price discrimination
to achieve marginal-cost distribution to low income populations has proven
very disappointing. Over the past five years there have been many
announcements of dramatic price cuts or voluntary programs, yet these
150
announcements have not resulted in much actual treatment in 2004.
Each PhRMA company creates idiosyncratic policies specifying which
countries qualify for differential pricing on any particular drug. Many of
these policies are limited to sub-Saharan Africa or specific low income
countries, thereby excluding AIDS crises in Asia, the former Soviet states,
Latin America, or most of the Caribbean. Transaction costs are high when
essential access discounts are negotiated on a case-by-case basis. Company
policies vary by the status of the purchaser (e.g., NGO, IGO, government,
private buyer).
Voluntary programs of differential pricing also fail to achieve
differential pricing at the marginal cost of production, which is absolutely
necessary for nonrival access. Voluntary negotiations kept ARV prices
unnecessarily high for years and delayed effective treatment for millions of
dying people. The Médecins sans Frontières pricing guide confirms that
most voluntary differential pricing programs continue to price significantly
151
above generic levels, a practice generally followed in the United States

shortly before Doha. Editorial, South Africa’s Moral Victory, 357 THE LANCET 1303 (2001);
THOMAS, CRS REPORT, supra note 144, at 16.
150. See, for example, the correspondence concerning access to Pfizer’s Diflucan
Donation Program, announced with great fanfare several years ago, but apparently still
unavailable on the ground in the Dominican Republic. E-mail from Eugene Schiff, Agua
Buena, to Joseph Saba, Axios (Sept. 20, 2004) (on file with author). A five company group
negotiated with five UN agencies for a year in 2000 and 2001 without tangible success. Each
company ended up negotiating access deals with each individual country. Paul Blustein &
Barton Gellman, HIV Drug Prices Cut for Poorer Countries; Other Firms May Follow Merck’s Lead,
WASH. POST, Mar. 8, 2001, at A1.
151. MÉDECINS SANS FRONTIÈRES, UNTANGLING THE WEB OF PRICE REDUCTIONS: A PRICING
GUIDE FOR THE PURCHASE OF ARVS FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (6th ed. 2004),
http://www.accessmed-msf.org [hereinafter MSF, UNTANGLING THE WEB]. Merck makes
Stocrin (efavirenz, EFV) 600 mg available in Columbia for US$767 per year. Id. at 9. The
lowest cost generic provider is Hetero of India at US$347 per year. Id. at 12, 22. Merck
matches the generic price only in Low Human Development Index (HDI) countries and
Medium HDI countries with adult HIV prevalence of one percent or greater. Id. at 12. The
distinction is lost on very poor persons living with HIV/AIDS in a Medium HDI country
with prevalence under one percent, such as Columbia.

227

193 ART_OUTTERSONV5

12/25/2004 4:45 PM

YALE JOURNAL OF HEALTH POLICY, LAW, AND ETHICS

V:1 (2005)

152

after generic market entry.
Voluntary differential pricing should be extended to target
populations in a larger group of countries. If pharmaceutical rents are
supra-optimal, loss of some elite markets will not harm innovation. Even if
pharmaceutical rents are sub-optimal, additional countries can receive
differential pricing if they undertake serious measures to segment and
153
protect the local elite market. As the AIDS epidemic expands in Eastern
Europe and Central Asia, access must be expanded to regions beyond subSaharan Africa.
Given the apparent limitations of the efficacy of voluntary pricing, it is
important that compulsory licensing be more than a threat—that it be a
viable way for countries to introduce generic competition. However, lack of
manufacturing capacity in the lowest income countries limits the
practicability of domestic production of generic pharmaceuticals. The
TRIPS Agreement seemingly restricts compulsory licenses predominantly
154
to domestic use, effectively preventing exports. Since many countries do
not have domestic pharmaceutical production capacity, the no-export rule
prevents many countries from delivering low-cost ARVs to HIV/AIDS
155
patients. For example, compulsory licenses are arguably not useful to
Malawi absent the opportunity to import from other countries, such as
Brazil, India, or South Africa. The ensuing debate was energetic, leading
up to the Cancun WTO meeting in 2003.
Immediately prior to the Cancun meeting, on August 30, 2003, the
United States conceded the point. Under the Cancun General Council
Decision, the WTO now permits exports of compulsory licensed drugs to
the poorest countries—an important development if compulsory licensing
is to be a meaningful option for countries without manufacturing
156
capacity. The Cancun General Council Decision established a WTO
notification process for cross-border compulsory licenses: The TRIPS
157
Council must be notified, but WTO approval is not required. In May
2004, Canada amended the Canadian Patent Law to permit compulsory

152. CBO, INCREASED COMPETITION, supra note 65, at xiii.
153. See infra Part II.
154. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, art. 31(f).
155. See Doha Declaration on TRIPS, supra note 32, ¶ 6.
156. Cancun General Council Decision, supra note 137; EU, Cancun, supra note 137. While
the Cancun General Council Decision has the potential to positively impact access, it has
not yet had an effect on drug availability. See infra note 293 and accompanying text.
157. Cancun General Council Decision, supra note 137, ¶ 2; see also EU, Cancun, supra note
137 (noting that WTO approval is not required).
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licenses for certain drug exports to needy nations. As of September 2004,
159
no WTO Member has notified the TRIPS Council.
Phil Thorpe’s study on TRIPS implementation recently found that
most developing countries have not taken advantage of the flexibilities and
160
exceptions permitted under TRIPS. He does not explore the reasons
behind this failure, but two are likely. First, many countries may lack the
impartial technical assistance needed to implement these provisions,
including restrictions on “new use” patents, Bolar provisions, and
international exhaustion rules. When the World Intellectual Property
Association has provided assistance, developing countries have found
WIPO’s agenda to be IP maximalist rather than aimed at taking full
161
162
advantage of TRIPS flexibilities. Second, the TRIPS-plus offensive of
the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) and the “Special 301” reports from
that same office are frequently used to bluster countries into modifying

158. The Jean Chretien Pledge to Africa Act, House of Commons, 3d Sess., 37th
Parliament, 52-53 Eliz. II, 2004 (Bill C-9) (received Royal Assent on 14 May 2004)
[hereinafter Canadian Bill C-9]. The law created a positive list of drugs eligible for
compulsory licensure, a procedural hurdle not required by the WTO. Id. Sched. 1. France
and Noway have recently followed suit. Law. N. 2004-800, Aug. 6, 2004, J.O, Aug. 7, 2004, p.
18 (Fr); Regulations Amending the Patent Regulations (In Accordance With the Decision
of the WTO General Council of 30 August 2003, Paragraphs 1(b) and 2(a)), Royal Decree
of 14 May, 2004 (Nor.), http://www.cptech.org/ip/health [hereinafter Norwegian
Compulsory License Regulation]. Norway does not have a significant pharmaceutical
sector, so the impact of the regulation is modest. Id. ¶ 7 (official explanation of the
regulation). Canada is more likely to actually export, but the Canadian law is more
restrictive than the Norwegian. See CANADIAN HIV/AIDS LEGAL NETWORK, GLOBAL ACCESS TO
TREATMENT: CANADA’S BILL C-9 AND THE COMPULSORY LICENSING OF PHARMACEUTICALS FOR
EXPORT TO COUNTRIES IN NEED (2004), http://www.aidslaw.ca/Maincontent/issues/
cts/patent-amend/billC-9flyer300604.pdf. The Norwegian regulations are far less
restrictive.
159. The WTO has established a web page to announce notifications under Doha and
Cancun, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/public_health_e.htm. None are
posted as of September 28, 2004.
160. THORPE, supra note 32, at 1.
161. Public comments by the official delegations from several non-OECD countries at
the Trans Atlantic Consumer Dialogue Future of WIPO Workshop, Geneva (Sept. 13, 2004)
(the author was present); see also Geneva Declaration on the Future of the World
Intellectual
Property
Organization,
http://www.cptech.org/ip/wipo/futureofwipo
declaration.pdf (last visited Sept. 21, 2004) (“The WIPO technical assistance programs must
be fundamentally reformed.”).
162. “TRIPS Plus” refers to provisions which exceed the floors established under the
TRIPS Agreement.
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domestic law to the liking of U.S. owners of IP. WTO Members should have
a realistic opportunity to implement the flexibilities bargained for in
TRIPS, including compulsory licensure, unhindered by unilateral U.S.
interests.
b. Compulsory Licensing Need Not Harm Optimal Innovation
Assuming that production for compulsory licensure is limited to noncommercial markets, production by a third party does not add any
163
marginal cost to the innovator and, thus, will not impede innovation. If
global pharmaceutical rents are supra-optimal, then compulsory licenses
without royalties can be utilized without loss of innovation incentives. The
burden of proof of sub-optimality should be on the innovator companies
seeking a royalty, and the royalty rate in conditions of sub-optimality
should balance innovation and access goals. In all cases, such nonrival use
by low income populations should be viewed as an opportunity rather than
164
a problem.
A free rider problem may emerge if compulsory licensure decisions
are evaluated solely at the domestic level. Each country may rationally
choose to shirk its share of R&D costs, the same free rider problem
afflicting innovation generally. Some form of global coordination may be
165
required to address the negative externality.
Second-degree price
discrimination such as price controls or other domestic rules affecting the
ability of companies to appropriate rents also raise global coordination
issues, which are now being negotiated in U.S. bilateral free trade
166
agreements.

163. This result holds without regard for whether rents are currently supra- or suboptimal. Critiques of compulsory licenses by Merges and others are not applicable here
because the goal is not the initiation of efficient bargaining around a rule, but the provision
of essential medicines at marginal cost without harming innovation. See Robert P. Merges,
Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights and Collective Rights Organizations, 84
CAL. L. REV. 1293 (1996) (arguing that compulsory licenses in digital media are less efficient
than private contractual efforts).
164. Scherer, Global Welfare, supra note 135, at 1141.
165. This is particularly true amongst the OECD, where free riding has the greatest
potential to affect global rents. See infra Section II.B.
166. BUDDHIMA LOKUGE & THOMAS FAUNCE, TRADE DISPUTES AND THE PHARMACEUTICAL
BENEFITS SCHEME: CONSTRUCTIVE AMBIGUITIES, NON-VIOLATION NULLIFICATION DISPUTES AND
THE AUSTRALIA US FREE TRADE AGREEMENT 8-9 (Austl. Nat’l Univ., Informal Working Paper,
Sept. 2004) (on file with author).
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ii. Dysfunctional Pharmaceutical Arbitrage
The second implication of global optimality concerns dysfunctional
pharmaceutical arbitrage. The form of pharmaceutical arbitrage which is
most likely to reduce rents is diversion from charitable non-commercial
167
markets into high income markets. If global pharmaceutical rents are
sub-optimal (or made sub-optimal thereby), this arbitrage may be labeled
dysfunctional. The EU recognizes that its attempts to support differential
pricing for essential medicines depend in part upon blocking arbitrage
168
into high income markets.
It is important to note the limited scope of the case against
dysfunctional pharmaceutical arbitrage. It does not apply to generic drugs
because protecting the generic company’s profits will not create incentives
for innovative R&D, and thus arbitrage restrictions on generic drugs are
169
not supportable on innovation grounds.
Restrictions are also inappropriate between and to low income
markets, so long as commercial markets are not replaced. Arbitrage
restrictions could be lifted on sales to and within low and medium income
countries. Outside of high income markets, the international exhaustion
rule should always apply, as there is no proven innovation-based warrant
for denying nonrival access.
Some level of arbitrage to recent immigrants to high income countries
might be tolerable. Very little money is at stake for PhRMA companies and
the likely high income country consumers of smuggled African drugs
might well be at the margins of the country’s health care system. Recent
immigrants may not be full market participants either, despite their
physical location in a high income country. The well-publicized
confiscation of thirty-six thousand packages of African AIDS medications
170
in the Netherlands in October 2002 might fit this profile. Even if the
167. Parallel trade from poor countries to rich countries is incompatible with differential
pricing of essential medicines. See DANZON & TOWSE, supra note 12 (noting that parallel
trade defeats the objectives of differential pricing); David A. Malueg & Marius Schwartz,
Parallel Imports, Demand Dispersion, and International Price Discrimination, 37 J. INT’L ECON. 167,
193 (1994).
168. DG TRADE, supra note 42, at 2.
169. Restrictions might be appropriate on other grounds, such as safety. If a generic
drug has not been approved in a market, importing it would not be arbitrage. For
unpatented or generic products, no innovation-based case for banning parallel trade can be
offered.
170. DUKES, supra note 84, at 50 n.1. For surprising details on this case, see infra notes
313-323 and accompanying text.
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patients are market participants, receiving familiar medications from
home, in their native language, might well be the best medical practice. In
the United States, the uniform use of English labels in a multicultural
society is not a culturally competent practice for recent immigrants lacking
good English skills.
Arbitrage controls may be unnecessary between and within high
income markets if pharmaceutical rents are supra-optimal. Put another
way, parallel trade in patented pharmaceuticals within high income
171
markets may be permitted. If rents are sub-optimal, the domestic
exhaustion rule should apply in high income markets, forbidding parallel
imports into such countries and raising pharmaceutical rents. Otherwise,
the international exhaustion rule should apply to sales between high
income markets on free trade principles since consumers will benefit while
innovation incentives remain intact.
iii. Domestic Pharmaceutical Arbitrage
The current TRIPS approach is tied to state sovereignty, affecting legal
regimes along national political boundaries. TRIPS aggregates customers
into country-level markets, reflecting both transaction costs and the
political realities of sovereignty. This state-centric system is not surprising,
given that only states are WTO Members, but the process suffers from both
over-inclusion and under-inclusion.
Over-inclusion occurs when an entire country is granted an exception,
extension, or flexibility under TRIPS, even though some people within
these low or middle income countries can afford to pay high income
market prices for drugs. Even in the poorest countries, an elite cadre of
individuals control enough wealth to afford these drugs. In middle income
countries such as India, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, South Africa, China, and
172
Argentina, these markets are significant and growing. The elites in low

171. Pharmaceutical arbitrage within high income markets is the subject of Section II.B
on Canadian-U.S. pharmaceutical arbitrage.
172. In its 2001 submission to the United States Trade Representative, PhRMA claimed
that $260 million was lost annually due to unlicensed generic drug products in Argentina.
Sell, TRIPS, supra note 142, at 496 n.55 (citing PHARM. RESEARCH MFRS. OF AM., NATIONAL
TRADE ESTIMATE REPORT ON FOREIGN TRADE BARRIERS (2001)). In 2003, the pharmaceutical
industry’s estimate ballooned to $600 million and was included in the 2003 National Trade
Estimate Report without any apparent verification from outside of the industry. U.S. OFFICE
OF TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2003 NATIONAL TRADE ESTIMATE REPORT ON FOREIGN TRADE
BARRIERS, ARGENTINA 6 (2003), http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Document_Library/Reports_
Publications/2003/2003_NTE_Report/asset_upload_file997_6178.pdf. The estimate was
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and middle income countries are actually part of the high income market
and should be expected to participate in this market on normal
173
commercial terms.
Theory suggests that providing low-cost AIDS drugs to impoverished
South Africans might make it more difficult to charge full price to wealthy
or middle class South Africans, but apparently PhRMA companies
174
effectively segment these markets, much as they do in the United
dropped from the 2004 National Trade Estimate Report. U.S. OFFICE OF TRADE
REPRESENTATIVE, 2004 NATIONAL TRADE ESTIMATE REPORT ON FOREIGN TRADE BARRIERS,
ARGENTINA (2004), http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Document_Library/Reports_Publications/
2004/2004_National_Trade_Estimate/2004_NTE_Report/asset_upload_file568_4735.pdf.
173. Pharmaceutical companies may currently prefer to keep the small full-priced elite
market in developing countries rather than risk arbitrage. FREDERICK M. SCHERER &
JAYASHREE WATAL, WHO COMM’N ON MACROECONOMICS & HEALTH, POST-TRIPS OPTIONS FOR
ACCESS TO PATENTED MEDICINES FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (2001) [hereinafter SCHERER &
WATAL, POST-TRIPS OPTIONS]; Oxfam, Fatal Side Effects: Medicine Patents Under the Microscope,
in ECONOMICS OF ESSENTIAL MEDICINES, supra note 3, 81, 93 (suggesting drug companies
profit from elite households in Argentina, Brazil, India, and China); W. Duncan Reekie, The
Development Trilemma and the South African Response, in THE ECONOMICS OF ESSENTIAL
MEDICINES, supra note 3, at 167-68 (showing that the top twenty percent of South Africans
enjoy a per capita GNP of $27,699, comparable to OECD levels and are therefore a
significant market for drug companies); World Health Organization-World Trade
Organization, Differential Pricing and the Financing of Essential Drugs, in ECONOMICS OF
ESSENTIAL MEDICINES, supra note 3, at 213 (recognizing elite drug markets in developing
nations); Patricia Danzon & Michael Furukawa, Prices and Availability of Pharmaceuticals:
Evidence from Nine Countries exhibit 8 (undated presentation), at http://
hc.wharton.upenn.edu/danzon/index.htm (showing that prices normalized by national
income in Chile and Mexico are at 528% and 529% of the U.S. prices, which I interpret to
mean that drug purchasers in Chile and Mexico must have personal incomes far in excess
of the national average). In their public filings with the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission, PhRMA companies acknowledge the growing middle class markets in the
developing world. Merck & Co, Inc., SEC Form 10-k, at 14 (filed Mar. 10, 2004) [hereinafter
Merck, SEC Form 10-k]. PhRMA companies have recognized the potential of these markets
for some time. Foreign Trade Practices (Part 2): Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and
Investigations, and the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 99th Cong. 196 (1985)
(statement of Gerald Mossinghoff, PhRMA President).
174. In South Africa, the NGO and public sector price for a triple therapy regime
(ZDV/3TC+NVP) was US$400 per person year while the private sector price in South Africa
was US$2007. MSF, SURMOUNTING CHALLENGES, supra note 141, at 37. A recent WHO survey
found significant variations in prices of essential medications within most countries
surveyed. Jeanne Madden, Basic Results That the WHO/HAI Survey Offers Country-Level
Investigators, 33 ESSENTIAL DRUG MONITOR 15 (2003). Significant domestic price variations
indicate that various legal and market-based segmentation approaches were apparently
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States. The persistence of domestic differential pricing, even in the face
of extensive donor programs, is a testament to the effectiveness of market
segmentation by PhRMA companies and the apparent weakness of actual
pharmaceutical arbitrage pressure. Possible mechanisms are brand
campaigns with trademarks, differential pricing by payor, and domestic
176
legal restrictions on arbitrage.
Under-inclusion occurs when a middle income country does not
qualify for exceptions or flexibilities, or is discouraged from taking
advantage of them, despite the needs of some desperately poor citizens
177
therein. The state-centric system lays responsibility for low income
patients on the middle and high income countries in which they reside.
Here we see a weakness of any system of defining market segments by state
political borders rather than actual health needs or ability to afford
medicines. It also illustrates the arbitrary categories of development and
the difficulties a country might face when it ‘graduates’ to a higher
category.
Accommodations (such as nonrival access to low income populations)
may be offered to middle income countries without damaging innovation,
so long as domestic price discrimination legal structures are successfully
178
maintained. Again, if global pharmaceutical rents are supra-optimal,
PhRMA companies could bear the loss of some elite markets without
harming innovation.
A simple estimate in the case of HIV drugs may be useful: PhRMA
would likely not suffer significant lost profit if all sales of HIV products in

functioning.
175. See W. VA. PHARM. COST MGMT. COUNCIL, REFERENCE PRICING SUBCOMMITTEE 2-3, app.
A-1, A-2 (2004) (demonstrating significant price discrimination within West Virginia
between prescription drug prices under Medicaid, private payors, the Public Health
Service’s 340b program, and the Federal Supply Schedule, as well as Canadian and
Australian prices) [hereinafter WEST VIRGINIA REPORT], http://www.wvc.state.wv.us/got/
pharmacycouncil/default.cfm.
176. Within the U.S. market, internal diversion is illegal in many cases. See Heather Won
Tesoriero & Gary Fields, FBI, FDA Investigates Big Drug Wholesaler, WALL ST. J., Sept. 19, 2003,
at B1 (reporting alleged diversion from discounted hospital markets to higher-priced
secondary markets).
177. See, e.g., Letter to Jong-Wook Lee, Director General, World Health Organization,
and Peter Piot, Executive Director, Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (Apr. 5,
2004), http://www.aidsinfonyc.org/tag/activism/UNltrOnPriceReductions.html
(discussing the plight of lower middle income countries such as Egypt, Ukraine, Costa Rica,
El Salvador, and Panama where ARVs are priced at unaffordable levels).
178. For a discussion of these legal structures, see supra Section I.C.
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every low and middle income country dropped to zero. GlaxoSmithKline,
the largest participant in the market for HIV drugs, reports sales in three
geographic regions: the United States, Europe, and “International.” This
latter category includes high income countries such as Japan, Canada and
Australia, as well as low and middle income countries in Latin America,
Asia, Africa and the Middle East. Even so, total international HIV drug
179
sales in 2003 were only £155 million, in a year in which gross profit was
£17.2 billion and selling, general, and administrative (SG&A) expenses
were £7.5 billion. Actual profits from ARV sales in both low and middle
income markets are likely to be negligible to GSK’s global profits and
R&D, particularly if elite markets in these countries remain commercial.
iv. Optimizing Subsidies
Another form of optimization creates subsidies to achieve particular
goals. Push subsidies include tax credits for R&D, general research grants
such as those distributed by the United States’s National Institutes of
Health (NIH), and the orphan drug tax credit. Pull subsidies directly
address the issue of the appropriation of rents; such mechanisms include
the patent system, exclusive marketing periods for orphan and pediatric
drugs, and donor purchase commitments for development of a specific
180
pharmaceutical, such as an AIDS or malaria vaccine or antidotes to
181
bioterrorism.
The heuristic suggests three implications. First, for drugs or conditions
with sub-optimal pharmaceutical rents, government intervention should
increase pharmaceutical rents toward optimal levels. For example,
subsidies are essential for neglected diseases, where the target population
cannot afford any commercial price for therapy. Second, subsidies can be
limited to drugs with sub-optimal pharmaceutical rents without harming
innovation. Scarce subsidies should not be directed to drugs with strong
commercial potential, but should be reserved for neglected diseases.

179. GLAXOSMITHKLINE PLC, 2003 ANNUAL REPORT, Form 20-F, at 61-63.
180. Michael Kremer, Pharmaceuticals and the Developing World, 16 J. ECON. PERSP. 67, 82-85
(2002). For a recent example, see Press Release, Inst. for OneWorld Health, Institute for
OneWorld Health Receives Gates Foundation Grant to Fund Development of Malaria
Vaccine (July 13, 2004), http://www.oneworldhealth.org/media/details.php?prID=76.
181. The Congressional Research Service indicates that “guaranteeing a market through
contract authority” is an aspect of President Bush’s Project BioShield to develop bioterror
countermeasures. FRANK GOTTRON, PROJECT BIOSHIELD 1 (Cong. Research Serv. Report for
Congress, RS21507, 2003). The proposed size of the pull subsidy for bioterror
countermeasures is $5.593 billion through FY 2013. Id. at 3.

235

193 ART_OUTTERSONV5

12/25/2004 4:45 PM

YALE JOURNAL OF HEALTH POLICY, LAW, AND ETHICS

V:1 (2005)

Finally, for patented drugs with supra-optimal pharmaceutical rents, the
government may intervene to achieve other goals, such as improved
nonrival access, without undermining R&D innovation.
Applying these implications to recent policy proposals is instructive.
Frederic M. Scherer and Jayashree Watal have proposed expanding U.S.
182
tax incentives for donating pharmaceuticals to poor countries, but this
additional push subsidy is warranted only if pharmaceutical rents are suboptimal. Likewise, the U.S. Congress on September 23, 2004 authorized
$7.6 billion to extend the expiring R&D tax credit for another eighteen
183
months without targeting specific disease conditions. Proposals for
indiscriminate tax credits are unsupported absent evidence of suboptimality of global pharmaceutical rents.
v. National Drug Regulation and WHO Prequalification
National regimes for testing the safety and efficacy of patented drugs
are inefficient, duplicating scientific work and wasting resources
unnecessarily. Each New Chemical Entity (NCE) requires clearance by the
FDA in the United States and parallel regulatory authorities in every
country where the drug will be sold. Prior to the establishment of the
184
EMEA, some estimates put the cost of duplicative NDRA processes within
185
the EU at £500 million per year. NDRA rules also delay the launch of
186
innovative drugs in many countries. A “reference” approval process
would reduce duplicative costs and speed market entry of
187
pharmaceuticals.

182. SCHERER & WATAL, POST-TRIPS OPTIONS, supra note 173.
183. Working Families Tax Relief Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-311, §301(1), 118 Stat.
1166 (2004) (conference report approved by House and Senate, Sept. 23, 2004); Rob Wells
& Maya Jackson Randall, Tax-Cut Bill Aids Firms; Research Credit Extended, WALL ST. J., Sept.
27, 2004, at A5.
184. Council Regulation 2309/93, O.J. (L 214), as amended by Commission Regulation
649/98 O.J. (L 88) 7.
185. ROTHNIE, supra note 66, at 493-94 (citing various sources).
186. See PATRICIA M. DANZON ET AL., IMPACT OF PRICE REGULATION ON THE LAUNCH DELAY
OF NEW DRUGS: EVIDENCE FROM TWENTY-FIVE MAJOR MARKETS IN THE 1990S (Nat’l Bureau of
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 9874, 2003). This study collects data on launch delay
and concludes that in addition to difficulties with the drug approval process, many
companies delay applications to enter some smaller markets due to fears of pharmaceutical
arbitrage. If global rents are supra-optimal, this industry practice is reprehensible, as it
voluntarily withholds important drugs from patients.
187. Many NDRAs practice a form of reference approval when they require, as a

236

193 ART_OUTTERSONV5

12/25/2004 4:45 PM

PHARMACEUTICAL ARBITRAGE

A reference approval system requires at least four provisions. First,
safety and efficacy testing would be referenced against approval in certain
benchmark countries. For example, if a compound was approved as safe
and efficacious by either the U.S. FDA or the EU’s EMEA, then it could
automatically be deemed to meet standards in the target country. Second,
WHO prequalification (or a similar process) would be deemed to satisfy
other domestic NDRA requirements, such as bioequivalence for generic
entry and good manufacturing practices. Third, IP rights and drug
marketing approvals should also be de-linked. IP rights would still be
enforceable under domestic law and TRIPS, but NDRA approval should
proceed apace. Finally, in categories of strong local collective preference
(such as RU-486), the NDRA may retain a veto.
The United States opposes the first three of these elements, without an
innovation warrant. Expansion of the WHO prequalification process is a
clear example. WHO Prequalification is clearly useful in many regions,
with many different companies producing generic ARVs under unknown
188
conditions. In the 2004 World Health Assembly, the United States
pushed to remove the word “strengthening” from the WHO HIV/AIDS
189
Resolution concerning prequalification. The word was retained in the
190
final document, but the United States continues to marginalize the
191
prequalification process in PEPFAR. The United States also implicitly
opposed reference approvals in various free trade agreements, on the
192
ground that the rights of data exclusivity must be protected. The recent

condition of application for marketing approval, prior marketing approval in either the
United States., the EU, or Japan. My suggestion is that NDRAs could consider extending the
practice for all of the biological aspects of the marketing approval process, retaining only
the right to veto based on a collective preference, as well as approval of the labeling.
188. AM. FOUND. FOR AIDS RESEARCH, TREAT ASIA SPECIAL REPORT: EXPANDED AVAILABILITY
OF HIV/AIDS DRUGS IN ASIA CREATES URGENT NEED FOR TRAINED DOCTORS 4 (2004),
http://www.amfAR.org/treatment/news/TADoc7.pdf [hereinafter AmfAR].
189. Compare World Health Org., A57/A/Conf.Paper No. 3 Rev. 1(May 20, 2004), with
Rev.2 (May 21, 2004).
190. Scaling up Treatment and Care Within a Coordinated and Comprehensive Response to
HIV/AIDS, World Health Assembly, 57th Ass., Agenda Item 12.1, at 3, WHO Doc. WHA57.14
(May 22, 2004) [hereinafter World Health Assembly, Scaling up Treatment].
191. Marilyn Chase, Generic AIDS Pill Gets Acceptance, WALL ST. J., July 2, 2004, at B3.
192. MÉDECINS SANS FRONTIÈRES, MSF BRIEFING NOTE, ACCESS TO MEDICINES AT RISK ACROSS
THE GLOBE: WHAT TO WATCH OUT FOR IN FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS WITH THE UNITED STATES
4-6 (2004), http://www.accessmed-msf.org/documents/ftabriefingenglish.pdf [herinafter
MSF, FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS]; DAVID VIVAS-EUGUI, QUAKER U.N. OFFICE, REGIONAL AND
BILATERAL AGREEMENTS AND A TRIPS-PLUS WORLD: THE FREE TRADE AREA OF THE AMERICAS
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Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with Australia requires linkage between drug
approval and patent status for the first time, exporting a portion of Hatch193
Waxman to Australia.
Resources are also wasted in the generic entry process. NDRAs should
not require generic applicants to repeat any clinical studies without a clear
194
benefit to public health. Generic companies also expend resources to
reverse-engineer patented drugs. Reverse-engineering in this case is a
wasteful effort and needlessly delays launch in low income countries by
195
several years. The United States’s TRIPS-plus proposals to extend data
196
exclusivity to five or ten years will further increase costs and delay generic
entry. If pharmaceutical rents are already supra-optimal, all of this is a
social loss. Taking unnecessary costs out of the NDRA system makes R&D
more efficient, lowers the threshold for cost-effective innovation, and
delivers innovative drugs to patients more quickly.
vi. Price Controls
This Article is agnostic on the question of the desirability of
pharmaceutical price controls generally. The purpose of this Section is to
describe what form price controls should (or should not) take if policy
makers choose to adopt them.
The heuristic suggests five conclusions about pharmaceutical price
controls. It confirms three relatively uncontroversial points: (1) price
(FTAA) 16-18 (2003) (on file with author) [hereinafter VIVAS-EUGUI, QUAKER UN OFFICE].
193. M. Kevin Outterson, Free Trade in Pharmaceuticals, 181 MED. J. AUSTL. 260-61 (2004);
Ken J. Harvey et al., Will the Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement Undermine the
Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme?, 181 MED. J. AUSTL. 256-59 (2004).
194. PhRMA companies withhold much of this data as trade secrets or seek “data
exclusivity” to block generic entry, but when a patent is set to expire there is no innovation
warrant to delay generic entry, unless all generic entry is premature.
195. Watal reports a lag of about two years for generic pharmaceuticals reverseengineered in India. Jayashree Watal, Pharmaceutical Patents, Prices and Welfare Losses: Policy
Options for India Under the WTO TRIPS Agreement, 23 WORLD ECON. 733-52 (2000).
196. MSF, FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS, supra note 192, at 4-6; OXFAM INT’L, UNDERMINING
ACCESS TO MEDICINES: COMPARISONS OF FIVE US FTA’S 13-15 (Oxfam Briefing Note, 2004);
VIVAS-EUGUI, QUAKER UN OFFICE, supra note 192, at 16-18. The United States is currently
pressuring Israel to accept five to ten years of data exclusivity, a threat targeting Teva
Pharmaceuticals, one of the world’s largest producers of generic medicines, based in Israel.
Teva Opposes 10-Year Data Exclusivity Provision for Israel, 21 GENERIC LINE, May 5, 2004, 2004
WL 65711471; Hadas Manor, US to Israel: Grant 5-Year Exclusivity for Ethical Drugs, GLOBES
(Israel), (July 1, 2004), http://www.globes.co.il/serveen/globes/docview.asp?did=810543
&fid=942.
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controls should exclude generic products; (2) developing country
differential prices should not be used in high income country external
reference pricing systems; and (3) price controls should be stable over
long periods of time. The last two conclusions are likely to meet more
controversy: (4) optimization of rents is preferable to price-fixing and
reference pricing; and (5) PhRMA company data should be more
transparent on a global basis.
First, generic pharmaceutical products must be excluded from price
controls. The special case for government intervention in pharmaceutical
prices derives from the monopoly market power granted by the state to
patented drugs. Generic products do not generate patent rents, and thus
197
should be exempt.
Second, virtual forms of dysfunctional arbitrage must be blocked. High
income markets should not utilize developing country differential prices as
198
an external reference price within these countries. At present, this is not
a problem, as it appears that no high income country uses donor prices in
its reference pricing system.
Third, price controls must be stable over long periods of time.
Pharmaceutical research requires long lead times before marketing.
Companies should receive accurate ex ante pricing signals that are
reliable. Otherwise, companies will discount the current price signals for
the political risk of more onerous price controls.
Fourth, the heuristic prefers optimization over price-fixing and

197. Internal reference pricing systems may refer to generic prices within the therapeutic
class, but generics themselves should not be reimbursed under an internal reference
pricing system. Inclusion is not warranted, and may actually keep the generic prices
artificially high. No pro-innovation goal is served by artificially high generic prices, other
than a very indirect and inefficient subsidy of the innovator companies.
198. F.M. Scherer & Jayashree Watal, The Economics of TRIPS Options for Access to Medicines,
in ECONOMICS OF ESSENTIAL MEDICINES, supra note 3, at 32, 48-49 (arguing for a ban on
external reference pricing which uses prices in low income nations). Just like physical
arbitrage, this practice should be restricted only when it flows from poor to rich nations.
External reference pricing within high income countries, or within low and middle income
countries does not undermine differential pricing for the poor. But see Scherer & Watal,
supra, at 49 (suggesting preventing parallel exports from any price-controlled country).
Danzon and Towse address the external reference pricing problem by suggesting increased
pricing obscurity and opacity so that the rock-bottom prices are not “directly observable.”
DANZON & TOWSE, supra note 12, at 6, 16-17. Their solution is vigorously rejected by
Médecins sans Frontières, which has been very active in negotiating price discounts and
distributing ARVs in sub-Saharan Africa. MSF, UNTANGLING THE WEB, supra note 151; MSF,
SURMOUNTING CHALLENGES, supra note 141, at 7.
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reference pricing. In this context, the policy goal should be to take the
widest possible advantage of nonrival access, limited only by setting the
minimum level of rents necessary to ensure optimal R&D. Any
modifications to the strength of the power to appropriate rents must be
evaluated in this light, whether it falls in the domain of IP law, contract,
market regulation, national drug regulation, or trade agreements.
By contrast, price-fixing implies a price level without considering these
other issues. Reference pricing schemes also may proceed automatically.
By contrast, the reimbursement systems in Australia and the United
Kingdom illustrate two different optimization approaches which support
innovation.
In Australia’s Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme (PBS), each new drug
must be approved under an economic evaluation process if governmental
reimbursement is desired. The company must submit a dossier to the
Pharmaceutical Benefits Advisory Committee (PBAC) proposing a price
for the drug and supporting the economic efficiency of that price, given
the drug’s clinical advantages over existing therapies. In other words,
Australia pays for value: Highly innovative drugs receive a much higher
price; me-too drugs are priced with the lowest-cost equivalent. The
199
incentives are obvious.
The United Kingdom’s National Institute of Clinical Effectiveness
(NICE) also performs economic evaluation of drugs, but targets a drug
company’s UK return on investment for its drug portfolio to the FTSE 100
London stock market index. One can argue about transfer pricing games
and whether the FTSE 100 is an appropriate target, but the overall
structure of the program is designed to support a reasonable return on
200
R&D investment.
Finally, greater transparency is warranted. Although biological data
from clinical trials is generally applicable worldwide, many NDRAs accept
confidentiality restrictions on data submitted for marketing approval and

199. LOKUGE & FAUNCE, supra note 166, at 7-8; SANJOY ROY, W. VA. PHARM. COST MGMT.
COUNCIL, AN OVERVIEW OF PHARMACEUTICAL REFERENCE PRICING AND REIMBURSEMENT:
ANALYSIS OF THE AUSTRALIAN PHARMACEUTICAL BENEFITS SCHEME 12-23 (2004),
http://www.wvc.state.wv.us/got/pharmacycouncil/default.cfm.
200. JOAN-RAMON BORRELL, PRICES OF MEDICINES: A CASE-STUDY OF THE IMPACT OF THE
RATE-OF-RETURN REGULATION IN THE UNITED KINGDOM 22 (Univ. of Barcelona Working
Paper, 1997) (finding the regulation largely ineffective in controlling UK medicine prices);
SARAH F. JAGGAR, GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/HEHS-94-30, PRESCRIPTION DRUGS:
SPENDING CONTROLS IN FOUR EUROPEAN COUNTRIES 69-77 (1994) (France, Germany, Sweden,
and the United Kingdom).
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reimbursement, needlessly reinventing the wheel each time. These
unnecessary costs raise rents without social benefit. The economic
evaluation studies submitted to the Australian PBAC would be very helpful
201
in formulary and reimbursement decisions worldwide. Further, if certain
forms of price controls are adopted, optimizing pharmaceutical rents will
require accurate global data on pharmaceutical pricing, profitability, and
innovation. This information is not currently available to independent
researchers, forcing policy makers to rely on the DiMasi study of secret and
202
unverified industry data.
It strains credulity to base important
pharmaceutical policy decisions on secret industry data, unavailable for
study by other researchers.
vii. Free Riders
The heuristic has additional implications for the free rider problem in
pharmaceutical innovation. If the free rider is a low income country (or
low income person), we can consider the situation either a gift or harmless
203
nonrival use. Free riding by high income countries is a more complicated
problem.
Most high income countries have created direct or indirect
governmental reimbursement of prescription drugs. One cannot expect
governments to passively accept third degree differential pricing dictated
by the drug companies. Nor do governments accept Ramsey Optimal
Pricing based upon the government’s ability to pay. Governmental
resources are too scarce to completely resist the monopsony power, with
204
the possible (temporary) exception of the United States.
Acting solely in the national interest, governments may negotiate for
the lowest possible prices, unconcerned about the possible negative global

201. Outterson, supra note 193, at 260-61.
202. DiMasi et al., supra note 29. The R&D expenditure data source for this study was a
“confidential survey” returned from ten PhRMA companies, id. at 152, 156, as well as
unverified PhRMA aggregate data, id. at 179.
203. Scherer, Global Welfare, supra note 135, at 1141.
204. The federal government is prohibited from exercising monopsony powers in the
new Medicare Part D drug benefit. Medicare Prescription Drug Improvement and
Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-173, § 301, 117 Stat 2066 (to be codified at §
1808(c)(1)(C) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. 139b-9). However, the United States is
not entirely immune to rate-setting inclinations in health care. Almost every other major
health care good or service purchased by Medicare or Medicaid is subject to rate-setting,
including the services of physicians, hospitals, ambulatory surgical centers, and home
health agencies.
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effects on innovation. PhRMA companies may respond by raising prices in
uncontrolled markets. The United States is the largest such market. Put
bluntly, high income countries with price controls are said to be free riders
205
on American innovation.
206
Whether the free rider thesis is true empirically is an open question.
Perhaps the crusade against the scourge of low-priced drugs is misplaced.
Perhaps American prices are supra-optimal, and Canadian prices are
207
optimal. Other countries may make up for their lower prices with higher
volumes, eliminating the free rider problem. In many EU countries, drug
prices are lower but account for a higher percentage of health expenditure
208
than in the United States. It may be unfair to label such countries as free
riders. Empirical doubts are also raised when the United States tolerates
significant domestic free riders without apparent harm. Canadian prices
are similar to the Federal Supply Schedule. Some Medicaid rebates and the
U.S. Public Health Service’s 340b program get better deals than Australia
209
or Canada. Before one picks up stones to cast, check the glazing at home.
PhRMA companies act as if the empirical question is beyond doubt,
proceeding apace to the solution phase. Answering these questions
properly requires transparent access to confidential company data. In any
event, free riding is an innovation problem only if global pharmaceutical
rents are sub-optimal.
The current PhRMA company solution is to use U.S. free trade
210
agreements to raise drug prices outside of the United States. To this end,

205. U.S. Editorial, Lower US Prices Through Higher International Prices, 9 PHARMA PRICING &
REIMBURSEMENT 222 (2004).
206. Kevin Outterson, Free Trade Against Free Riders?, 9 PHARMA PRICING & REIMBURSEMENT
254-55 (2004).
207. I thank Professor Jim Friedberg for this suggestion. The free rider hypothesis
assumes a joint sunk cost, but another possibility is that lower-priced countries such as
Canada are efficiently avoiding waste. One empirical study suggests that PhRMA companies
still make sufficient profits on Canadian sales, undercutting the free rider hypothesis. SAGER
& SOCOLAR, supra note 11, at 1.
208. ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION AND DEV., OECD HEALTH DATA 2004, tbl.14 (2004),
http://www.oecd.org/document/16/0,2340,en_2825_495642_2085200_1_1_1_1,00.html
(noting that Canada, France, Germany, Switzerland, and the UK have higher total
expenditures on pharmaceuticals as a percentage of total expenditure on health as
compared to the United States).
209. WEST VIRGINIA REPORT, supra note 175, app. A-2, A-2 (comparing Medicaid, private
payor, 340b, Canadian, FSS, and Australian data).
210. Peter Drahos & David Henry, The Free Trade Agreement Between Australia and the United
States: Undermines Australian Public Health and Protects U.S. Interests in Pharmaceuticals, 328
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USTR recently created the post of Assistant United States Trade
Representative for Pharmaceutical Policy. Bilateral treaties are an awkward
response to this global coordination problem. USTR may succeed in
raising drug prices in the least appropriate places. The greatest success will
be found in the poorest countries, or other smaller countries desperately
211
seeking preferential access to the U.S. market. Small, poor countries
offered a free trade deal with the United States may well agree to
provisions which undermine health in order to serve commercial interests.
But these small and generally poor markets can make very little
contribution to the global fight against pharmaceutical free riders. The
U.S. stance should be the opposite: Low income markets are the best
targets for the enlightened policy of nonrival access.
If the USTR’s solution is to be significant for innovation, it must
involve the EU and Japan, but the USTR will find them better positioned
to resist bilateral U.S. pressure to modify sensitive domestic health policy.
Nor is there any guarantee that increased prices abroad will result in lower
prices in the United States. A strategy which depends upon offending
America’s best trading partners should be preceded by proof that
innovation and access will be improved. The ultimate free riders are
counterfeiters, not governments, and any strategy to increase global
212
pharmaceutical prices will increase the opportunity for counterfeits.
BRIT. MED. J. 1271-72 (2004); Elizabeth Becker, Drug Industry Seeks To Sway Prices Overseas,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 2003, at A5; Elizabeth Becker & Robert Pear, Trade Pact May Undercut
Importing of Inexpensive Drugs, N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 2004, at A1; Marilyn Werber Serafini, Drug
Prices: A New Tack, NAT’L J., Apr. 17, 2004, at 1177 (“So [House Speaker] Hastert and
[Senator] Kyl championed the novel idea that the key to lowering U.S. prescription drug
prices is to persuade foreign governments to raise their prices. . . .The idea of trying to level
the international playing field on prescription drug pricing originated with the U.S.
pharmaceutical industry. But Hastert and Kyl played significant roles last fall in persuading
the Bush administration to embrace this strategy. . . .The result was the United States’ first
free-trade agreement that included modest concessions on pharmaceutical price
controls.”); Marilyn Werber Serafini, The Other Drug War, NAT’L J., Mar. 20, 2004, at 871-72;
Mark B. McClellan, Speech Before the First International Colloquium on Generic Medicine
(Sept. 25, 2003), http://www.fda.gov/oc/speeches/2003/genericdrug0925.html.
McClellan’s speech was widely reported. See, e.g., Christopher Bowe & Geoff Dyer, Americans
Lured by Lower Prices, FIN. TIMES, May 5, 2004, at 17 (“The rhetoric intensified in September
when Mark McClellan, then head of the FDA, attacked European drug price controls and
said other rich nations should pay more of the development cost for drugs.”).
211. Witness the TRIPS-plus provisions in negotiated or pending FTAs with Morocco,
Singapore, Jordan, Israel, Central America (CAFTA), and the Western Hemisphere
(FTAA). See supra note 196 and accompanying text.
212. Aidan Hollis may well be the first to make this connection to counterfeiting explicit.
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Other forms of global coordination should be considered, such as James
213
Love and Tim Hubbard’s Global R&D Treaty. The R&D Treaty would
serve as a global coordination mechanism amongst the high income
countries, while permitting prices to decline to marginal manufacturing
costs since R&D would no longer be recovered through the price
mechanism. At lower price levels, access is greatly improved and the
opportunity for counterfeits diminishes.
viii. Neglected and Global Diseases
a. Neglected Disease Innovation Does Not Require Increased
Appropriation of Pharmaceutical Rents in Low Income Countries
Jean Lanjouw and Alan Sykes each support the enactment of IP laws in
low income countries to encourage the development of local markets for
214
treating neglected diseases. Lanjouw cites empirical results from India
suggesting that implementation of TRIPS is encouraging the largest Indian
pharmaceutical companies to invest in R&D for new chemical entities
215
(NCEs), but those NCEs are either me-too generics or target global
216
diseases. Sykes argues that the huge disease burden in the developing

Aidan Hollis, An Efficient Reward System for Pharmaceutical Innovation (July 2, 2004)
(discussing prizes based upon therapeutic value) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
author) [hereinafter Hollis, Efficient Reward System]. See infra Subsection II.A.2 for a
description of counterfeits.
213. JAMES LOVE, FROM TRIPS TO RIPS: A BETTER TRADE FRAMEWORK TO SUPPORT
INNOVATION IN MEDICAL TECHNOLOGIES (Workshop on Economic Issues Related to Access to
HIV/AIDS Care in Developing Countries, 2003); Hubbard, supra note 13; Love, supra note
13.
214. JEAN O. LANJOUW, A PATENT POLICY PROPOSAL FOR GLOBAL DISEASES 4 (The Brookings
Institution, Working paper No. 84, 2001) (on file with author); Sykes, supra note 25, at 5862.
215. JEAN O. LANJOUW, THE INTRODUCTION OF PHARMACEUTICAL PRODUCT PATENTS IN
INDIA: ‘HEARTLESS EXPLOITATION OF THE POOR AND SUFFERING?’ (1998), http://papers.
nber.org/papers/wb366.
216. Hannah E. Kettler & Rajiv Modi, Building Local Research and Development Capacity for
the Prevention and Cure of Neglected Diseases: The Case of India, 79 BULL. WORLD HEALTH ORG.
742, 744-45 (2001) (finding that Indian companies are likely to target the largest markets,
i.e., for global diseases rather than neglected diseases). A decade after the signing of TRIPS,
a leading Indian pharmaceutical company reports that indeed its R&D budgets are growing
rapidly, from 2.7% of sales in 2000 to 7.6% in 2003 and a projected 10% in 2004, but the
primary output are generic pharmaceuticals. Adam Levitt, Dr. Reddy’s Laboratories:
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world should stimulate markets if patents were available. He thus looks to
use IP laws to extract a greater portion of consumer surplus from the
217
developing poor, in order to strengthen the incentives to innovate.
Surely this burden should be imposed on the world’s poorest people only
as a last resort. We should not demand the widow’s mite in order to fund
PhRMA.
Moreover, strong IP laws in low income countries are simply and
unfortunately insufficient to create new markets for neglected disease
drugs. If most patients in such countries are unable to purchase neglected
disease drugs in commercial quantities and prices, the offer of patent
218
protection will not stimulate R&D. An exclusive offer to sell drugs at a
219
loss is not valuable. Profit-maximizing Indian drug companies will focus

Driving Growth 17-25 (Bear Stearns Healthcare Conference, Sept. 8, 2003) (on file with
author) [hereinafter Levitt, Dr. Reddy’s Laboratories]. The primary new drug application
filed by the company is amlodipine maleate, which is the salt version of an innovative drug,
Norvasc. The NDA is being opposed in federal court by the innovator company. Id. at 20.
Of the eight NCEs in the company’s pipeline, seven will treat global diseases such as
diabetes, cancer, metabolic disorders, and cardiovascular disease. The eighth is an antiinfective drug, also for global diseases, but with more applicability in developing countries.
Id. at 27. These are hardly the type of innovations that Lanjouw hoped for, and in fact this
activity could hurt global innovation by reducing expected rents to innovator companies
through early generic entry by aggressive Indian companies.
217. Sykes, supra note 25, at 61-62. Notably, Sykes has critiqued F.M. Scherer on the
question of the net value of IP laws for developing countries.
218. The relative size of the commercial and non-commercial markets is important here.
The growth of India and China’s middle and upper classes one day will be sufficient to
support commercial pricing of innovative drugs for conditions endemic only to the
developing world. PhRMA companies do recognize a growing middle class market in these
nations. Merck, SEC Form 10-k, supra note 173, at 14 (“In recent years, the Company has
been expanding its operations in countries located in Latin America, the Middle East,
Africa, Eastern Europe and Asia Pacific where changes in government policies and
economic conditions are making it possible for the Company to earn fair returns. Business
in these developing areas, while sometimes less stable, offers important opportunities for
growth over time.”).
219. Keith E. Maskus, Ensuring Access to Essential Medicines: Some Economic Considerations, 20
WISC. INT’L L.J. 563, 574 (2002) (casting doubt on the efficacy of patents to improve R&D
on neglected drugs); see Kettler & Modi, supra note 216, at 742 (noting that Indian
pharmaceutical companies will still require financial incentives to research and develop
drugs for neglected diseases). A recent study of neglected vaccine projects found patent
incentives to be completely ineffective. JASON C. HSU & EDUARDO S. SCHWARTZ, A MODEL OF
R&D VALUATION AND THE DESIGN OF RESEARCH INCENTIVES 37, 43-45 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 10041, 2003).
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220

on their best economic opportunities; neglected disease drugs will not be
221
at the top of that list. The leading Indian drug companies derive most of
their profits from sales in the United States and other high income
222
markets. Nor are strong IP laws important to develop indigenous
manufacturing capacity. The absence of pharmaceutical patents in India
was the proximate cause of India’s vibrant generic pharmaceutical sector.
Implementation of TRIPS and restrictions on PEPFAR procurement will
223
hinder this path of development.
Developing non-OEDC pharmaceutical R&D capacity has the potential
to improve the efficiency of global research. Non-OECD PhRMA
companies may have significantly lower cost structures, enabling R&D on
disease markets with less market potential. Cipla, Ltd. and other Indian
pharmaceutical companies pay their India-based chemists and investigators
a fraction of the prevailing OECD pharmaceutical company research
wages. These companies may also be better poised to understand and
respond to the developing market and less likely to discount the actual
market size due to unfamiliarity. Network effects and sunk costs are also
present in pharmaceutical sales and marketing: While OECD companies
have invested in marketing systems in OECD countries, emerging
companies may invest in regional markets heretofore overlooked by OECD
220. Kettler & Modi, supra note 216, at 745. For the leading Indian pharmaceutical
company, in early 2004 only a negligible percentage of sales were of New Chemical Entities
(NCEs). Most sales were either active pharmaceutical ingredients (APIs, i.e. intermediate
ingredients for drugs) to the United States and Europe or branded (generic) formulations
sold in India and other similar markets. Levitt, Dr. Reddy’s Laboratories, supra note 216, at
9-10.
221. Jean O. Lanjouw & Iain Cockburn, New Pills for Poor People?: Empirical Evidence After
GATT, 29 WORLD DEV. 265, 265-89 (2001) (finding in 1998 survey of Indian drug firms that
only 16% of the firms’ R&D targeted developing country markets). In fiscal year 2002-2003,
Cipla’s major innovative introduction was TIOVA, a long-acting bronchodilator for Chronic
Obstructive Pulmonary Disease (COPD), a global disease. Cipla also launched a new
generic ARV Fixed Dose Combination (FDC). CIPLA, SIXTY-SEVENTH ANNUAL REPORT 20022003, at 5 [hereinafter CIPLA 2002-2003 ANNUAL REPORT].
222. See, e.g., CIPLA 2002-2003 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 221, at 7 (“During the year,
Cipla’s strategic alliances with leading generic companies in the USA and Europe were
expanded to include additional products and projects. Currently, there are nearly 50 such
projects in various stages of development in the USA alone.”); Rasul Bailay, Cipla May Find
Right Rx for Success: Indian Drug Firm Partners with Peers in U.S. To Crack No. 1 Market for
Generics, WALL ST. J., Oct. 20, 2003, at A15. For Dr. Reddy’s Laboratories, the U.S. market
accounted for fifty-seven percent of 2003 gross margin. Levitt, Dr. Reddy’s Laboratories,
supra note 216, at 11.
223. On PEPFAR procurement, see infra Subsection II.B.1.
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companies and invest in process developments to lower production
225
costs.
Most neglected disease conditions lack a market not because of the
absence of IP rights in low income countries but because of the poverty of
the patients. Perhaps the best description of a neglected disease drug is
that market-based innovation is unlikely because the target population will
require the drug or vaccine to be distributed at or below the lowest
possible marginal cost of production. Any such drug will require nonmarket funding for innovation and distribution, with or without IP
regimes.
Michael Kremer’s model of a donor purchase commitment is a
226
prominent example of a non-market mechanism,
attracting many
227
commentators on the proper design of such a prize. Prize systems and
donor purchase commitments do not require IP laws in low income
countries. The donor may reference the patent law of some country (such
as the United States), without requiring the target populations to have any
IP laws at all. The appropriate incentives are in place so long as the donor
is bound to a credible commitment to act as if they are bound by the IP
laws of a reference country such as the United States. This process would
create a “reference” or “virtual” IP regime. This is a significant point, not
well developed by supporters of TRIPS implementation in low income
countries. Virtual IP regimes would achieve all of the claimed advantages
of TRIPS implementation in low income countries for prizes, without the
blocking effects of local IP laws.

224. India, Russia, China, Brazil, Mexico, Africa, and other markets are major markets
for Indian companies such as Dr. Reddy’s Laboratories. Levitt, Dr. Reddy’s Laboratories,
supra note 216, at 17; see also Kettler & Modi, supra note 216, at 743 (describing the Indian
pharmaceutical industry).
225. Kettler & Modi, supra note 216, at 743-45. But Kettler and Modi do not assume an
Indian comparative advantage in cost.
226. Michael Kremer has thoughtfully analyzed and articulated the donor purchase
commitment model. Michael Kremer, Creating Markets for New Vaccines: Part I: Rationale &
Part II: Design Issues, in 1 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 35-109 (Adam B. Jaffe et al.
eds., 2001).
227. See, e.g., Hollis, Efficient Reward System, supra note 212; Michael Abramowicz,
Perfecting Patent Prizes, 56 VAND. L. REV. 115 (2003); Steven Shavell & Tanguy Van Ypersele,
Rewards Versus Intellectual Property Rights, 44 J.L. & ECON. 525 (2001) (concluding that
optional reward systems are superior to IP rights systems).
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b. Global Disease Innovation Does Not Require Increased
Appropriation of Pharmaceutical Rents in Low Income Countries
The neglected disease debate tends to overlook the fact that the
chronic conditions of the high income and low income worlds are
228
229
converging. Global diseases —conditions which affect patients in both
230
rich and poor countries—include cancer and cardiovascular disease, as
231
well as AIDS.
228. Non-communicable disease accounts for forty-seven percent of the global burden of
disease. WORLD HEALTH ORG., WHO GLOBAL STRATEGY ON DIET, PHYSICAL ACTIVITY AND
HEALTH (May 22, 2004). Cancer and cardiovascular disease are the second and third largest
causes of death in developing countries. WORLD HEALTH ORG., WORLD HEALTH REPORT 2003
(2003). Stephen Leeder et al., A RACE AGAINST TIME: THE CHALLENGE OF CARDIOVASCULAR
DISEASE IN DEVELOPING ECONOMIES 12-15 (2004) (“In 1998, non-communicable diseases
were responsible for 59% of total global mortality and 43% of the global burden of disease.
Importantly, 78% of [non-communicable disease] deaths were borne by low- and middle
income countries, as was 85% of the NCD burden of disease . . . nearly 50% of deaths
worldwide were due to CVD, diabetes, cancer and chronic lung disease.”). PhRMA agrees
with this position when it argues that the current “Western oriented” R&D program actually
includes diseases endemic to the entire world, such as cancer and CVD. Response of the
Research-Based Pharmaceutical Industry to the Interim Report of the Task Force on Access
to Essential Medicines (Feb. 1, 2004), reprinted in DUKES, supra note 84, app. 2, at 7-8.
229. Herein, the term global disease refers to conditions for which a therapeutic market
exists in high income countries, and the condition is also endemic to the low or middle
income world. The definition of global disease is not static. Malaria was once a global
disease, but is now largely eradicated in high income countries, rendering it neglected.
Diseases may also move in the opposite direction. Increased international mobility is likely
to further blur the epidemiological effect of political borders, causing neglected diseases to
migrate into the global disease category. The eastward expansion of the EU is importing
additional infectious disease threats into the EU, requiring enhanced public health
responses to tuberculosis and AIDS. Richard J. Coker et al., Health-care System Frailties and
Public Health Control of Communicable Disease on the European Union’s New Eastern Border, 363
THE LANCET 1389-92 (2004).
230. Carlos Correa interprets the Doha Declaration to include global diseases such as
asthma and cancer. CORREA, IMPLICATIONS OF DOHA, supra note 137, at 5. Others ask why
diseases such as cancer and diabetes are not covered by Doha. Julian Fleet, U.N. Approach to
Access to Essential AIDS Medications, Intellectual Property Law and the WTO TRIPS Agreement, 17
EMORY INT’L L. J. 451, 465 (2003).
231. North America and Western Europe account for less than two million of the thirtyfour to forty-six million people living with HIV/AIDS in 2003. UNAIDS/WHO, AIDS
EPIDEMIC UPDATE 37 (2003) [hereinafter UNAIDS/WHO, AIDS EPIDEMIC UPDATE]. While
AIDS is a global disease, at least two market failures plague public health. First, one strain of
AIDS (Type A) is largely confined to the developing world, and thus receives less research
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As an example of crossover potential of global diseases, consider the
WHO Prequalification Project. The WHO has requested prequalification
dossiers on four cancer drugs (vinblastine, etoposide, bleomycin and
232
233
vincristine) and two have been prequalified. These drugs are all related
to the treatment of AIDS-related cancers and are off-patent in the United
234
States. For the treatment of TB, the WHO prequalified non-licensed
235
generic forms of patented ciprofloxacin from India and Spain. But these
drugs may be used to treat conditions other than TB and AIDS related
236
cancers. The Doha Declaration was not limited to these three diseases,
237
despite U.S. efforts to narrow the exception.
To the pharmaceutical industry, extending nonrival access to global
disease drugs outside of AIDS, malaria, and TB opens Pandora’s Box.
Roger Bate acknowledges that the United States negotiated to limit
flexibilities to twenty two diseases, keeping “lifestyle complaints and major
238
western diseases” off the table. Nonrival access should not be limited to
these three diseases, or narrow “on label” uses, but should be extended to
any global disease, on the basis of global disease burden and public health
need. Furthermore, this extension will not adversely affect innovation. The
most important proposition about global diseases is that a robust level of
attention. Second, pediatric AIDS is also primarily a developing country issue, including the
debates over the use of Nevirapine and the absence of pediatric formulations of most AIDS
drugs. MÉDECINS SANS FRONTIÈRES, UNTANGLING THE WEB OF PRICE REDUCTIONS: A PRICING
GUIDE FOR THE PURCHASE OF ARVS FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 5 (4th ed. 2003) (“Children
living with HIV/AIDS are one of the most neglected populations: pediatric formulations
are lacking and/or formulations do not meet children’s and caregivers’ needs . . .
unpleasant tasting syrup, tablets too big to swallow, need to refrigerate some products,
unbreakable tablets, lack of fixed dose combinations, and non-adapted dosages. For
example there are currently no combinations for paediatric use.”).
232. WORLD HEATH ORG., ACCESS TO HIV/AIDS DRUGS AND DIAGNOSTICS OF ACCEPTABLE
QUALITY, PROCUREMENT QUALITY AND SOURCING PROJECT (15th ed. 2004) [hereinafter WHO
HIV/AIDS PREQUALIFICATION, 15th ed.], http://mednet3.who.int/prequal/.
233. Those two drugs are vinblastine and vincristine. WHO HIV/AIDS
PREQUALIFICATION, 15th ed., supra note 232.
234. FDA ORANGE BOOK (Oct. 2004), http://www.fda.gov/cder/ob/default.htm.
235. WHO HIV/AIDS PREQUALIFICATION, 15th ed., supra note 232.
236. According to the FDA label, vincristine is indicated in acute leukemia, Hodgkin’s
disease, non-Hodgkin’s malignant lymphomas, rhabdomyosarcoma, neuroblastoma, and
Wilms’ tumor. Ciprofloxacin is a widely used antibiotic.
237. CORREA, IMPLICATIONS OF DOHA, supra note 137, at vii, 15-16 (discussing the
definition of emergency); ‘t Hoen, supra note 7, at 39-42.
238. Roger Bate, Entire IP System Could Easily Fall, FIN. TIMES (London), Aug. 18, 2003, at
10.
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innovation is assured by high income markets alone. A few hundred
thousand early AIDS cases in the United States (and government funding)
239
were sufficient to encourage successful research programs. Likewise,
aggressive research programs are underway to treat most or all of the
chronic conditions endemic in the high income countries. Since global
disease knowledge is nonrival, it can be offered to low income populations
without detriment. With innovation assured, IP law can stand aside and
permit nonrival access for the poor.
Together, these implications suggest a new approach to the
innovation-access conundrum, calling for a radical re-evaluation of the role
of TRIPS and other laws to encourage nonrival access, with substantial
potential gains in global public health.
II. THE PRAXIS OF PHARMACEUTICAL ARBITRAGE
In Part II of this Article, the theory of pharmaceutical arbitrage will be
placed in two different contexts: the AIDS crisis in sub-Saharan Africa and
prescription drug importation from Canada to the United States.
Certain forms of pharmaceutical arbitrage are dysfunctional—for
example, diversion of differentially priced ARVs from sub-Saharan
countries into high income countries. Other forms of arbitrage benefit
consumers without damaging optimal innovation. The desirability of
Canadian-U.S. pharmaceutical arbitrage hinges on whether global
pharmaceutical rents are supra-optimal or not and whether one credits the
safety of Canadian sourced drugs. If global pharmaceutical rents are supraoptimal and safety concerns properly addressed, then U.S. consumers are
needlessly overcharged for patented drugs, and many unnecessarily suffer
negative health outcomes from restricted access.
A. Pharmaceutical Arbitrage of AIDS Drugs in Sub-Saharan Africa
PhRMA companies have been reluctant to make patented ARV drugs
available on a nonrival basis in sub-Saharan Africa. Fear of pharmaceutical
arbitrage and undermining IP laws are the purported causes of this
reluctance. Delayed treatment has been the proximate cause of the death
of millions. Applying the theory of pharmaceutical arbitrage to AIDS may
transcend the competing goals of innovation and access, by improving
access while supporting optimal R&D.
239. Indeed, many early AIDS-related drugs qualified for orphan drug status in the
United States when the expected U.S. market was fewer than 200,000 persons. Salbu, supra
note 103, at 703-07.
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1. Financial Constraints Limit Access to AIDS Drugs in Sub-Saharan Africa
Globally, AIDS is not under control, with approximately forty million
240
persons living with HIV/AIDS worldwide. Ninety-five percent live outside
of North America and Western Europe. Two-thirds of infected persons,
241
new infections, and deaths are in sub-Saharan Africa. An estimated 5.5
million people in developing countries need ARV treatment for
HIV/AIDS, but only five percent of those currently receive it; in subSaharan Africa in 2003, only one percent of the people who need ARV
242
therapy actually receive it. Large scale roll-out of ARV therapy in low
243
income countries is now a major global public health goal.
Purchasing AIDS drugs at U.S. prices is not an option for the vast
majority of these people. The per capita annual cost of a popular first-line
244
ARV in the United States is $7215, and the recently introduced Fuzeon
245
(enfuvirtide) costs $20,000 per year. The annual per capita health
246
expenditures in sub-Saharan Africa averages $29.30 and range from $12

240. UNAIDS/WHO, AIDS EPIDEMIC UPDATE, supra note 231, at 2. While much progress
has been made, AIDS is not fully under control in high income countries. In 2003, 66,000
to 94,000 persons were newly infected with HIV in North America and Western Europe. Id.
at 38. But these numbers are quite small when compared to sub-Saharan Africa, and the
health and longevity of the U.S. patients have improved. Id. at 28-30 (“AIDS mortality
continues to drop, thanks to the widespread availability of antiretroviral treatment.”).
241. UNAIDS/WHO, AIDS EPIDEMIC UPDATE, supra note 231, at 38; Robert Greener,
UNAIDS, HIV/AIDS and Absorptive Capacity (Kaiser Family Foundation HealthCast, Jan. 29,
2004) (2003 data) [hereinafter Greener, UNAIDS], http://www.kaisernetwork.org/
health_cast/hcast_index.cfm?display=detail&hc=1066.
242. MSF, SURMOUNTING CHALLENGES, supra note 141, at 2, 5; UN To Seek $6 Billion To
Fight AIDS in Third World, REUTERS, Nov. 6, 2003.
243. INST. OF MED., SCALING UP TREATMENT FOR THE GLOBAL AIDS PANDEMIC: CHALLENGES
AND OPPORTUNITIES (2004); World Health Assembly, Scaling up Treatment, supra note 190.
244. Sixty tablets of Combivir cost $592.99. Drugstore.com, at http://www.drugstore.com
(last visited Dec. 4, 2004).
245. Vanessa Fuhrmans, Medical Dilemma: Costly New Drug for AIDS Means Some Go Without,
WALL ST. J., Jan. 13, 2004, at A1. Fuzeon is the first fusion inhibitor treatment for HIV,
developed at Duke University. Ironically, high cost has forced the North Carolina AIDS
assistance project to strictly ration the number of residents who can receive the treatment.
Duke University: North Carolina Firm’s New AIDS Drug Development On Hold, U-WIRE, Jan. 22,
2004, 2004 WL 59460572 (“Steve Sherman, director of North Carolina’s ADAP, said the
program set a cap for 25 state residents to be eligible for Fuzeon treatment at any one time,
creating a system of rationing medical care.”). Other states such as Alabama have decided
the cost is too high to cover the drug at all, despite its effectiveness. Fuhrmans, supra.
246. WORLD BANK, 2004 WORLD DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS (2004) (citing 2001 data).
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(Malawi) to $253 (South Africa). Radically reducing the price of AIDS
medications for the poor is thus a necessary condition to extending ARV
248
treatments to millions of afflicted persons worldwide. Indeed, for many
patients, the drugs must be free. Recognizing the important public health
249
250
251
252
issues, Brazil, India, South Africa, and China produce generic ARVs
for the poor, provoking conflicts between human rights and IP rights.
The European Commission has embraced voluntary “tiered
[differential] pricing as the principal means of rendering essential
253
medicines affordable . . . to the poorest populations.” Differential pricing
is possible because of relatively low marginal costs of production. Most
patented drugs can be produced relatively cheaply, absent R&D cost
recovery. The primary variable expenses are direct manufacturing costs,
which are a small fraction of the retail prices of patented ARVs. A high
ratio of retail prices to direct manufacturing costs enables a company to
254
sell at highly differentiated prices without selling below marginal cost.

247. Id.; see also Markus Haacker, Providing Health Care to HIV Patients in Southern Africa, in
ECONOMICS OF ESSENTIAL MEDICINES, supra note 3, at 242, 244. After adjustments for
purchasing power parity, Haacker’s figures rise to $44.8 (Malawi) and $552.3 (South
Africa).
248. Funds for ARVs and drugs to treat opportunistic infections are scarce. UNAIDS
estimates these needs at approximately thirty-seven percent of the total $10.7 billion which
should be spent on HIV/AIDS in 2005 for a comprehensive response. Total unmet financial
need in 2005 is projected at approximately five billion dollars. Greener, UNAIDS, supra
note 241. If these drugs were available at a much lower cost, resources could be redeployed
to prevention and other unmet priorities.
249. ‘t Hoen, supra note 7, at 32-33.
250. Mark Schoofs, Clinton Program Would Help Poor Nations Get AIDS Drugs, WALL ST. J.,
Oct. 23, 2003, at B1 (Indian and South African drug companies); see also CIPLA 2002-2003
ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 221, at 7 (“In HIV/AIDS care, the Company continued its
pioneering role in making available a range of antiretroviral drugs including unique
combination products. These were made available at reasonable prices not only in India but
also in other parts of the world.”).
251. Schoofs, supra note 250 (Indian and South African drug companies); ‘t Hoen, supra
note 7, at 30-31 (describing South Africa’s efforts to provide royalty-free ARVs to its
population and the legal and political challenges to those actions by the United States and
PhRMA companies).
252. Jim Yardley, China Begins Giving Free H.I.V./AIDS Drugs to the Poor, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7,
2003, at A3.
253. DG TRADE, supra note 42, § 2.2. Low income countries targeted for essential
medications by the EU had a per capita income of less than $765 in 2000.
254. SAGER & SOCOLAR, supra note 11, at 7 (roughly estimating marginal U.S.
manufacturing and distribution costs for prescription drugs to be 9.9%).
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While the public does not know the true marginal manufacturing costs
of most patented drugs, differential pricing and generic production
255
provide useful proxies. Differential pricing ratios currently exceed 30:1
in ARV drugs, implying marginal costs of production in the range of 3 to
4%. For example, in November 2003, a daily dose of GlaxoSmithKline’s
256
best selling combination ARV drug Combivir costs about $19.76 per day
257
or $7215 per year by mail order in the United States. In sub-Saharan
Africa in 2003, GlaxoSmithKline sells Combivir to health agencies at ninety
258
cents per day or $329 per year, and has announced a new non-profit
259
price of sixty-five cents per day. Even this low price may not reflect
GlaxoSmithKline’s marginal cost, because Cipla sells a generic form of
Combivir to governments and nonprofit agencies at thirty-three cents per
260
day or $197.10 per year. The differential pricing ratio for Combivir is

255. Compulsory licensure enables ex-factory pricing closer to true marginal
manufacturing cost, particularly if the tender process is competitive. Generic competition
pierces the pricing veil, accelerates differential pricing toward true marginal production
costs, and does not rely on public disclosure of confidential financial information from the
companies. Given the endemic opacity of all PhRMA data on costs, perhaps the best way to
calculate marginal cost is through compulsory licensure. PhRMA simply asserts that “there
is no guarantee that generic companies will price at marginal cost.” Response of the
Research-Based Pharmaceutical Industry to the Interim Report of the Task Force on Access
to Essential Medicines, supra note 228, reprinted in DUKES, supra note 84, app. 2, at 27.
Absent the patent monopoly, generic companies in a competitive environment will certainly
price much closer to marginal cost than PhRMA companies.
256. Combivir is a fixed dose combination (FDC) of 300 mg zidovudine (ZDV or AZT)
and 150 mg of lamivudine (3TC). MSF, UNTANGLING THE WEB, supra note 151, at 13. The
best clinical FDC also adds a NNRTI. Gregory K. Robbins et al., Comparison of Sequential
Three-Drug Regimens as Initial Therapy for HIV-1 Infection, 349 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2293 (2003);
Robert W. Shafer et al., Comparison of Four-Drug Regimens and Pairs of Sequential Three-Drug
Regimens as Initial Therapy for HIV-1 Infection, 349 NEW ENGLAND J. MED. 2304 (2003).
257. Calculation
of
the
U.S.
price
comes
from
Drugstore.com,
at
http://www.drugstore.com (sixty tablets of Combivir for $592.99, taken twice per day) (last
visited July 7, 2004).
257. ‘t Hoen, supra note 7, at 32-33.
258. MSF, UNTANGLING THE WEB, supra note 151, at 13.
259. GLAXOSMITHKLINE PLC, 2003 ANNUAL REPORT, Form 20-F, at 4, http://www.sec.gov/
edgar/searchedgar/companysearch.html.
260. MSF, UNTANGLING THE WEB, supra note 151, at 15. GSK itself also issued a voluntary
license to Aspen Pharmacare for production of generic Combivir. GLAXOSMITHKLINE PLC,
2003 ANNUAL REPORT, Form 20-F, supra note 259, at 29. Aspen’s price is not yet listed in the
pricing guide. MSF, UNTANGLING THE WEB, supra note 151, at 15.
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approximately 35:1. This ratio is likely to increase: MSF aims for an
262
annual per patient cost of fifty to one hundred dollars in the near future.
The organization notes that achieving the lowest possible price is an
urgent necessity: “If you have the option of spending $200 per person per
year or $600 per person per year, and you’re electing to spend $600, that
263
means you’re treating one person when you could be treating three.”
Triomune is Cipla’s brand name for the most important triple-drug
therapy fixed dose combination (FDC) for sub-Saharan Africa, containing
nevirapine (NVP), stavudine (d4T), and lamivudine (3TC). Triomune is
produced as a generic by Cipla Ltd. and sold for sixty-seven cents per day
264
or US$244 per year. As of July 2004, Triomune is not available in a
licensed FDC form, a rare inversion in which a generic is a sole-source
265
supplier. The patents for nevirapine, stavudine, and lamivudine are held
266
by different companies, and they are apparently unable to conclude a
cross-licensing agreement. Triomune’s components, taken as six separate
pills per day, cost about $936 per month in the United States, a ratio
267
exceeding 46:1.
High differential pricing ratios are not limited to ARVs. Ciprofloxacin
268
is available in generic form in Africa at $0.0189 per 500 mg tablet; in the
269
U.S. retail market it sells for about five dollars a pill, a ratio of 264:1. A
high ratio is not necessarily a bad thing; in fact, if nonrival access is truly

261. The numerator is $7215, and the denominator is $204.
262. MSF, SURMOUNTING CHALLENGES, supra note 141, at 9. As of 2004, the WHO 3 x 5
program estimates the per person per year cost for first-line drugs at US$304. WORLD
HEALTH ORG., THE WORLD HEALTH REPORT 2004: CHANGING HISTORY 30 (2004).
263. Ellen Nakashima & David Brown, U.S. Rule on AIDS Drugs Criticized: Ban on Using Aid
To Buy Foreign Generics Hinders Treatment, Experts Say, WASH. POST, July 14, 2004, at A12
(quoting Rachel Cohen of MSF).
264. MSF, UNTANGLING THE WEB, supra note 151, at 15.
265. UNICEF-UNAIDS-MSF, SOURCES AND PRICES OF SELECTED MEDICINES AND
DIAGNOSTICS FOR PEOPLE LIVING WITH HIV/AIDS 18 (2004) (NVP + D4T + 3TC fixed dose
combination not available in the US).
266. FDA ORANGE BOOK, supra note 234.
267. Epivir (lamivudine) costs about $9 per day or $270 per month; Zerit (stavudine)
costs about $10.51 per day or $316 per month; Viramune (nevirapine) costs about $11.67
per day or $350 per month. All data is in U.S. dollars and is taken from
http://www.drugstore.com (last visited July 8, 2004). The ratio numerator is $936, and the
denominator is $20.
268. Management Sciences for Health, International Drug Price Indicator Guide, at
http://erc.msh.org/dmpguide/ (last visited Oct. 20, 2004).
269. Drugstore.com, at http://www.drugstore.com (last visited July 8, 2004).
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provided to the world’s poorest communities, one would expect to find
very large differential pricing rations.
2. IP Laws Hinder Delivery of ARVs in sub-Saharan Africa
In a widely-cited 2001 study, Attaran and Gillespie-White demonstrated
270
the relative paucity of ARV patents in many sub-Saharan countries. This
article has been widely interpreted to claim that patents do not hinder
271
ARV access in sub-Saharan Africa. Attaran published a follow-on report
in Health Affairs in 2004, again suggesting that patents have not been the
272
major hindrance to ARV access. This conclusion is not warranted from
the data.
ARVs were available in the high income countries for many years
273
before the developing world first began to receive treatment. As recently

270. Amir Attaran & Lee Gillespie-White, Do Patents for Antiretroviral Drugs Constrain Access
to AIDS Treatment in Africa?, 286 JAMA 1186 (2001). After the manuscript was submitted,
Merck gave a $25,000 grant. Several critical letters to the editor were printed in the next
volume of the journal. Boelaert et al., supra note 141, at 840-41; Eric Goemaere et al., Letter
to the Editor, 287 JAMA 841 (2002); Michael J. Selgelid & Udo Schuklenk, Letter to the
Editor, 287 JAMA 842 (2002) (“In the world of politics the carefully qualified conclusions of
Attaran and Gillespie-White are likely to be misrepresented by pharmaceutical industry
lobbyists claiming that ‘it has been shown that patents do not matter,’ with the aim of
blocking proposed TRIPS agreement amendments that weaken pharmaceutical patent
protection in developing countries.”). In their reply to these letters, Attaran and GillespieWhite do not make the broad claim that patent laws are no barrier to ARVs in sub-Saharan
Africa, but merely suggest that where patents exist, other alternatives can be pursued, such
as voluntary licensure or switching to another therapy. Where patents do not exist, they call
for generic production, ignoring the industrial infrastructure issue described above. Amir
Attaran & Lee Gillespie-White, In Reply, 287 JAMA 842-43 (2002); see also Amir Attaran, How
Do Patents and Economic Policies Affect Access to Essential Medicines in Developing Countries?, 23
HEALTH AFF. 155 (2004).
271. LANJOUW, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, supra note 70, at 11-12 (“[I]ndustry uses this fact
[the Attaran & Gillespie-White study] to stress that patents in the poorest countries are not
impeding access to drugs.”); see also, e.g., Harvey E. Bale, Jr., Patents, Patients and Developing
Countries: Access, Innovation and the Political Dimensions of Trade Policy, in ECONOMICS OF
ESSENTIAL MEDICINES, supra note 3, at 100, 106 n.10. Bale is the head of the international
PhRMA company trade association.
272. Attaran, supra note 270, at 156 (“Briefly, I find that patents for essential medicines
are uncommon in poor countries and cannot readily explain why access to those medicines
is often lacking, suggesting that poverty, not patents, imposes the greater limitation on
access.”).
273. Combination therapy was available in the United States from December 1995 with
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as 2002, no person in the developing world had received ARVs through
274
official donor support from any country or multilateral institution. When
MSF and Partners In Health independently began ARV treatment in
Thailand, South Africa, and Haiti in 2000 and 2001, some were puzzled at
their attempts, due to costs per patient exceeding $10,000 to $15,000 for
275
patented drugs. Access to AIDS medications was discussed at the highest
276
levels at the WHO as early as 1991, and at the International AIDS
277
Conference in Durban in 2000. Thirteen years later, in 2004, the world is
just beginning to scale-up toward universal provision of ARVs, and it is still
expected to take a long time to achieve. Precious years were lost because
the drugs were too expensive for the developing world, and they were too
278
expensive because of patent protection and fears of arbitrage. Millions

the approval of the first protease inhibitors, Invirase (SQV) on December 7, 1995 and
Crixivan (IDV) and Norvir (r) in early 1996. Lamivudine was approved for marketing in the
United States on November 17, 1995. The U.S. Centers for Disease Control was well aware
of the growing HIV/AIDS epidemic in Africa no later than the mid-1980s. RANDY SHILTS,
AND THE BAND PLAYED ON: POLITICS, PEOPLE, AND THE AIDS EPIDEMIC 49, 193, 392-93, 460
(1988) (“Equatorial Africans faced death on the scale of the Holocaust.”) (citing Dr. Don
Francis, CDC AIDS Research, June 1984).
274. African HIV/AIDS Crisis: Pursuing Both Treatment and Prevention: Hearing Before the
Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, Subcomm. on African Affairs, 107th Cong. (2002) (statement
of Jeffrey D. Sachs).
275. As of December 2000, the World Bank still considered ARV treatment in poor
countries to be “cost-ineffective.” See Barton Gellman, An Unequal Calculus of Life and Death;
As Millions Perished in Pandemic, Firms Debated Access to Drugs, WASH. POST, Dec. 27, 2000, at
A1 [hereinafter Gellman, Unequal Calculus].
276. Id.
277. Esther Kaplan, Time’s Up, THE NATION, July 22, 2004, at 30, 30 (“It’s been four years
since the International AIDS Conference was first held in the developing world, in Durban,
South Africa, where the activist demand for universal treatment access was catapulted onto
the world stage. Then, the idea of treating the millions of HIV-infected people worldwide
was considered farfetched. . . .The official policy of wealthy nations was to focus on
prevention and leave the millions already infected to die.”).
278. JOAN-RAMON BORRELL & JAYASHREE WATAL, IMPACT OF PATENTS ON ACCESS TO
HIV/AIDS DRUGS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (Center for Int’l Dev., Harvard Univ., CID
Working Paper No. 92, 2002) (finding that a significant increase in ARV uptake would have
resulted absent patents). This paper provides a static analysis which ignores the innovation
question and does not model subsidized ARV markets. Had it done so, it might have
demonstrated that patents have a much larger negative impact. Barton Gellman, A Turning
Point That Left Millions Behind; Drug Discounts Benefit Few While Protecting Pharmaceutical
Companies’ Profits, WASH. POST, Dec. 28, 2000, at A1 (“For a decade, makers of AIDS
medications had rejected the idea of lowering prices in poor countries for fear of eroding
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have died, untreated, for the principle of IP law.
Attaran defends his conclusions by identifying many sub-Saharan
countries wherein patents had not been filed for some ARVs. This fact is
both misleading and irrelevant because the sub-Saharan countries where
patents have not been filed did not possess the domestic industrial base to
279
manufacture ARVs. Throughout almost all of 2004, only one company
was producing generic ARVs in Africa—South Africa’s Aspen
280
Pharmacare. As one might expect, Attaran finds Aspen’s home market,
South Africa, to be effectively covered by patent filings.
With South Africa stymied, generic ARVs would have to be imported
into sub-Saharan Africa from elsewhere, such as Brazil or India. Brazil was
281
sued to block this practice, and India has faced a U.S.-requested WTO
282
dispute resolution on its implementation of TRIPS for pharmaceuticals,
283
as well as U.S. “Special 301” threats. The USTR frequently used the
Special 301 watch list to discipline countries attempting to produce
284
generics, even if legal under domestic law or TRIPS.
The mere possibility of a patent filing is likely to act as a deterrent to
the filing of generic drug applications and the creation of generic
manufacturing capacity in sub-Saharan Africa, since the innovator could
undercut the generic company’s market investment by tying them up in
litigation. Unfortunately, the intended lessons of the United States’s
attacks on Brazil, South Africa, and India were not lost on other
developing countries: All but three of Africa’s least developed countries
have implemented laws for pharmaceutical patents as of 2004, despite the

profits in rich ones.”).
279. CORREA, IMPLICATIONS OF DOHA, supra note 137, annex 2.
280. Wendell Roelf, Aids Drugs Are Available—But Are There Enough?, MAIL & GUARDIAN,
May 17, 2004. Thembalami Pharmaceuticals in South Africa is a joint venture with Indian
producer Ranbaxy, importing the APIs from India. In July 2004, Archy Pharmaceuticals
Limited commissioned the creation of a pharmaceutical plant in Nigeria to produce ARVs.
Godwin Haruna, First HIV/AIDS Drug Plant Takes Off, THIS DAY (Lagos), July 28, 2004,
http://allafrica.com/stories/200407280351.html. By contrast, Asia has twenty-seven
companies producing generic ARVs in eight countries. AMFAR, supra note 188, at 4.
281. See supra notes 144-145 and accompanying text.
282. World Trade Org., India-Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical
Products, WT/DS50/R (Sept. 5, 1997); World Trade Org., India-Patent Protection for
Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products, WT/DS50/AB/R (Dec. 19, 1997).
283. U.S. OFFICE OF TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2004 SPECIAL 301 REPORT (2004),
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Document_Library/Reports_Publications/2004/2004_Special_
301/asset_upload_file16_5995.pdf.
284. Sell, TRIPS, supra note 142, at 492.
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flexibility granted by the Doha Declaration to delay implementation until
285
2016.
Procurement policies by donors also undercut Attaran’s argument. All
of the AIDS/HIV drugs on the WHO Prequalification list are produced
286
either in high income countries or in India, countries now covered by
287
TRIPS. USTR and President’s Emergency Plan For HIV/AIDS Relief
(PEPFAR) also hinder procurement of generic ARVs by multilateral and
288
official donors.
The patent thicket effectively covers all sources of ARVs for Africa,
forming an effective deterrent to ARV commercialization by generic
companies, even in the absence of a formal patent filing in every subSaharan country. Even today, treatment with generic ARVs occurs by either
complying with TRIPS flexibilities, or by (temporary) forbearance by the
United States and PhRMA. Perhaps Attaran and Gillespie-White should say
that patent law should not be used to delay access any longer. If so, we are
in agreement. But it is historical revisionism of the foulest kind to claim
that patents did not matter over the last decade for access to cheap ARV
therapy in Africa.
3. Achieving Both Nonrival Access and Optimal Innovation
Next I present my proposals for maximizing public health while
optimizing innovation, in light of the urgent problem of access illustrated
by this case study. Nonrival access is embraced, whether through voluntary
differential pricing or compulsory licensure for low and middle income
markets. Dysfunctional pharmaceutical arbitrage from low income markets
to high income markets is forbidden, but is not found to be a significant
empirical problem. Much more troubling is the threat of counterfeit
drugs. All other forms of pharmaceutical arbitrage are encouraged as a
means to lower consumer prices. Finally, PEPFAR is critiqued, particularly

285. THORPE, supra note 32, at 1.
286. WHO, HIV/AIDS Prequalification, 15th ed., supra note 232.
287. See supra notes 137-139 and accompanying text. As of January 1, 2005, concessions
under TRIPS will be largely limited to the thirty poorest members of the WTO, excluding
middle income countries such as Mexico, India, China, and Brazil. Only a few countries
have notified the TRIPS Council of their intent to delay full TRIPS implementation until
the January 1, 2005 deadline, namely Argentina, Cuba, India, Pakistan, Jordan, Uruguay,
Egypt, United Arab Emirates, and Turkey. Indeed, all but three least developed countries in
Africa have already adopted pharmaceutical patents, many years prior to the 2016 deadline.
THORPE, supra note 32, at 1.
288. See infra Subsection II.A.3.iv.
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for its procurement and supply chain policies which are based upon a fear
of pharmaceutical arbitrage.
i. Streamline Compulsory Licensure
Compulsory licenses are difficult to administer under TRIPS. The
procedures under Article 31 are time-consuming and expensive. The first
two national laws implementing the Cancun General Council Decision
require the grant of compulsory licenses in both the importing and
289
exporting countries when patents have been filed. The Canadian version
requires a good faith effort to negotiate a voluntary license “on reasonable
terms and conditions” before applying for a compulsory license, following
290
the general language of TRIPS Article 31(b). Requirements like these
raise transaction costs and may allow pharmaceutical companies to delay
the process for many months or years. This process is wasteful, particularly
291
when duplicated in multiple countries. Good faith negotiations are not
required in two circumstances: public non-commercial use, and “national
292
emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency.” Both exceptions
fit the AIDS crisis, and the former is broad enough to encompass nonrival
access for global diseases.
Absent the credible threat of compulsory licensure, PhRMA
companies have few economic reasons to cooperate with differential
pricing, particularly for global diseases outside of the media glare of AIDS.
This is not an academic exercise, as annual preventable deaths in low and
middle income countries now number in the millions. The process must
be simpler and faster for nonrival access to medicines.
At this time, no compulsory license has been issued under the Cancun
General Council Decision (i.e., involving import or export), and only a
handful of countries have issued any TRIPS-compliant compulsory licenses.
Malaysia issued a compulsory license to Cipla Ltd. in February 2004 for
293
importation. As of May 2004, compulsory licenses have also been issued
294
by Cameroon, Mozambique, and the Philippines.
289. See, e.g., Norwegian Compulsory License Regulation, supra note 158, § 108;
Canadian Bill C-9, supra note 158, § 21.04 (3)(d)(i)(B).
290. Canadian Bill C-9, supra note 158, § 21.04 (3)(c)(i).
291. Blustein & Gellman, supra note 150.
292. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, art. 31(b).
293. Cipla Gets Malaysian Nod for AIDS Drugs: In a Trailblazing Move, Malaysia Has Issued a
Compulsory License, BUS. STANDARD, Feb. 26 2004, at A6.
294. Statement of the Representative of Brazil, speaking on behalf of the GRULAC
countries, WHO Executive Board Meeting (May 25, 2004).
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For most countries, compulsory licensing is not yet a principal
mechanism for introducing generic competition and protecting public
health. Many companies are engaged in cross-border sales of generic
295
ARVs, without currently necessitating the Cancun process. For example,
Brazil, as permitted by its national patent laws, has been producing a
number of generic ARVs for both domestic purposes and aid projects to
296
Africa. Taking another approach, Thailand simply ruled Bristol-Myers’s
297
didanosine patent invalid on public health grounds.
These various tactics have led to significant generic production of at
least first-line ARVs, although much of the market remains in a grey area
298
outside of the compulsory licensing regime established by Doha. A more
streamlined process for compulsory licensing could bring this market in
from the grey. Moreover, it could be particularly helpful with regard to
second-line ARVs, where there is still inadequate availability of generics.
For example, no FDC containing the second-line drug efavirenz is
299
currently available. The medical need for such second-line ARV therapy
in the low and middle income countries is significant and growing. The
WTO (and the USTR) should make the ARV production and export
process more rational, not more difficult. A more streamlined approach to
compulsory licensing would provide a well-defined mechanism that might
encourage greater participation in these potential markets.

295. Most are not prequalified by the WHO: The amfAR July 2004 report notes the
difficulties with twenty-seven companies in eight countries in Asia producing generic ARVs,
and only one of them (Cipla Ltd.) operating with WHO Prequalification. AMFAR, supra note
188, at 4.
296. Médecins sans Frontières, Brazilian Generic Drugs in South Africa—Background
(Jan. 29, 2002), at http://www.msf.org/countries/page.cfm?articleid=F8557436-9B60-4D00BC5F0476D8B7A5E1.
297. Gov’t Pharm. Org. v. Bristol-Myers, Thailand Central Intellectual Property Court,
Oct. 2002.
298. MSF, UNTANGLING THE WEB, supra note 151, at 5-7.
299. Id. at 6. This may be because of pressures applied to potential source countries—
such as India and Thailand—by the USTR under the Special 301 process. U.S. TRADE REP.,
2004 NATIONAL TRADE ESTIMATE REPORT ON FOREIGN TRADE BARRIERS, 217-220 (2004)
(India); id. at 463-65 (Thailand). The United States and Thailand are negotiating a free
trade agreement with TRIPS-plus provisions. See Thai Free Trade Agreement Watch
Website, at http://www.ftawatch.org (last visited Sept. 2003); see also Marwaan MacanMarkar, Thailand-U.S.: Freer Trade Weakens Access to HIV/AIDS Drugs, INTER PRESS SERVICE
NEWS AGENCY, May 21, 2004, http://www.ipsnews.net/africa/interna.asp?idnews=23849.
Fortunately, despite trade-related pressures, Thailand is now preparing a generic FDC as a
second-line therapy, containing efavirenz, lopinavir and ritonavir.
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ii. Dysfunctional Pharmaceutical Arbitrage of AIDS Drugs
a. Dysfunctional Arbitrage Is Rarely Observed
International arbitrage certainly seems to pose a plausible risk to
pharmaceutical companies. The consumer retail price of a kilogram of the
300
active ingredients in Combivir is about $20,000 in the United States, but
301
sells for as little as $612 in Hyderabad and sub-Saharan Africa. This price
differential is equal to about twenty-five times the average per capita
income in the lowest income countries. Neo-classical economic theory
302
predicts that entrepreneurs will divert these drugs from the poor and
export them to wealthy countries where they will fetch higher prices.
Domestic arbitrage occurs within the United States at much lower
303
thresholds. Since the great majority of the world’s AIDS patients are in
poorer countries, if only a small percentage were diverted, significant
304
volumes of ARVs could flow into high income country markets.

300. Combivir is GlaxoSmithKline’s best selling ARV drug, and the company holds a
forty-five percent global market share in HIV/AIDS drugs. See Gautam Naik, Glaxo’s HIV
Drugs Come Under Pressure: Competition, Calls for Price Cuts Weakens Company’s Dominance of
Maturing Market, WALL ST. J., Sept. 22, 2003, at B3; GLAXOSMITHKLINE PLC, 2003 ANNUAL
REPORT, Form 20-F, at 63, http://www.sec.gov/edgar/searchedgar/companysearch.html
(total of all HIV sales).
301. The active ingredients in Combivir total 450 mg per tablet. A kilogram of active
ingredients will create approximately 2222 tablets. The retail price of 2222 tablets of
Combivir in the U.S. retail market exceeds $20,000. See Drugstore.com, at
http://www.drugstore.com (last visited July 9, 2004).
302. Or smugglers, depending upon your perspective.
303. See infra Subsection II.B.2. Jackie Judd, Senior Fellow with the Kaiser Family
Foundation, Interview with Gilbert M. Gaul and Mary Pat Flaherty, Interview with
Washington
Post
Reporters
on
Drug
Safety
Articles
(Oct.
24,
2003),
http://www.kaisernetwork.org/health_cast/hcast_index.cfm?display=detail&hc=1004
(describing significant arbitrage diversion within the U.S. market taking advantage of
relatively modest price differentials).
304. The United States is a likely target market. The EU may not be as vulnerable to
diversion because most of its citizens are covered by a third party prescription drug benefit
and are not as price sensitive. DG TRADE, supra note 42, § 3.3. This conclusion might be true
for ultimate consumers, but European intermediaries such as parallel traders could seek
arbitrage earnings from this trade. The available evidence suggests that European parallel
traders are closely scrutinized and do not knowingly participate in illegal diversions. See, e.g.,
Glaxo Group Ltd. v. Dowelhurst Ltd., [2004] E.T.M.R. 39 (July 31, 2003), 2003 WL
21729286.
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Further, criminal organizations might be attracted to the profits to be
found in dysfunctional pharmaceutical arbitrage. The pricing ratios
operating in the illegal cocaine market are broadly similar to ARV pricing
ratios. The U.S. wholesale price of a kilogram of cocaine ranges from
305
$13,000 to $25,000, comparable to the U.S. retail value of a kilogram of
306
the active ingredients in Combivir. The U.S. retail price of a gram of
307
cocaine is about $100. The retail price of cocaine in Columbia is between
308
309
three dollars and five dollars per gram, yielding a ratio of about 25:1.
Since ARV arbitrage offers potentially higher profits than cocaine
trafficking, one might expect criminal enterprises to enter the ARV
business, especially since the risk of apprehension and punishment are so
severe for cocaine trafficking, but relatively modest for prescription drug
310
counterfeiting.
Given these facts, it would be striking if dysfunctional ARV arbitrage
did not occur. And yet reality appears to depart from the neo-classical
economic model, for there is quite limited evidence of dysfunctional
arbitrage. It is notable that generic drugs have been produced in India for
311
decades without apparently infiltrating or undermining Western markets.
As of April 2002, both the European Commission and the pharmaceutical
companies acknowledged that pharmaceutical arbitrage from poor
312
countries into high income countries was “still largely theoretical.” Only
305. U.S. DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMIN., DRUG TRAFFICKING IN THE UNITED STATES (2001),
http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/pubs/intel/01020/index.html (2000 data). Retail prices per
gram are significantly higher, particularly for smaller quantities.
306. See supra note 301.
307. OFFICE OF NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL POLICY, TRENDS IN COCAINE PRICES (1981-2000)
(price per gram for purchase of one to ten grams). The UK price for a gram in similar lots
is around £50. Independent Drug Monitoring Unit Ltd., UK Drug Prices 2002,
http://www.idmu.co.uk/prices02.htm.
308. This figure is from a hopelessly anecdotal source, a travel journal of an American
using drugs in Columbia. David Ashley, Cocaine in Columbia (June 14, 2000), at
http://www.erowid.org/experiences/exp.php?ID=1796 (last visited Oct. 20, 2004).
309. The numerator is $100 per gram and the denominator is $4 per gram.
310. ALLIANCE AGAINST COUNTERFEITING & PIRACY, PROVING THE CONNECTION: LINKS
BETWEEN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY THEFT AND ORGANISED CRIME 7-8 (2002), http://www.acg.com/index2.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2004).
311. One would expect that over the past twenty years there would have been some
significant reported court cases on illegal imports of Indian and other unlicensed generics
if the problem were widespread. Andrew Farlow of Oxford finds little evidence of diversion.
Andrew Farlow, Costs of Monopoly Pricing Under Patent Protection, Presentation at
Columbia University slide 19 (Dec. 4, 2003).
312. DG TRADE, supra note 42, at § 3.3.
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six months later, GlaxoSmithKline, the patent holder for several important
AIDS drugs, brought the sensational charge that 36,000 packages of
HIV/AIDS medicines worth approximately US$18 million were found to
313
have been diverted from West Africa to the EU. GlaxoSmithKline sued
several participants in the transactions, including a legal parallel trader in
314
pharmaceuticals, Dowelhurst Ltd, for trademark infringement.
The Dowelhurst case unearthed several remarkable facts which
undercut the public relations spin that Glaxo had put on the case. First,
ninety-nine percent of the packages handled by Dowelhurst were not part
of Glaxo’s charitable access initiative for Africa, but were ordinary
315
commercial sales to Africa, at prices approximating EU prices. The
Deputy Judge expressed keen displeasure upon finally understanding this
point, as he had been led to believe that all of the packages were destined
316
for charitable access programs. Second, 99% of the packages had been
sold within Europe, to addresses in France, and probably never made the
317
trip to Africa. The alleged diversions occurred in Europe, not in Africa. I
say alleged diversions, because the case makes clear that the resale of the
318
drugs was not proscribed by contract. Third, by placing the packages into
319
commerce within Europe, Glaxo exhausted its IP rights within Europe.
Finally, Glaxo sold the packages without any attempt to label them as
ineligible for sale or reimportation into the EU. They were packaged in
French, with EMEA license codes and nothing was done to indicate they

313. There were a number of media reports from three continents in October 2002. See,
e.g., Sarah Boseley & Rory Carroll, Profiteers Resell Africa’s Cheap Aids Drugs, THE GUARDIAN,
Oct. 4, 2002, at P1; see also DUKES, supra note 84, at 50 & n.1.
314. Glaxo Group Ltd v. Dowelhurst Ltd, [2004] E.T.M.R. 39 (July 31, 2003), 2003 WL
21729286.
315. Id. ¶ 36.
316. Id. ¶ 46. The Deputy Judge imposed over ninety percent of the litigation costs on
Glaxo, in part because he felt misled. Glaxo Group Ltd. v. Dowelhurst Ltd., [2003]
E.W.H.C. 3060 (High Ct., Ch. Div. 2003), ¶¶ 10, 17.
317. Glaxo Group Ltd. v. Dowelhurst Ltd., [2004] E.T.M.R. 39 (2003), ¶¶ 66-76. Only
one percent of the packages had actually been sold to a buyer in Africa, namely the
packages involved in the access program.
318. Id. ¶ 39.
319. Id. ¶¶ 66-76. On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the Deputy Judge’s rulings on
summary judgment, permitting the trial to proceed on the question of compliance with EU
rules for pharmaceutical parallel trade. Glaxo Group Ltd. v. Dowelhurst Ltd., [2004]
E.W.C.A. Civ. 290 (App. Ct., Civ. Div., 2004). Specifically, the Court of Appeals upheld the
exhaustion rule on 100% of the packages rather than just 99%. Id. ¶¶ 30-40.
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320

were destined for a charitable access program. Legal European parallel
traders were led to believe the drugs had been lawfully placed into
European commerce. Indeed, the defendant suggested that Glaxo did so
321
deliberately in order to generate the resulting publicity. Within three
weeks of the Glaxo diversion story, the European Commission announced
322
plans to issue a regulation to curb such diversions. The 2003 Council
Regulation promptly required many modifications to packages and pills
323
destined for essential access programs.
The only other major media report of diversion of essential access
drugs was in Forbes in April 2004, noting allegations of diversion in
324
Indonesia, Chile, and Lebanon. This story parroted PhRMA’s spin on the
2002 Glaxo case in Europe, but failed to mention any of the facts from the
Dowelhurst case discussed above. The source of the report in Indonesia
was a survey in Jakarta by a respected local health group, which found
many donated drugs being either sold on the black market in Jakarta or
available in the public health clinics for a price in excess of the statutory
325
maximum. This is a simple case of local corruption, and there is no
evidence that the drugs were leaving the immediate market. This situation
might be regrettable, but it is not dysfunctional arbitrage; it does not
replace commercial markets in the high income countries. Similar local
326
diversions occur in the United States. The reports from Chile and
Lebanon are sourced exclusively from local affiliates of PhRMA. Neither
report was substantiated; nor do they suggest dysfunctional arbitrage as
opposed to local movement of drugs within low or medium income
countries. In sum, empirical evidence to date does not indicate a sizable

320. Glaxo Group Ltd, [2004] E.T.M.R. at ¶¶ 46-50.
321. Id. ¶¶ 51-53.
322. EU/WTO – Plan to Curb Illicit Medicines Trade, EUR. REP., Oct. 26, 2002.
323. At present, the European Union Council Regulation only applies to “tiered price”
pharmaceutical exports to seventy-six listed developing and least-developed countries and
to “HIV/AIDS, malaria, tuberculosis and related opportunistic diseases” (a limitation which
should be amended following Cancun). The European Union defines a “tiered price”
pharmaceutical as being offered to the poor for either direct manufacturing cost plus no
more than fifteen percent or at less than twenty-five percent of the OECD weighted average
ex-factory price. Council Regulation 953/2003 To Avoid Trade Diversion into the European
Union of Certain Key Medicines, art. 7, 2003 O.J. (L 135/6) art. 3(a) [hereinafter Council
Regulation 953/2003].
324. Richard C. Morais, “Pssst . . . Wanna Buy Some Augmentin?,” FORBES 2000, Apr. 12,
2004, http://forbes.com/forbes/2004/0412/112_print.html.
325. Id.
326. Judd, supra note 303.
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arbitrage market in ARVs from low income countries into the high income
countries.
b. Measures To Hinder Dysfunctional Arbitrage
Possible reasons for the dearth of empirical evidence of dysfunctional
pharmaceutical arbitrage include moral and legal sanctions within high
income market countries. The impact of these norms is significant in
pharmaceutical arbitrage markets. When pharmaceutical arbitrage is
unmistakably legal, it flourishes, even at low differential pricing ratios. For
example, the EU follows the “community exhaustion” rule, permitting
parallel trade in patented and trademarked products within the European
Economic Area. Differential pricing ratios of less than 2:1 have been
sufficient to create a multi-billion euro legal arbitrage market within the
327
EU,
subject to complex rules on repackaging and trademark
infringement devised by the European Commission and the European
328
Court of Justice.
In the European Union, illegal pharmaceutical
329
arbitrage is rarely observed.
Canada provides a contrasting example. Pharmaceutical arbitrage
from Canada to the United States operated for years under legal
ambiguity. Proponents touted the enhanced consumer access. The pricing
differential is less than 2:1, but the arbitrage market now is in the range of
330
$600 million to $1.1 billion a year.
So the first imperative is to prevent any legal or moral uncertainty
concerning dysfunctional arbitrage. At a minimum, diversion of drugs
intended for the poor to high income country markets should be clearly
illegal. The European Union, for example, promptly moved in this
331
direction following media reports of the Glaxo diversion. The United
States should follow suit.
The second task is to modify the product to resist substitutability. The

327. PETER WEST & JAMES MAHON, BENEFITS TO PAYERS AND PATIENTS FROM PARALLEL TRADE
(York Health Econ. Consortium, Working Paper, 2003) (estimating direct savings of 631
million in 2002 from legal pharmaceutical arbitrage (parallel trade) within the EU)
(funded by a grant from European parallel traders). But see KANAVOS ET AL., supra note 54, at
15-16 (finding meager benefits to consumers from parallel pharmaceutical trade) (funded
by an unrestricted grant from Johnson & Johnson).
328. For a recent discussion, see Boehringer Ingelheim KG v. Swingward Ltd., [2004]
E.T.M.R. 65 (2004), 2004 WL 343819, at ¶¶ 3-17.
329. See supra Subsection II.A.1.
330. See infra Subsection II.B.2.
331. See Council Regulation 953/2003, supra note 323, art. 7.
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pharmaceutical manufacturing process could be altered to create multiple
versions of any prescription drug, distinguished by radically different
colors, shapes, names, sizes, and packaging. Markets must be segmented
into commercial and charitable markets, and never the twain shall meet.
The Cancun General Council Decision addresses this issue: Exporting
countries must clearly identify the products through labeling or marking
332
and through special coloring or shaping. The EU Council Regulation
333
follows this tact. GlaxoSmithKline and others are complying, altering
334
both the packaging and the color of the product. These steps will
eliminate the flow of improperly diverted essential access medicines
through legal distribution channels such as parallel traders and
distribution companies.
Third, the manufacturer also has the responsibility to deliver the
essential medicines to a reputable supply chain located outside of the
United States or European Union, in order to avoid domestic exhaustion.
Fourth, consumers in high income markets can be persuaded to resist
substitution. Advertising could be directed to commercial market
consumers, warning them never to take the red pills with labels in Swahili.
This should not be an implicit safety warning that “those pills may not be
safe,” since Africans will be told exactly the opposite: “The red pills are safe
335
and effective.” Advertising should describe diversion as a moral and legal
issue: High income patients who take pills intended for impoverished
336
Africans are stealing from the poor. Under the European Union Council
Regulation, all covered pharmaceuticals exported from the European
Union will bear a special logo identifying the product as destined for the
337
poor. In addition, domestic law within the high income countries should
criminalize the practice.
The final front for anti-diversion measures is the borders of the high
income countries. Pharmaceutical arbitrage may become dysfunctional
332. Cancun General Council Decision, supra note 137, ¶ 2(b).
333. See Council Regulation 953/2003, supra note 323, art. 7, ¶ 10. While the Council
Regulation addresses importation in luggage for personal use, similar to the U.S. personal
importation rule, it does not address (but probably covers) Internet sales. Id. art.10, ¶ 13,.
Seized product may be used for humanitarian purposes. Id. ¶14.
334. GLAXOSMITHKLINE PLC, 2003 ANNUAL REPORT, Form 20-F, at 29.
335. Vertical product differentiation based on quality is common in some products
(regular versus premium gasoline), but is probably untenable in pharmaceuticals.
336. If the arbitraged drugs were voluntarily sold rather than stolen, then the moral
claim weakens.
337. Council Regulation 953/2003, supra note 323, 2003 O.J at art. 7. The logo is found
in Annex V of the regulation.
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only when diversion occurs from low or middle income markets to high
income markets. Trade among or between low and middle income markets
338
is not dysfunctional. Thus, the key moment to control dysfunctional
arbitrage is at the border of high income countries, not at the border of
the exporting country. These protections can be put into place
immediately by high income countries and do not depend upon reaching
a multilateral agreement at the WTO. Furthermore, the high income
countries possess the resources and infrastructure to make interdiction a
reality. Indeed, the absence of observed dysfunctional arbitrage may well
be a result of the border controls over the entry of drugs that many high
income countries enjoy.
c. Low and Middle Income Markets Should Not Bear the Burden of
Anti-Diversion Measures
The most striking aspect of these anti-diversion measures is that the
responsibility for all of them logically rests upon the manufacturers and
high income markets. None of the five measures require expenditure by
low or medium income countries. Nevertheless, when PhRMA companies
finally agreed to significant differential pricing of ARVs in low income
countries, they insisted on strong anti-diversion protections and burden339
sharing by the recipient countries.
The Cancun General Council
Decision requires importing countries to implement reasonable measures
to prevent diversion and re-exportation. “Reasonable” measures must be
“within their means” and “proportionate to their administrative capacities
340
and the risk of trade diversion.” Under Cancun, developing and least
developed countries inappropriately bear these costs even if global
341
pharmaceutical rents are supra-optimal.
Minor diversions at the clinic or patient level should not be an
international enforcement focus. Given the difficulty in setting up a source
collection system, it is unlikely that small batches or individual blister packs
without packaging will filter back to high income country markets in
significant quantities. Minor local diversions are likely to remain in the
region and may well be re-sold to other poor patients outside of the

338. See supra Subsection II.A.2.iii.
339. Gellman, supra note 150.
340. Cancun General Council Decision, supra note 137, ¶ 4.
341. If global rents are supra-optimal, these costs could be borne by the PhRMA
companies without harming innovation. Placing the burden on countries with annual per
capita health budgets of $100 or less is exceedingly unfair.
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342

current distribution system. This is not a best-case result, but preventing
this arbitrage is not an enforcement priority. The priority should be to
address weaknesses in the supply chain that allow large batches to be
diverted in a single transaction. The risk may be greatest while the product
343
is still outside of the recipient country.
Finally, the heuristic suggests that some level of dysfunctional arbitrage
may be tolerable from an innovation point of view. So long as commercial
markets are not replaced, the practice will not harm innovation. Modest
leakage from commercial markets may reduce rents, but will not harm
innovation if overall rents remains supra-optimal.
iii. Counterfeit Drugs
In the debates over essential medicines, care must be taken to
distinguish arbitrage from counterfeiting. The term “counterfeit” is often
loosely applied in a manner which conflates several categories of
344
products: safe and effective drugs that have entered the United States
improperly, drugs that are intended to be legitimate but are “sub-standard”
in some way, and those that are blatant attempts to defraud consumers by
345
selling fake drugs. While all these types of products may raise concerns
346
for consumers, I focus my analysis here on the third, narrow category—
342. This appears to be the case in Jakarta. See generally Morais, supra note 324.
343. Both conditions were present in the Glaxo case.
344. See Prescription for Danger: Counterfeit Drug Trade Grows, CBSNEWS.COM, Aug. 2, 2001,
at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2002/01/31/health/main327265.shtml (“There is no
single definition for counterfeit drugs. The may contain dangerous substitutes instead of
the real ingredients. Or they may be much like ‘the real thing’—only expired, or not
approved for sale in the [United States].”).
345. For discussion of the FDA’s definition, see Examining the Implications of Drug
Importation: Hearing Before the Senate Judiciary Comm., 108th Cong. (2004) (statement of
William K. Hubbard, U.S. FDA Associate Commissioner for Policy and Planning),
http://www.fda.gov/ola/2004/importeddrugs0714.html. See also Heather Won Tesoriero,
Fake-Drug Sites Keep a Step Ahead, WALL ST. J., Aug. 10, 2004, at D4 (describing generic
versions which were substituted for brand name drugs still patented in the United States as
“counterfeits”); Options for Safe and Effective Prescription Drug Importation: Hearing Before the
Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, & Transportation, 108th Cong. (2004) (statement of Mark
McClellan, Commissioner of the FDA), http://commerce.senate.gov/hearings/
testimony.cfm?id=1105&wit_id=3132 (discussing “unapproved, imported pharmaceuticals”
and “unsafe and illegal drugs” along with “ineffective, counterfeit” drugs).
346. See FDA, COUNTERFEIT DRUG TASK FORCE INTERIM REPORT 5-7 (2003),
http://www.fda.gov/oc/initiatives/counterfeit/report/interim_report.html (noting that
counterfeit drugs may “pose significant public health and safety concerns,” as they “may
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products which do not contain the proper active ingredient (for example,
where the counterfeit is essentially a placebo product). These “nonfunctional” counterfeits merit special consideration because of the
347
particular incentives for, and dangers of, their production.
Empirical evidence suggests that virtually none of the internationally
arbitraged drugs arriving in the United States are non-functional
counterfeits; their importation is most likely to simply violate technical
restrictions on parallel importation, FDA approval or labeling, or other
348
laws. Instead, most of the blatantly fake or nonfunctional counterfeit
349
drugs in the United States have domestic origins or domestic networks.
350
While the FDA still considers it a relatively rare practice, it is nevertheless
351
growing rapidly in the United States and in other high income markets.
In 2000, the estimated value of EU pharmaceutical counterfeiting was

contain only inactive ingredients, incorrect ingredients, improper dosages, sub-potent or
super-potent ingredients, or be contaminated.”); EUROPEAN FED’N OF PHARM. INDUS. &
ASS’NS, INTERNATIONAL EXHAUSTION OF TRADE MARK RIGHTS 7 (2001) (describing the range
of products that may be considered counterfeit by the WHO and the European
pharmaceutical trade association and corresponding concerns).
347. My point is not to argue whose definition is “right,” but to demonstrate the analysis
which is possible when focusing on this narrower category. In copyright and trademark
practice, a “counterfeit” or “pirated” copy is one that was manufactured by an unlicensed
source, but such copies are likely to be as functional as the genuine article: A counterfeit
Gucci purse might nevertheless be a fully functional and stylish purse. In pharmaceuticals,
non-functional counterfeits are, arguably, particularly likely. See infra note 353 and
accompanying text.
348. See, e.g., Press Release, FDA, Recent FDA/U.S. Customs Import Blitz Exams
Continue To Reveal Potentially Dangerous Illegally Imported Drug Shipments (Jan. 27,
2004) (mentioning many categories of unapproved drugs but never indicating that any of
them contained no active ingredient).
349. Gilbert M. Gaul & Mary Pat Flaherty, U.S. Prescription Drug System Under Attack:
Multibillion-Dollar Shadow Market Is Growing Stronger, WASH. POST, Oct. 19, 2003, at A1.
350. FDA, supra note 346, at 3.
351. The FDA estimates that pharmaceutical counterfeiting has increased four-fold in
the past few years. See, e.g., Mary Pat Flaherty & Gilbert M. Gaul, Anti-Counterfeit Steps
Drugmakers Sought; Legislators’ Goal Is To Halt Illegal Sales, WASH. POST, Jan. 17, 2004, at A11;
Mary Pat Flaherty & Gilbert M. Gaul, Miami Man Charged with Selling Counterfeit Lipitor,
WASH. POST, Dec. 6, 2003, at E1; Mary Pat Flaherty & Gilbert M. Gaul, Lax System Allows
Criminals To Invade the Supply Chain, WASH. POST, Oct. 22, 2003, at A1. These articles were
part of a series of articles on counterfeit drugs by Mary Pat Flaherty and Gilbert M. Gaul
that ran in the Washington Post during Fall 2003/Winter 2004. The Wall Street Journal has also
covered the story. E.g., Anna Wilde Mathews & Heather Won Tesoriero, Murky Channels:
Bogus Medicines Put Spotlight on World of Drug Distributors, WALL ST. J., Sept. 29, 2003, at A1.
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more than 1.5 billion Euros. The United Kingdom-based AntiCounterfeiting Group estimated in 2003 that 5.8% of pharmaceutical
352
company annual revenue is lost due to counterfeiting.
If true,
counterfeiting is a major threat not only to public health, but also to
innovation, far outstripping the limited potential damage from
dysfunctional pharmaceutical arbitrage.
Criminal enterprises are currently involved in pharmaceutical
353
counterfeiting. Counterfeiting opportunities may explain the absence of
criminal ARV arbitrage. In the illegal, nonprescription drug market,
counterfeiting is a difficult practice: If users do not get high, the product
will not sell, particularly in sales between repeat players. In prescription
drugs, however, the opportunity for counterfeiting is much greater.
Patients are often unable to tell whether a counterfeit pill contains the
correct active ingredients. It may take weeks or months to notice that
therapy is failing, and the cause of failure may not be linked with the
counterfeits. Counterfeits may be introduced into legitimate supply chains,
diluting therapy while making the counterfeiting more difficult to observe
and trace. These information characteristics enable the criminal seller of
counterfeit prescription drugs to act as if the transactions were discrete,
rather than repeating.
While obtaining arbitraged ARVs might be possible, obtaining them in
sufficient quantities would require a procurement team in the field (e.g.,
sub-Saharan Africa), with multiple diversions against alerted supply chains,
followed by repackaging and illegal reverse supply chains back to high
income country markets. Counterfeiting is arguably easier than diverting
pills from Africa: Drugs labeled and packaged to look like the authentic
licensed product (rather than distinguishable pills in packaging labeled for
essential medicine programs) can be introduced into high income country
supply chains directly. Counterfeiting dispenses with many costs. The perpill cost to produce a placebo without active ingredients may be far
cheaper than covert diversion and procurement, re-coloration,
repackaging, and transportation. Finally, it is unlikely that anyone would
bother to counterfeit a cheap generic drug. Expensive, patented drugs are
354
the targets of counterfeiters; cheap generics are not. A criminal is

352. THE ANTI-COUNTERFEITING GROUP, WHY YOU SHOULD CARE ABOUT COUNTERFEITING
14, http://www.a-cg.com/docs/why_you_should_care.pdf (last modified June 22, 2004).
353. ALLIANCE AGAINST COUNTERFEITING & PIRACY, supra note 310, at 2 (“This document
provides clear and unambiguous evidence of organised crime controlling, exploiting and
benefiting from intellectual property fraud. It is on the increase.”).
354. The examples of counterfeits in most media and FDA reports are of expensive
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unlikely to counterfeit a pill and sell it as aspirin or Triomune, when it
could be sold as Lipitor or Fuzeon. When low-cost generics are available on
a nonrival basis, the threat of counterfeits recedes.
Counterfeits, not dysfunctional arbitrage, are the more immanent
danger to both public health and PhRMA innovation. Counterfeiting will
remain an issue so long as the actual product has a high value relative to
the cost of manufacturing a plausible placebo. Taking all R&D cost
recovery out of the price system will greatly reduce counterfeiting pressure,
but so long as a placebo can be made for a fraction of the value of the
actual pill, counterfeiting will remain an issue. The Hubbard-Love R&D
Treaty thus would wipe out much of the current incentives to counterfeit,
355
by removing R&D cost recovery from the retail sales price. Likewise,
nonrival access in low and middle income countries would create the same
conditions.
Additional anti-counterfeit measures in high income countries should
include a pedigree system of tracing drugs from the manufacturer to the
consumer. A pedigree system (or the European system of parallel traders
giving notice of intent to trade) would also hinder arbitrage by making
product movement transparent to the manufacturer. Most importantly,
routine market sampling for counterfeits must be introduced, and sources
356
of counterfeit drugs aggressively traced by law enforcement.
iv. Implications for PEPFAR
When the Bush Administration established PEPFAR, it chose to largely
bypass existing multilateral institutions such as the Global Fund. PEPFAR
calls for only 6.3% of the $15 billion to be placed with the Global Fund,
357
with the remainder devoted to unilateral U.S. efforts. This move reflects
the Bush Administration’s penchant for unilateralism, even in the world of
AIDS.
The Global Fund’s procurement and supply management guidelines
358
prioritize lowest price, assured quality, and legal compliance. Grant
patented drugs such as Lipitor, Epogen, Zyprexa, and Serostim. See Leila Abboud et al.,
Fakes in the Medicine Chest; As Drug Counterfeiting Rises, FDA May Propose Changes in Sales,
Distribution Network, WALL ST. J., Sept. 22, 2003, at B1.
355. See supra note 213 and accompanying text.
356. Some steps towards an anti-counterfeiting policy are being taken by the FDA. FDA,
supra note 346, at 18-22.
357. THE PRESIDENT’S EMERGENCY PLAN FOR AIDS RELIEF: U.S. FIVE-YEAR GLOBAL
HIV/AIDS STRATEGY 16 (2004).
358. THE GLOBAL FUND TO FIGHT AIDS, TUBERCULOSIS, & MALARIA, GUIDE TO THE GLOBAL
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recipients retain flexibility in how they balance cost, quality, and access in
the local context. For example, a recipient country could choose to rely on
the WHO prequalification process as the quality mechanism on ARV
drugs, or it could choose to impose different standards based on local
collective preferences. Similar choices may be made between branded
drugs and generics.
One way to understand PEPFAR is that it inverts the Global Fund’s
ARV procurement priorities and strikes a different balance between access
and innovation. PEPFAR gives first priority to legal compliance (and
359
highest quality) rather than lowest effective cost, shunning generics.
PEPFAR requires approval by a “stringent regulatory authority” before
procurement, meaning the NDRAs from the United States, EU, and Japan
360
(the ICH), and possibly Canada. Critics attacked these standards as
inappropriate barriers to rapid roll-out. On May 16, 2004 PEPFAR
announced a new “fast track” FDA certification for generic ARVs, rather
361
than following the WHO pre-certification process. PEPFAR will impose
362
“all FDA standards for drug safety, efficacy, and quality,” even though
363
existing studies have proven the efficacy of ARV treatment with generics.
FUND’S POLICIES ON PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY MANAGEMENT (2004), http://www.theglobal
fund.org/pdf/guidelines/pp_guidelines_procurement_supplymanagement_en.pdf.
359. From the beginning, PEPFAR guidance to its field offices prohibited acquisition of
cheaper generic FDCs. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-04-784, U.S. AIDS COORDINATOR
ADDRESSING SOME KEY CHALLENGES TO EXPANDING TREATMENT, BUT OTHERS REMAIN 37
(2004). A cynic might view “highest quality” as merely a stalking horse for “highest price.”
360. Id. at 19-37.
361. Tommy G. Thompson & Randall L. Tobias, HHS Proposes Rapid Process of Fixed
Dose Combination and Co-Packaged Products: Joint Statement Issued by HHS Secretary
Thompson and U.S. Global AIDS Coordinator Tobias (May 16, 2004),
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2004/32503.htm; see also Gautam Naik et al., Viral
Strain: In AIDS Fight, Ambitious Goals Meet Hard Realities - Millions of Ill in Poor Nations Fail To
Get Drugs as Funds, Medical Systems Fall Short, WALL ST. J., July 1, 2004, at A1; Sarah Lueck &
Michael M. Phillips, U.S. Awards Grants in AIDS Battle: Disbursement Is First Part of a $10 Billion
Pledge; Generics Issue Is Unresolved, WALL ST. J., Feb. 24, 2004, at D5 (raising unresolved
questions about whether the Office of the U.S. Global AIDS Coordinator will procure
generic AIDS drugs at the lowest possible price).
362. HIV/AIDS Fiscal Year 2005 Budget Request: Hearing of the Subcomm. on Foreign Operations
of the Comm. on Appropriations, 108th Cong. (2004) (statement of Randall L. Tobias, U.S.
Global AIDS Coordinator), http://appropriations.senate.gov/hearmarkups/record.cfm?
id=221702.
363. S. PUJARI ET AL., SAFETY AND LONG-TERM EFFECTIVENESS OF GENERIC FIXED-DOSE
FORMULATIONS OF NEVIRAPINE-BASED HAART AMONGST ANTIRETROVIRAL-NAÏVE HIV-INFECTED
PATIENTS IN INDIA (2003) (background document for WHO meeting on Fixed Dose
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PEPFAR is also creating its own supply chain management system,
364
independent of The Global Fund. These efforts are duplicative and will
365
inevitably raise costs and delay treatment. Amazingly, the United States
366
funds both programs and remains the largest donor to The Global Fund.
Three aspects of PEPFAR are worthy of detailed discussion. PEPFAR
erects hurdles to procurement of generic ARVs in order to steer additional
volume at higher prices to PhRMA companies. It establishes a separate
supply chain, permitting the United States to maximize protection against
367
diversion and arbitrage. And, finally, it controls quality hoping to delay
the onset of resistance. My recommendations to PEPFAR’s administrators
are as follows:
a. Purchase Generics
The first goal is not legitimate on innovation grounds, since donor
programs do not replace existing commercial markets for ARVs. PEPFAR’s
unilateralism is not needed for innovation, but imposes American notions
of the appropriate quality-access balance upon desperately poor countries.
Innovation does not require ignoring their collective preferences for low
cost treatment under WHO prequalification. PEPFAR appears to operate
in the mode of many bilateral aid projects, as a subsidy for domestic
exports. The PEPFAR legislation requires fifty-five percent of the U.S.
contribution to be used in treatment, and seventy-five percent of that
amount (or 41.25% of the total) to be spent on ARVs for fiscal years 2006
368
through 2008. Blocking generic ARVs will funnel $6.18 billion dollars in

Combinations for HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria); Christian Laurent et al.,
Effectiveness and Safety of a Generic Fixed-Dose Combination of Nevirapine, Stavudine, and
Lamivudine in HIV-1-Infected Adults in Cameroon: Open-Label Multicentre Trial, 364 THE LANCET
29 (2004); Gregory K. Robbins et al., Comparison of Sequential Three-Drug Regimens as Initial
Therapy for HIV-1 Infection, 349 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2293 (2003); Robert W. Shafer et al.,
Comparison of Four-Drug Regimens and Pairs of Sequential Three-Drug Regimens as Initial Therapy
for HIV-1 Infection, 349 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2304 (2003).
364. U.S. AGENCY FOR INT’L DEV., DRAFT STATEMENT OF WORK PUBLISHED FOR COMMENT—
SUPPLY CHAIN MANAGEMENT SYSTEM FOR THE PRESIDENT’S EMERGENCY PLAN FOR AIDS RELIEF
(2004).
365. See, e.g., U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 359; Mark Schoofs, At Zimbabwe
Clinic, Wait Is Long and U.S. Drug Cupboard Is Bare, WALL ST. J., July 1, 2004, at A8.
366. See THE GLOBAL FUND TO FIGHT AIDS, TUBERCULOSIS & MALARIA, ANNUAL REPORT
2003 (2003).
367. U.S. AGENCY FOR INT’L DEV., supra note 364, at 6.
368. United States Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act of 2003,
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369

additional ARV sales to PhRMA companies, at a price much higher than
370
generics.
PEPFAR’s stand also diverts those unit sales away from
companies such as Cipla, another move advantageous to PhRMA
companies.
b. Do Not Create Duplicate Supply Chains
The heuristic tells us that the second goal may be legitimate: Avoid
arbitrage from donor programs to high-income markets. But the analysis is
not so simplistic. PEPFAR costs are very significant, including both
duplicated program expenses and indirect costs from delayed and
constrained treatment. PEPFAR is devoting special multi-billion dollar
371
efforts to minimize drug diversion within the recipient countries. These
costs should be balanced against the benefits of averted arbitrage. Most
arbitrage is not harmful to innovation, and modest levels of dysfunctional
372
arbitrage may be tolerable, particularly in conditions of supra-optimality.
c. Generic FDCs Delay Resistance
PEPFAR’s final goal is quality, together with the fear of
mismanagement, leading to resistance. This is an important question.
Unfortunately, it is likely that another parallel AIDS relief system will
hinder the uniform management of the disease. A parallel system further
complicates treatment in the field and confuses providers. Resistance must
be managed globally. Furthermore, if PEPFAR’s primary goal is the
avoidance of resistance, it should not erect barriers to Triomune and other
FDCs, which are the first-line treatments most effective in preventing the
emergence of resistant strains, but which are only available as generic in
FDC form. PEPFAR’s insistence on U.S. FDA standards will delay the
procurement of FDCs. If PEPFAR requires the same standards on antimalarial FDCs (Fixed-done Artesunate Combination Therapy or FACT),
the most effective treatment for managing malarial resistance will be
373
unnecessarily delayed,
despite the fact that WHO has already

Pub. L. No. 108-25, § 403 (2003), 117 Stat. 711.
369. 41.25% of $15 billion.
370. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 359, at 20; Ellen Nakashima & David
Brown, U.S. Rule on AIDS Drugs Criticized: Ban on Using Aid To Buy Foreign Generics Hinders
Treatment, Experts Say, WASH. POST, July 14, 2004, at A12 (quoting Rachel Cohen of MSF).
371. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 359, at 44.
372. See supra Subsection II.A.3.ii.
373. For a description of the effort to create FDCs for malaria in Africa and Latin
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prequalified a FACT.

374

B. Pharmaceutical Arbitrage from Canada
Pharmaceutical arbitrage is not just an issue in low and middle income
countries; millions of U.S. residents are importing cheaper patented drugs
st
from Canada and elsewhere—the so-called “Boston Tea Party of the 21
375
Century.” Drug imports from Canada should be a textbook example of
pharmaceutical arbitrage at work, as PhRMA companies scramble to
protect high-priced U.S. markets.
For the larger essential medicines debate, the most salient conclusion
from the following analysis is that pharmaceutical arbitrage will flourish,
even at relatively low arbitrage ratios below 2:1. Aggressive moves by
PhRMA companies and the FDA have not succeeded in stopping the
arbitrage. The key factor is the legal ambiguity and moral support for the
practice of importing from Canada. Institutions and human behavior
matter a great deal when neo-classical economic theory is applied in the
real world. In the narrower context of U.S. drug prices, arbitrage from
Canada seems unlikely to harm innovation, absent transparent access to
PhRMA company data to prove the contrary.
1. The Opportunity for Arbitrage
Patented drug prices in the United States are generally the highest in
376
the world. Most other OECD countries have regulatory structures that
America, see Press Release, DNDi, Malaria Patients Enter DNDi Clinical Trials (July 2,
2004), http://www.dndi.org/cms/public_html/insidearticleListing.asp?CategoryId=166&
SubCategoryId=167&ArticleId=301&TemplateId=1;
and
DNDi,
Fact
Sheet,
at
http://www.dndi.org/cms/public_html/insidearticleListing.asp?categoryid=164&articleid=
304&templateid=2 (last visited July 18, 2004).
374. WORLD HEALTH ORG., ACCESS TO ARTEMISININ-BASED COMBINATION ANTIMALARIAL
DRUGS OF ACCEPTABLE QUALITY (2d ed. 2004), http://mednet3.who.int/prequal/. The
Artemether/Lumefantrine FDC is manufactured by Novartis.
375. Senator Joe Lieberman, Democratic Presidential Debate in Goffstown, New
Hampshire (Jan. 22, 2004), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A398752004Jan22.html, quoted in Donald L. Bartlett & James B. Steele, Why We Pay So Much for
Drugs, TIME, Feb. 2, 2004, at 46.
376. United States patented prescription drug prices are the highest of any major
market, with the possible exception of Japan. Danzon & Furukawa, supra note 173, exhibit
3. Generic drugs, unprotected by patents or exclusive marketing periods, are generally
priced competitively in the United States. Comparisons of international drug prices should
not conflate these categories. Danzon and Furukawa fault other studies for excluding
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significantly limit prices for patented pharmaceuticals. Canadian price
378
controls, including the Patented Medicine Prices Review Board help to
keep Canadian prices significantly lower than U.S. prices for patented
379
drugs. This significant differential pricing invites consumer arbitrage.
The first phase of the Canadian-U.S. arbitrage involved individuals
purchasing drugs while traveling in Canada for other reasons, such as
vacation or business. This arbitrage was usually limited to people who got
generics since they represent significant volumes in the OECD. Id. at 4. However, generics
must be excluded when calculating rents or the potential for arbitrage in patented drugs.
Canadian prices are sixty-four percent of U.S. prices for patented drugs, and somewhat
higher for generics, yielding a net differential of six percent. Id. exhibit 4; see also Letter
from William K. Hubbard, Associate Commissioner for Policy & Planning, FDA, to Ram
Kamath & Scott McKibbin, Special Advocates for Prescription Drugs, State of Illinois (Nov.
6, 2003) (on file with author) [hereinafter Hubbard Letter] (noting that generics are
generally cheaper in the United States compared to Canada). Thus the potential for
arbitrage lies in the thirty-six percent differential in patented medications, not the six
percent overall figure.
377. See ROTHNIE, supra note 66, at 491 (providing a general, but dated, discussion of EU
pharmaceutical price controls); see also DANZON ET AL., supra note 186 (noting that
pharmaceutical companies delay the launch of new drugs in EU countries with strict price
controls to reduce the risk of parallel trade).
378. Since 1988, Canada has regulated patented drug prices through the Patented
Medicine Prices Review Board, a quasi-judicial board with can bring proceedings against
PhRMA companies that charge excessively high prices. MARIA BARRADOS ET AL., 1998 REPORT
OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL OF CANADA ¶ 17.93 (1999), http://www.oag-bvg.gc.ca; Robert G.
Elgie, Canada’s Patented Medicine Prices Review Board: New Approaches, Address to Drug
Industry Association Washington Conference on Pharmaceutical Pricing and
Reimbursement: What New Variables are at Work? 3-4 (Apr. 16, 1999),
http://pmprb.com/cmfiles/sp-dia-e14NRL-482003-7465.pdf. The Board has constrained
some patented drug prices in Canada. BARRADOS ET AL., supra, ¶17.25. Since the creation of
the Board, patented pharmaceutical prices in Canada have increased only one percent per
year on average. Elgie, supra, at 6. Nevertheless, Canada’s system is not strictly a price
control or rate-setting system, but a soft reference price system with a quasi-judicial process.
BARRADOS ET AL., supra, ¶17.50 -17.56; Elgie, supra, at 6.
379. Many surveys have documented the price differential between U.S. and Canadian
patented pharmaceuticals. See, e.g., RAM KAMATH & SCOTT MCKIBBIN, ILL. OFFICE OF SPECIAL
ADVOCATE FOR PRESCRIPTION DRUGS, REPORT ON FEASIBILITY OF EMPLOYEES AND RETIREES
SAFELY AND EFFECTIVELY PURCHASING PRESCRIPTION DRUGS FROM CANADIAN PHARMACIES 79
(2003) (thirty-nine percent savings on the drugs that Illinois purchases that could be safely
imported from Canada); Danzon & Furukawa, supra note 173, exhibit 4 (noting that
patented drugs are thirty-six percent cheaper in Canada compared with the United States);
Savings Immense on Canadian Drugs, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 5, 2003, at A15 (thirty-three percent
to eighty percent cheaper for the ten most popular drugs).
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sick while in Canada, or who unexpectedly exhausted their U.S.
prescriptions while traveling. Marginal transaction costs were negligible for
those persons already in Canada.
The second phase was more strategic on the part of consumers. Some
U.S. consumers noticed the price differentials when filling prescriptions in
Canada. People living close to the border could make short intentional
trips to fill lower-cost prescriptions, with a transaction cost of a few dollars
and a modest amount of time. Bus trips were subsequently organized for
people living at greater distances, specifically to stock up on patented
medications. Politicians, particularly those from states near Canada, began
to sponsor the trips. The transaction costs for these trips were greater—
several hundred dollars and significant time—but for some consumers, the
cost savings were greater still. As consumers became more accustomed to
mail order pharmacies, repeat customers could avoid the transaction costs
of another trip and re-order by mail from Canada. Consumer arbitrage
began to erode differential pricing between United States and Canadian
drug prices.
These early forms of arbitrage were limited in several ways. Only drugs
for outpatient non-emergency use could easily be substituted. The initial
buyers were Americans who exhausted their personal drug supplies while
traveling in Canada. The high transaction costs of travel to Canada limited
the scope and potential expansion of this market. Information costs were
also significant. Canadian pharmacies did not significantly advertise in the
United States during this phase of the market. Knowledge of the arbitrage
opportunity was largely gained by word of mouth or opportune discovery.
i. The Internet Enables More Extensive Arbitrage
The Internet dramatically altered the potential for pharmaceutical
arbitrage. The transaction cost of importing a prescription from Canada
380
dropped to a small fraction of the arbitrage savings. Many Canadian
websites began to compete for the American consumer’s attention. These
factors multiplied the possible arbitrage market. The potential number of
buyers for cross-border arbitrage jumped from several million Americans
living near the Canadian border to the entire wired population of the
United States. In the last several years, the potential number of buyers
expanded again, as U.S.-based companies began to facilitate Internet
ordering of pharmaceuticals for unwired consumers, particularly the

380. For a patient with annual out of pocket prescription costs of $2000, a reasonable
amount of search costs can be justified to save thirty percent.
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elderly. Health insurers and some government officials began to
encourage consumers to acquire cheaper medicines from Canada. The
media devoted increasing attention to the phenomenon from 1999, raising
awareness amongst consumers that arbitrage was an option. A large and
growing portion of the most valuable market for patented pharmaceutical
medications is now only a click away from arbitrage.
If this process continues unchallenged, one would expect institutions
such as hospitals, nursing homes, and retail pharmacies to begin to source
381
382
from Canada. Payors such as health plans and governments are now
following suit. The State of Illinois recently recommended importing
patented drugs from Canada for its employees and retirees. The State of
Illinois estimates that $250 million of its prescription drug costs could be
383
384
sourced from Canada, with potential savings of $90.7 million per year.
385
Several other states are exploring similar programs. These state efforts
are being blocked by the FDA.
The current level of arbitrage is already significant in the Canadian
market. In 2004, the U.S. retail prescription drug market is an estimated
386
$207.9 billion. In October 2003, an FDA official estimated that three
387
million U.S. prescriptions per year were being filled from Canada,
381. United States-based PBMs are paying claims today from Canadian pharmacies,
supporting the patient’s decision to import, KAMATH & MCKIBBIN, supra note 379, at 13, as
are some large health plans such as UnitedHealth, Thomas M. Burton, The FDA Begins
Cracking Down on Cheaper Drugs from Canada, WALL ST. J., Mar. 12, 2003, at A1.
382. The State of Illinois is aggressively pursuing a plan to import patented medications
from Canada beginning April 1, 2004, if FDA approval is given. KAMATH & MCKIBBIN, supra
note 379, at 3, 30.
383. Id. at 79-81.
384. Id. at 19. This figure is based on the assumption that all employees and retirees will
participate.
385. See, e.g., Fred Frommer, Pawlenty Tries To Win FDA over on Drug Plan, MINNEAPOLIS
STAR TRIB., Jan. 16, 2004 (describing the Minnesota Governor’s attempt to win FDA
approval for a drug importation plan); Tony Leys, Vilsack Offers Plan on Canadian Drugs, DES
MOINES REG., Jan. 22, 2004 (describing Iowa’s plan); Katherine M. Skiba, Doyle Makes Case for
Buying Cheaper Drugs from Canada, MILWAUKEE JOURNAL SENTINEL, Feb. 24, 2004, at 1A.
386. Heffler et al., supra note 80, exhibit 1. This number includes only retail sales of
prescription drugs, excluding purchases of prescription drugs by institutions such as
hospitals and nursing homes. The all-inclusive number for 2004 is closer to $250 billion.
SAGER & SOCOLAR, supra note 11, at 4 & n.25.
387. Transcript of Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 127-28, United States v. Rx
Depot, Inc., No. 03-CV-0616-EA (M) (N.D. Okla. Oct. 8-9, 2003) (examination of Thomas
McGinnis, Director of Pharmacy Affairs, FDA) (on file with author) [hereinafter Rx Depot
Transcript].
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yielding an estimated arbitrage market size of $600 to $700 million in
388
2003. The IMS Health consulting agency estimates US$1.1 billion (in
389
U.S. prices) in 2003, an increase of seventy percent over 2002. The State
of Illinois program alone could add $250 million to this market,
demonstrating the potential for growth. Canadian expenditures on
390
prescribed pharmaceuticals in 2002 were CAN$14.573 billion, thus the
arbitrage market is already a significant part of the overall Canadian
market.
Unlike ordinarily fleeting opportunities for financial arbitrage, this
market is not self-correcting. Canadian prices will not increase much, given
391
government regulation; normal U.S. prices will not fall unless the
PhRMA companies agree to reduce their monopoly price. If the supply of
patented drugs in Canada remains sufficient, a permanent arbitrage
opportunity results and will persist for as long as the patent remains in
392
force. With negligible transaction and information costs, a fungible

388. While the average size of U.S.–Canadian prescriptions is unknown, data from the
State of Illinois describe consumer co-pays of at least $40 per prescription, KAMATH &
MCKIBBIN, supra note 379, at 5, implying a retail price of $200 at a twenty percent co-pay.
Recent Canadian estimates suggest a market of $700 to $800 million per year. Tamsin
Carlisle, Canada Cools to U.S. Drug Flow: Some Online Pharmacies Aren’t Filling Big Orders Due to
Fears of Shortages, WALL ST. J., Dec. 26, 2003, at A9; Tony Pugh, Low-Cost Drug Sales to U.S.
Should Stop, Canadian Group Says, PHILA. INQUIRER, Nov. 16, 2003, at A24. Other recent
studies have reached similar estimates for the size of the Canadian arbitrage market. SAGER
& SOCOLAR, supra note 11, at 4 ($695 million in 2003, based on IMS data). The largest U.S.
retail drug store chain, CVS, estimates that U.S. patients spend $3 billion a year outside the
United States. US HHS Import Task Force Urged To Curb Overseas Pharma Price Controls, PHARMA
MARKETLETTER, May 17, 2004. By comparison, the domestic U.S. prescription mail order
market was $20.7 billion in 2001. NIHCM, supra note 63, at 9.
389. Morais, supra note 324 (quoting Paul Saatsoglou, IMS Health).
390. CAN. INST. FOR HEALTH INFO., supra note 79, at 66. Precise comparisons with U.S.
pharmaceutical sales are difficult. The Canadian figures exclude sales to non-Canadians
(including cross-border Internet sales) but include institutional sales (which are excluded
from the comparable U.S. statistics).
391. PhRMA companies recently announced small price increases permitted by the
Patented Medicine Prices Review Board. Bernard Simon, Curtailing Medicines from Canada,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 2003, at W1. These price increases were targeted against drugs in the
U.S. arbitrage market. PhRMA companies are also attempting to limit the supply of drugs
provided to Canada to hinder cross-border arbitrage, encouraging shortages and retail
price increases. Id. Both actions are designed to hinder arbitrage.
392. A permanent arbitrage opportunity is also present in the EU parallel market, given
national price controls and various legal restrictions which keep parallel trade to a
manageable size. KANAVOS ET AL., supra note 54, at 136 (disproving the price convergence
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product in abundant supply, and non-responsive pricing, one would
expect a large portion of the available U.S. market to source from Canada,
limited only by the capacity of the Canadian market to handle the
393
volume.
Theoretically, Canadian arbitrage may destroy the differential pricing
system which kept U.S. drug prices the highest in the world. Erosion of
differential pricing might shift consumer surplus from producers to
consumers. American consumers might save many billions of dollars on
pharmaceuticals, greatly improving financial access. The other side of the
coin is that PhRMA companies may lose the lion’s share of their worldwide
394
profits. One unasked question is whether this process will result in suboptimal pharmaceutical rents. Supporters of pharmaceutical companies
simply assume that drug innovation will be hindered. So long as total
pharmaceutical rents remains supra-optimal, Canadian arbitrage improves
consumer welfare without harming innovation.
ii. Regulatory Arbitrage
A process similar to arbitrage also occurs between regulatory systems.
Within the United States, if one particular state imposes draconian
regulations upon businesses, the business owners may vote with their feet
by relocating to a more attractive regulatory environment. If sufficiently
important firms relocate, or credibly threaten to do so, then the state may
395
reconsider its stance and ameliorate the harsh regulations.

hypothesis).
393. A recent CBO issue brief suggests that the net effect on U.S. prices from Canadian
arbitrage will be small. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, WOULD PRESCRIPTION DRUG IMPORTATION
REDUCE U.S. DRUG SPENDING? 15 (2004). The CBO assumed that arbitrage supplies would be
successfully interdicted by PhRMA companies, capping the arbitrage at ten to fifteen
percent of the U.S. market and assumed no competitive price reductions in the United
States. Id. at 4-6. Even under the CBO’s pessimistic assumptions, the ten year savings to U.S.
consumers will be $40 billion. Id. at 8. Put another way, PhRMA’s displaced sales from
legalizing OECD arbitrage will be $40 billion over ten years.
394. Alan Sager and Deborah Socolar dispute this conclusion, claiming that Canadian
arbitrage need not reduce the profits of PhRMA companies, but their conclusion requires
that a high percentage of arbitrage purchases actually represent new aggregate demand.
SAGER & SOCOLAR, supra note 11, at 1 (“We find that if new prescriptions’ share of imports is
44.53 percent or more, importing actually increases drug makers’ profits.”). The question
will turn on whether pharmaceutical demand is relatively inelastic. Id. at 11-13.
395. The classic work is Charles Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL.
ECON. 416 (1956).
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A variation of this process is at work in Canadian arbitrage. In the
United States, pharmaceutical companies have been largely successful in
396
blocking the adoption of price controls for their products. Other
nations, such as Canada, have imposed more restrictive regulatory
397
measures to reduce prices.
One perspective on this cross-border
arbitrage is that some Americans have imported Canada’s pricing
regulatory system into the United States for outpatient non-emergency
398
pharmaceuticals. Regulatory arbitrage is at work between the United
States and Canada.
Regulatory arbitrage encourages domestic political reaction.
Constituents’ demands for pharmaceutical arbitrage has led the Congress
to pass the MEDS Act, which legalizes the process once the Secretary of
399
Health and Human Services certifies its safety and cost savings. The
certification proved to be the Achille’s heel, since HHS has refused to issue
400
the certification. The Medicare Prescription Drug and Modernization
Act of 2003, as passed by the House of Representatives, permitted
401
importation from Canada without requiring the Secretary’s approval.
The Pharmaceutical Market Access Act of 2003, also passed by the House,
402
permitted imports from twenty-five countries with effective NDRAs. The
396. The industry strongly oppose price controls. See, e.g., Sidney Taurel, Hands Off My
Industry, WALL ST. J., Nov. 3, 2003, at A14. Taurel is President, Chairman, and CEO of Eli
Lilly.
397. Many discussions of Canada’s patented pharmaceutical pricing system wrongly
assume that it includes mandatory price controls. Canada’s Patented Medication Prices
Review Board uses soft reference prices and quasi-judicial processes to regulate the exfactory prices within Canada. The Board also encourages R&D at a minimum level of ten
percent of revenues and grants special pricing consideration to breakthrough drugs.
BARRADOS ET AL., supra note 378, ¶ 17.56; Elgie, supra note 378, at 3-4. Thus, Canada’s
system is one attempt to optimize the appropriation of rents, striking a balance between
cost, quality and access, based upon imperfect data.
398. The American Enterprise Institute identifies this as a major weakness of proposals to
permit reimportation from Canada. JOHN E. CALFEE, THE HIGH PRICE OF CHEAP DRUGS
(2003), http://www.aei.org/docLib/20030715_%2315530Calfeegraphics.pdf.
399. Medicine Equity and Drug Safety Act of 2000, Pub. L. 106-387, 114 Stat. 1549A-35
(codified at 21 U.S.C. § 384).
400. Sarah Lueck, Senate Supports Wider Importing of Canada Drugs, WALL ST. J., June 23,
2003, at A10.
401. Medicare Prescription Drug and Modernization Act of 2003, H.R. 1, 108th Cong. §
1121 (2003) (passed in the House on June 27, 2003). Another bill in the 108th Congress
would have permitted reimportation from the EU as well. Save Our Seniors Act of 2003,
H.R. 2769, 108th Cong. § 2 (2003).
402. Pharmaceutical Market Access Act of 2003, H.R. 2427, 108th Cong. (2003).
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Senate version of the bill reinstated the certification requirement,
403
effectively gutting Canadian importation under the Bush Administration.
Most observers would not expect a majority of the U.S. Congress to enact
Canada’s price regulatory system for the United States; nevertheless,
existing federal law (if certified by HHS) would achieve a similar result, in
404
response to consumer exploitation of arbitrage opportunities.
Another example of regulatory arbitrage involves the efforts of U.S.
psychologists to obtain prescribing authority, currently denied to them
under U.S. law. Some U.S. psychologists direct their patients to Canadian
405
pharmacies, which accept prescriptions written by U.S. psychologists.
This practice will provide empirical evidence of the medical efficacy of
prescriptions by U.S. psychologists, a form of self-directed research.
In both cases, regulatory arbitrage focuses debate on the comparative
advantages of alternative systems of regulation. This process should be
encouraged, as it promotes competitive analysis of regulatory structures
and allows market participants to influence the debates with diminished
406
intermediation by interest groups.
403. Medicare Prescription Drug Improvement and Modernization Act of 2003, 21
U.S.C. § 804 (2000); see also Sarah Lueck, Senate Supports Wider Importing of Canada Drugs,
WALL ST. J., June 23, 2003, at A10. A subsequent administration could certify safety and costeffectiveness and begin importation from Canada without additional Congressional
legislation.
404. Henry J. Aaron, Should Public Policy Seek To Control the Growth of Health Care
Expenditures?, W3 HEALTH AFF. 28-31 (2003) (“The chances that we will adopt the Canadian
or French health care systems as a whole are about as good as those that we will join the
British Commonwealth or adopt French as a second national language. Even adopting
elements of foreign systems is problematic because important aspects of health care
financing and delivery are mutually interrelated.”). John Calfee of the American Enterprise
Institute makes the point that reimportation of pharmaceuticals from Canada is equivalent
to importing Canadian price controls. CALFEE, supra note 398.
405. Linda Temple, Who Gets To Prescribe? Psychologists Send Drug Orders to Canada, Spark a
Medical Debate, USA TODAY, Dec. 18, 2003, at D10.
406. Alvarez and Trachtman note that regulatory arbitrage may or may not have positive
effects, depending upon the condition of spillovers (negative externalities). Joel P.
Trachtman, Institutional Linkage: Transcending “Trade and . . .,” 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 77, 84
(2002) (citing Joel P. Trachtman, Regulatory Competition and Regulatory Jurisdiction, 3 J. INT’L
ECON. L. 331 (2000)). In the present case, pharmaceutical regulatory arbitrage is a response
to the existing free rider problem of national drug price regulation. This response may well
destabilize the system, and force OECD countries to re-allocate jurisdiction on drug price
regulation. Efficient re-allocation of jurisdiction is the primary theme in Trachtman’s
article. Alan O. Sykes remarks that subjecting domestic regulatory systems to the pressures
of global trade “need not be unfortunate. International regulatory competition may well
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iii. Virtual Arbitrage
The closely-related concept of virtual arbitrage involves foregoing the
actual importation of drugs, but using lower observed prices as an external
reference price, whether by government regulation or in contract. The
United States employs a virtual arbitrage system in requiring certain
discounts for drugs purchased under Medicaid, discounts which reference
407
other “best” prices. West Virginia recently established a state agency
which adopted the Federal Supply Schedule as a soft reference price for
408
drug purchases by the state. If West Virginia succeeds in lowering drug
prices, many other states will likely follow suit.
Virtual arbitrage is preferred in any situation where physical arbitrage
is acceptable. Virtual arbitrage is more efficient than physical arbitrage,
since resources are not expended in transporting products or in policing
409
against diversion. Virtual arbitrage is also safer than physical arbitrage
since the supply chain is not needlessly articulated through intermediaries.
Just as in physical arbitrage, virtual arbitrage from low income markets into
high income markets must be blocked if differential pricing is to be
410
supported for essential medicines.
Without clear data on the optimality of pharmaceutical rents, no
conclusion can be reached as to whether other forms of virtual arbitrage
harm innovation. All arbitrage, whether virtual or not, will reduce the
surplus captured by the patent holder and shift surplus to the consumer
and the arbitrageur; however it begs the question to assume that arbitrage
will reduce pharmaceutical rents to a sub-optimal level. One should not
assume that the externality is negative. It is possible that West Virginia’s use
of an external reference price retains supra-optimal innovation incentives
while dramatically lowering the state’s costs and improving access.

drive out foolish and wasteful regulations rather than undermine valuable regulations.”
ALAN O. SYKES, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND HUMAN RIGHTS: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 17
(Univ. of Chi. John M. Olin Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 188, 2d Series, 2003).
407. 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-8 (2000) (using reference prices to calculate drug prices and drug
rebates under Medicaid).
408. WEST VIRGINIA REPORT, supra note 175, at 1-7.
409. On the issue of the transaction costs of physical arbitrage, see the comments by
Harvey E. Bale, Jr., the Director-General of the International Federation of Pharmaceutical
Manufacturers Associations, in Harvey E. Bale, Jr., The Conflicts Between Parallel Trade and
Product Access and Innovation: The Case of Pharmaceuticals, 1 J. INT’L ECON. L. 637 (1998).
These claims are hotly disputed by proponents of parallel trade in pharmaceuticals. See, e.g.,
WEST & MAHON, supra note 327.
410. See supra Subsection II.B.2.
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2. Responses to Canadian-U.S. Arbitrage
The current efforts to hinder Canadian arbitrage include legal
interdiction, increasing transaction and information costs, and selectively
controlling drug supplies shipped to Canada.
i. Reducing Arbitrage Demand
a. Legal Interdiction
If transaction costs are raised significantly, at some point the arbitrage
transaction will become unrewarding and the market pressure on
differential pricing will abate. For consumers, the transactions must be lowrisk, particularly with regard to the legality of the transaction, eligibility for
411
reimbursement from third parties, and the counterparty risk of fraud.
412
In the first two phases of Canadian arbitrage, the transactions were
clearly legal under U.S. and Canadian law. The consumer physically visited
a Canadian pharmacy, presented a valid prescription, and received the
product. When returning to the United States, most Americans were not
searched or questioned about their pharmaceuticals. Even if they had been
scrutinized, the federal government allowed them to import small amounts
413
of pharmaceuticals for personal use.
When pharmaceutical arbitrage expanded to mail order and the
Internet, Canadian pharmacies and their agents emphasized the personal
use exception. Prior to 2003, federal officials did not vigorously challenge
this practice. Federal officials did not lack statutory authority to block
414
importation through the mails or package delivery services,
but
enforcement was uncommon. This lack of enforcement, coupled with the
claims of legality under the personal use exception, permitted consumers
to believe that the transaction was legal and the risk of government
sanction was small.

411. Virtual arbitrage partially escapes this condition since no additional transportation
costs are incurred, and safety issues cannot be raised. Other transaction costs may still
apply, such as the cost of observing prices and legal costs.
412. See supra Subsection II.B.1.
413. FDA, Personal Use Import Policy, http://www.fda.gov/ora/import/pipinfo.htm
(Apr. 3, 1998).
414. See, e.g., United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606 (1977) (holding that customs officials
are permitted to intercept mail for contraband).
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Beginning in 2003, the enforcement environment changed. Federal
and state officials are currently attacking Internet pharmaceutical arbitrage
on multiple fronts. The FDA is aggressively enforcing against U.S.
416
companies involved in the trade. The Customs Department has posted
417
clarifications of the personal use exception to discourage importation.
Facilitators such as the Discount Prescription Center in West Virginia have
been challenged by state Boards of Pharmacy as engaged in the unlicensed
418
practice of pharmacy. The FDA has sued regional facilitators such as Rx
419
Depot for assisting in the importation of prescription drugs. The FDA
and state pharmacy investigators have also purchased prescription drugs in
420
undercover operations. Direct interdiction would include enforcement
actions against consumers, but arresting grandparents for purchasing
Canadian Lipitor is not politically viable.
Canadian arbitrage was born in conditions of legal uncertainty, and
continues with a zone of legal protection around the consumers. In
addition, the consumers occupy the moral high ground of gaining access
to an important drug at market rates. These conditions allowed arbitrage
to take root and grow. Citizens and governments which would never
consider importing cocaine are buying Canadian drugs over the Internet.
b. Raising Information and Transaction Costs
These enforcement actions, while significant, have not shut down the
arbitrage trade. From the perspective of arbitrage, the more significant
415. Thomas M. Burton, The FDA Begins Cracking Down on Cheaper Drugs from Canada,
WALL ST. J., Mar. 12, 2003, at A1.
416. Lolita C. Baldor, FDA: Too Costly To Legalize Drug Imports, LAS VEGAS SUN, Dec. 24,
2003 (describing confiscations of illegal mail-order drugs in New York); Gardiner Harris
and Monica Davey, U.S. Steps Up Effort Against Drug Imports, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 2004, at C1;
Recent FDA/U.S. Customs Import Blitz Exams Continue To Reveal Potentially Dangerous Illegally
Imported Drug Shipments, FDA NEWS, Jan. 27, 2004.
417. U.S. Customs & Border Protection, Medication/Drugs, http://www.cbp.gov/xp/
cgov/travel/alerts/medication_drugs.xml (last visited Feb. 15, 2004).
418. The West Virginia Circuit Court issued a preliminary injunction forbidding
enforcement by the West Virginia State Board of Pharmacy against Discount Prescription
Center, concluding that Discount Prescription Center was not a pharmacy and did not
violate state law. Becker v. W. Va. Board of Pharm., No. 03-C-1237, slip op. at 11-12 (W. Va.
Cir. Ct. Nov. 3, 2003).
419. Rx Depot was shut down by a preliminary injunction granted by District Court Judge
Claire V. Eagan on November 6, 2003. United States v. Rx Depot, Inc., 290 F. Supp. 2d 1238
(N.D. Okla. 2003).
420. Rx Depot Transcript, supra note 387, at 16-40.
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element is pairing enforcement action with widespread publicity to
dampen consumer demand. The effect is to increase consumers’
transaction costs and deter arbitrage without comprehensive direct
interdiction.
Raising information costs may also support product differentiation and
421
discourage substitution.
Pharmaceutical arbitrage occurs when the
consumer considers the drugs to be substitutable. These consumers are
generally not trained medical specialists, and are unable to evaluate safety
422
or efficacy. These consumers are relying on the effectiveness of Health
Canada’s Therapeutic Product Directorate (TPD), assuming that Canadian
drugs are generally as safe as U.S. drugs regulated by the FDA. If the safety
or equivalence of drugs from Canadian Internet pharmacies is in doubt,
this assumption dissolves and risk-averse consumers are less likely to
arbitrage. Supporters of importation take the opposite tack. In October,
2003, the State of Illinois released a major report in support of importing
patented drugs from Canada. The report concluded that the Canadian
423
drug supply was actually more secure than that of the United States.
A major component of the assault on pharmaceutical arbitrage has
been to question safety and equivalence. The FDA has publicly announced
its lack of confidence in the Internet drug supply chain. Undercover
operations and enforcement activities have highlighted the seizure of
424
mislabeled, counterfeit, or out-of-date drugs. Questions have been raised
as to whether the drugs are produced and transported under FDA
425
standards of safety. Labeling issues, such as the Canadian label for
426
Accutane, have been identified. The actual source of arbitraged drugs
has also been publicly challenged by FDA officials who muse whether the
drugs actually come from Canada at all; perhaps the true source is
427
Thailand or India.

421. PHILIPS, supra note 43, at 187-200.
422. Raising search costs for these consumers should hinder arbitrage and support
differential pricing. See PHILIPS, supra note 43, at 187-200.
423. KAMATH & MCKIBBIN, supra note 379, at 11-16 (finding Canadian and U.S. systems
equivalent for most aspects, but finding the Canadian system superior in preventing the
introduction of counterfeit drugs and incident reporting for internal process errors).
424. See, e.g., Recent FDA/U.S. Customs Import Blitz Exams Continue To Reveal Potentially
Dangerous Illegally Imported Drug Shipments, FDA NEWS, Jan. 27, 2004.
425. Rx Depot Transcript, supra note 387, at 16-158.
426. Id. at 77 l. 22 (cross-examination of Melvin Frank Szymanski, consumer safety
officer, FDA).
427. Savings Immense on Canadian Drugs, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 5, 2003 (“It is not an answer
to this problem to say go buy drugs from Canada, which may be coming from Pakistan and
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At one level, these accusations prove too much. Counterfeit and
unsafe drugs are found in the U.S. market generally and are not confined
428
to the Internet supply chain. The FDA does not want to undermine
consumer confidence in the U.S. drug supply, but to distinguish the U.S.
domestic supply from international Internet sources. Thus, the FDA
opposes all international pharmaceutical arbitrage into the United States.
c. The Special Case of Reimportation
Questions about production safety, equivalence, and labeling are
reduced for a segment of this market known as reimportation. As a matter
of production efficiency, pharmaceutical companies do not build plants in
every country of the world. Many are located in the United States,
including Puerto Rico, where the U.S. government has long encouraged
pharmaceutical research and production through generous tax incentives
429
under Section 936 of the Internal Revenue Code. Many drugs produced
in these U.S. plants are both sold into the U.S. market as well as exported
to nations like Canada. When these drugs make the return trip back to the
United States, the process is called reimportation.
Concerns about production safety, equivalence, and labeling of reimported drugs should be carefully scrutinized. The Canadian government
is fully satisfied that these drugs are safe, efficacious, and properly labeled
for Canadian use. The FDA worries about errors in shipping and handling
430
from Canada to the consumer, but these questions are relevant to all
mail order pharmaceuticals and are not endogenous to pharmaceutical
arbitrage from Canada. The FDA correctly notes that some Canadian
standards differ from FDA rules and forbids reimportation solely on that
431
basis. But the FDA has not shown that the Canadian drug supply is less
safe. Rx Depot was one of the largest facilitators of importing prescription
drugs from Canada. The FDA sued Rx Depot, demanding that importation
cease. At the Rx Depot trial in October 2003, the FDA was unable to say
432
that Canadian drugs were unsafe or had injured Americans.

India and China and all those countries we have health concerns about.”) (quoting Sen.
John B. Breaux, D-La); Hubbard Letter, supra note 376 (noting one instance of a Canadian
website shipping an Indian drug).
428. ‘Lipitor’ Surfaces in Counterfeit Probe, WALL ST. J., Dec. 8, 2003, at B8; Daniel Yee, CDC:
Seniors Prescribed Dangerous Drugs, LAS VEGAS SUN, Feb. 9, 2004.
429. Puerto Rico and Possessions Tax Credit, 26 U.S.C. § 936 (2000).
430. Rx Depot Transcript, supra note 387, at 29-31.
431. Id. at 28, 76-77.
432. Id. at 138-41. But see Hubbard Letter, supra note 376 (claiming that Internet sales

287

193 ART_OUTTERSONV5

12/25/2004 4:45 PM

YALE JOURNAL OF HEALTH POLICY, LAW, AND ETHICS

V:1 (2005)

The most thorough recent analysis of this question concludes that the
Canadian drug supply is actually safer on balance than that of the United
States. The State of Illinois report recommends a controlled importation
system, with extensive safety checks, that results in a high quality drug
433
supply at substantial savings. The EU has many years of experience with
434
parallel trade in pharmaceuticals, without significant safety issues.
ii. Reducing Arbitrage Supply
Each arbitrage transaction lowers the average price. If the supply or
demand of product available for arbitrage can be limited, the net financial
impact on the producer will be less severe. In European markets, PhRMA
435
companies successfully restrict supply to curb parallel trade. Conversely,
theory suggests that if supply and demand are unlimited, differential
pricing will disappear and a new equilibrium price will prevail in both
markets, shifting surplus from the producer to the consumer.
a. Targeting Canadian Internet Pharmacies
Pharmaceutical companies have identified Canadian pharmacies that
sell to the United States market. These pharmacies have been threatened
436
with a refusal to deal unless the cross-border sales cease. This threat not
only cuts off the supply for the patented drugs being arbitraged, but it also
uses the entire product line as a weapon to enforce differential pricing.
This strategy may not wholly prevent arbitrage. Some doubt the
437
effectiveness and legality of attempts to restrict supply to Canada.
from Canada will be more open to counterfeiting).
433. KAMATH & MCKIBBIN, supra note 379, at 1-5.
434. WEST & MAHON, supra note 327.
435. Janice Haigh, Parallel Trade: What Next?, 9 PHARMA PRICING & REIMBURSEMENT 295,
297-98 (2004).
436. Tamsin Carlisle, Pfizer Pressures Canadian Sellers of Drugs to U.S., WALL ST. J., Jan. 14,
2004, at A6; Tamsin Carlisle, Some Online Pharmacies Aren’t Filling Big Orders Due to Fears of
Shortages, WALL ST. J., Dec. 26, 2003, at A9; John O’Connor, Canadians Warn of Rx Shortage,
CHI. SUN-TIMES, Nov. 13, 2003, at 18; Tony Pugh, Low-Cost Drug Sales to U.S. Should Stop,
Canadian Group Says, PHILA. INQUIRER, Nov. 16, 2003, at 18. Similar restrictions have been
employed for many years to hinder parallel trade in Europe, Maskus & Ganslandt, supra
note 55, at 69-70, with limited effectiveness, WEST & MAHON, supra note 327. For the effects
of the same tactic on a national level, see DANZON ET AL., supra note 186.
437. KAMATH & MCKIBBIN, supra note 379, at 22 (“[W]e do not feel the manufacturers[’]
rhetoric to restrict supply will ever materialize either broadly or consistently, and not at all
in the Canadian pharmacies that are hybrid—internet and retail—for two reasons. First,
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Members of Congress have asked the United States Attorney General to
438
investigate whether antitrust laws are being violated, and traditional
Canadian pharmacies are complaining about the impact of drug company
439
restrictions on their domestic operations.
Canadian pharmacies will still be able to purchase drugs for export but
will be forced to purchase through intermediaries. Expenses and marginal
cost are likely to rise, but given the significant price differentials between
the United States and Canada, arbitrage opportunities will remain.
Perverse effects should also be noted. By cutting off direct supplies to
exporting pharmacies, the pharmaceutical companies force additional
intermediaries into the supply chain, which increases safety and handling
problems, increases inefficiencies, and increases the opportunity for
440
spoilage and introduction of counterfeits. If the concern is truly for
patient safety, supply restrictions are a crude and counterproductive tool.
b. Reducing Demand in the United States with a Medicare
Prescription Drug Benefit
Pharmaceutical companies also restrict demand in the United States.
The current market is mostly non-emergency outpatient drugs. For the
Medicare population, these drugs have historically not been covered. In
2003, the U.S. Congress for the first time passed a Medicare prescription
drug act, as PhRMA reversed its historic opposition and embraced a
market-based third party reimbursement plan in Medicare for outpatient
441
drugs. The new Medicare drug benefit will reduce consumer demand for

limiting supply to Canadian pharmacies may risk their Canadian patent protection; second,
as the Minnesota Attorney General and Illinois Attorney General are currently investigating
any concerted effort by the pharmaceutical companies to limit supply may violate U.S.
antitrust laws.”).
438. Gardiner Harris, Some in Congress Seek Inquiry over Drug Supply to Canada, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 1, 2003, at C2.
439. Carlisle, supra note 436; O’Connor, supra note 436; Pugh, supra note 436.
440. KAMATH & MCKIBBIN, supra note 379, at 11-18 (explaining that Canada’s drug
distribution system does not rely on intermediates to the same extent as the U.S. system and
that increasing reliance on intermediates increases the risk of counterfeit drugs).
441. Prescription Drug and Medicare Improvement Act of 2003, 42 U.S.C.A § 1395, 13951430 (West 2004). This plan also sows the seeds of future government price controls. Once
the federal government becomes the payor, price increases are directly translated into
budget issues. Medicare providers such as physicians and hospitals were once paid on a feefor-service market basis; after years of budgetary issues, Medicare now imposes price
controls and rate setting for physician and hospital services. Pharmaceuticals may well
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arbitrage in an important population and thus support differential pricing.
3. Implications of Optimality for Canadian-U.S. Arbitrage
Mindlessly blocking pharmaceutical arbitrage between high income
countries needlessly sacrifices cost and financial access on the altar of
quality. Wonder drugs are useless if they are too expensive to be taken as
prescribed. The government’s regulatory power should not be used to
force consumers into grey markets.
The United States should permit functional pharmaceutical arbitrage,
particularly with countries with NDRAs similar to the FDA. Regulatory
resources would be devoted to coordination with these governments to
ensure the integrity of the supply chain. PhRMA companies bemoan this
approach as destructive of long-term research incentives. This is an overly
simplistic assessment, for it assumes that pharmaceutical rents would be
sub-optimal at undifferentiated high income market prices. If, in fact,
Canadian prices are supra-optimal, then Canada is not free riding on
442
American R&D. Optimal pharmaceutical rents would be achieved at
prices between current U.S. and Canadian prices. PhRMA companies
would be able to compensate for reduced unit prices by increasing volume.
If Canadian prices currently result in supra-optimal pharmaceutical
rents, then extending Canadian prices to the United States will do no
harm to innovation. This astonishing possibility would greatly reduce U.S.
pharmaceutical access issues without any decline in innovation. Price
controls in Canada do not appear to have stifled innovation, as Canadian
443
pharmaceutical R&D is robust and growing. If optimality lies somewhere
between U.S. and Canadian prices, then U.S. prices could be decreased by
some amount without harming innovation. Modest levels of arbitrage and
additional price transparency may achieve this result.
Finally, the Canadian experience suggests that PhRMA companies will
react to reduced unit prices by stimulating demand for their products. In
Canada, despite stable to declining Canadian unit prices for patented
pharmaceuticals, national drug expenditures per capita have been rising

follow the same trend line.
442. See Kevin Outterson, Free Trade Against Free Riders, 9 PHARMA PRICING &
REIMBURSEMENT 254-55 (2004).
443. BARRADOS ET AL., supra note 378, ¶ 17.11 (noting that Canadian drug companies
agreed to increase R&D to ten percent of sales by the end of 1996). For current data on
Canadian pharmaceutical R&D, see Rx&D, at http://www.canadapharma.org (the official
trade association website).
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by 10.2% annually.
Companies increase their profits in declining unit
445
446
price markets by increasing unit sales and by developing new drugs. If
profits are stable or increasing, innovation is not harmed. It may be
possible to reduce prices, increase access and improve human health
simultaneously—the Holy Grail of health policy.
The major barrier to empirically proving any of these three conditions
is the lack of independent and reliable data on actual R&D expenditures
and profits. Erosion of the high income market internal differential
pricing system would put the ball in PhRMA companies’ court to
demonstrate whether the resulting pharmaceutical rents were globally suboptimal. For perhaps the first time, these decisions could be made on the
basis of actual data rather than imprecise estimates and secret company
data.
CONCLUSION
The head of the U.S. global AIDS effort, Ambassador Randall Tobias,
is the former CEO of Eli Lilly & Co. When asked about the essential
medicines access issue, he claimed it was “yesterday’s issue” and that “from
447
a price point of view, there’s no longer that much difference.” I beg to
differ. Not only are ARVs still not widely available at marginal cost in
developing countries, but drug pricing remains unaffordable for other
global diseases such as cancer and heart disease in low and middle income
markets. The industry prefers to turn off the media spotlight and assume
that access problems were adequately addressed at Doha and Cancun, or
will be dealt with by PEPFAR. Meanwhile, global public health catastrophes
continue to mount. For some of these conditions, we possess effective
therapies that can be provided on nonrival terms but are withheld from
the poor because of fears of inadequate pharmaceutical rents.
Health care public policy should not be chained to innovation; it must
also champion access, whether in Africa or Akron. The theory and praxis
of pharmaceutical arbitrage suggests that pharmaceutical access may be
greatly improved, at a modest cost, without damaging optimal innovation.
444. CAN. INST. FOR HEALTH INFO., supra note 79, fig.18 (reporting, based on 2002 data,
the stable to declining Patented Medicine Price Index since the introduction of the
Patented Medicine Prices Review Board).
445. Id. fig.14 (reporting annual growth rate of per capita prescribed drug expenditures
of 10.2% from 1997-2000).
446. Id. at 33-43.
447. Robin Wright, A CEO To Direct the AIDS Battle: Former Eli Lilly Chief Comes out of
Retirement, WASH. POST, Feb. 13, 2004, at A25.
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